































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   75 
 
Figure 2.1 – Conceptual framework
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Chapter 3 – Research Design 
 
 
Research site, sample, and methodology 
 
Overview 
This chapter describes the qualitative research methodology of this dissertation.  
There are six cases in this dissertation, and each is an organizational level of analysis.  
The analysis of themes across each case will address the research questions.  Each case 
is an academic spin‐off company associated with the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere (pseudonym) in Australia.  I conducted the study from the company’s point 
of view, providing an “outside in” frame of reference regarding the company’s 
relationship with the academic community.  I visited Australia in October 2007 in order 
to conduct some preliminary investigation into this research site and topic and to 
ascertain the feasibility of the study. 
Data consist of two primary categories – interviews and company documents.  
There are a total of 18 interview respondents spread among the six companies.  
Respondents consist of a mix of company scientists, company officials, and venture 
capital professionals.  I conducted 15 interviews at respondents’ worksites in Australia 
during a four‐week time period during November‐December 2008.  I conducted three 
additional interviews by phone during July‐August 2009 with individuals I was unable to  
 
 77 
meet in person during my fieldwork.  Additionally, I analyzed a total of 287 company 
documents across all six companies for the purpose of building richness and deeper 
context in the development of each case.   
This dissertation adheres to the tenets of inductive theory‐building rather than 
deductive theory‐testing.  The scope of this project lends itself to mid‐level theorizing as 
it explores academic spin‐off companies through the intersection of several theories and 
concepts.  Through a combination of these various theories and concepts as well as the 
richness of qualitative data, this dissertation will conclude with propositions and 
directions for future research. 
 
Research site 
My sample will consist of spin‐off companies that were established in some 
connection with the University of the Southern Hemisphere in Australia – a university 
and surrounding regional innovation system that makes an appropriate site for 
answering the proposed research questions.  The University of the Southern 
Hemisphere is a large institution with over 40,000 students and a sizable research 
budget. 
Australia is the leading center for biotechnology and life sciences research in the 
Asia‐Pacific region (Gilding, 2008; Herpin, Karuso, and Foley, 2005), although anecdotal 
evidence suggests that Australia faces competitive pressures from Singapore in retaining 
this title.  The presence of biotechnology and life sciences is a strong barometer for 
academic entrepreneurship and university‐industry knowledge transfer.  Research in 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these disciplines is often regarded as sitting at the leading edge of technology transfer 
and academic research commercialization activities, and these disciplines are some of 
the most influential academic disciplines to industry (Mowery, 2007; Shane, 2005; 
Powell and Owen‐Smith, 1998).  Regions that show promise in biotech are likely to also 
show promise in other entrepreneurial industries.  Thus the selection of a region that is 
relatively strong in biotech and life sciences is likely to yield multiple opportunities for 
research on academic entrepreneurship.  Ten of twenty new Australian biotech firms 
created in 2004‐05 were spun off from universities, and in 2004, two‐thirds of Australian 
biotech companies were based on university research either in whole or in part 
(Marceau, 2007). 
Much of Australia’s economic growth is occurring in small to medium‐sized 
enterprises, or firms (SMEs) (Group of Eight, 2005).  SMEs yield the most innovative 
outcomes when they participate in knowledge‐sharing cooperative networks 
(Mohannak, 2007).  SMEs are increasingly interested in acquiring capabilities and long‐
term relationships more so than simply acquiring raw technologies.  Academic spin‐off 
companies, like other entrepreneurial ventures, are usually SMEs in the early phases of 
their existence.  There are a total of 30 such companies that have founding ties with the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere. 
Australia is an interesting place in which to conduct this research.  In the context 
of today’s rapidly changing and globalising economy, geographic place – and the high 
quality human and intellectual capital embedded within such places – matters in the 
modern creative economy (Florida, 2009; Lee, Florida, and Acs, 2004).  Florida argues 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that mega‐regions in various worldwide locales house a variety of respective knowledge 
hubs that connect to other hubs on a global scale.  Australia’s geographic isolation 
physically constrains the size of its domestic hubs, but its isolation does not restrict the 
connectedness of its hubs to the rest of the world.  As discussed in chapter two of this 
dissertation, the navigation of geographic space is an important aspect of the study of 
academic spin‐off companies, and Australia’s location provides an interesting 
geographic starting point. 
Australia is an interesting example of recent trends in the global scope of 
knowledge development.  Universities and the people associated with them form local 
knowledge hubs, as is the case with the University of the Southern Hemisphere and the 
clustering of companies near its campus.  Yet this local hub connects to other networks 
in other corners of the world.  The academic community is one of the important means 
through which this connectedness is possible.  Scientists attend conferences all over the 
world, form connections with one another, and collaborate across these long distances 
on a variety of projects.  Thus, a dissertation that explores the access, creation, and 
transfer of knowledge from the perspective of cases that originate in an isolated region 
of the world can offer rich conclusions about the global aspects of knowledge flow. 
The Australian innovation system is gaining international recognition.  Florida 
(2004) writes that Australia is fast becoming a global center for creativity and 
innovation, and it ranks ahead of the United States on metrics that define a national 
profile of creativity and innovation.  He attributes this trend in part to an investment in 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higher education and an ability to attract creative foreign talent (this foreign talent is 
even being attracted away from the U.S.).   
 
Research sample 
I selected the University of the Southern Hemisphere as a starting point for the 
selection of university‐based spin‐off companies because of the presence of many life 
sciences companies in the surrounding region.  I subsequently used the university 
technology transfer office to narrow my selection.  Nicolaou and Birley (2003) used a 
similar collaborative approach with the technology transfer office at the Imperial 
College of London in the identification of their sample for their study of academic 
inventors and start‐up companies.  Likewise, Shane and Stuart (2002) received the 
names and related data of all MIT‐based start‐up firms from the MIT technology transfer 
office. 
University Enterprises Pty Ltd. (pseudonym) is the university’s technology 
transfer office.  It is a private company that is wholly owned by the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere.  University Enterprises was established in 2003.  University 
Enterprises was established as part of the university’s effort to be more proactive in the 
commercialization of research.  Prior to the establishment of University Enterprises, 
research commercialization was mostly reactive in that a researcher would approach 
the university’s research office for assistance in the commercialization process.  The 
establishment of University Enterprises denotes an effort to institutionalize research 
commercialization.  The next chapter in this dissertation will offer a more detailed 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description of University Enterprises and its role within the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere community. 
University Enterprises has a total of 30 companies in its portfolio, which includes 
companies it actually helped found after the office was organized in 2003 as well as 
companies that self‐founded or founded with little university involvement.  Each of the 
30 companies has some intellectual connection to the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere.  With the exception of one firm that the university helped launch in 1978 
before it routinely engaged in such commercialization efforts, each firm was launched in 
1997 or later.  Twenty‐five of the 30 companies were launched in 2001 or later.  Twenty 
of the 30 companies can be classified under the biotechnology or medical technology 
industries.  The other industries represented in the University Enterprises portfolio are 
software (4 companies), materials (2 companies), imaging (1 company), audio 
technology (1 company), mining technology (1 company), and food technology (1 
company).  Six companies are publicly traded, and the remaining 24 are privately held.  
Each of the publicly traded companies was founded in 2001 or earlier.   
I received the list of spin‐off companies from the director of University 
Enterprises.  During an exploratory visit to Australia in October 2007, I visited the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere and met with the director of University 
Enterprises in order to learn about the organization of the office and the companies in 
its portfolio.  My visit to the University of the Southern Hemisphere enabled me to 
secure the support of University Enterprises in that the director agreed to provide me 
with any needed informational resources as well as any needed support in gaining 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access to the individuals affiliated with the spin‐off companies.  However the University 
of the Southern Hemisphere was in no way “engaged” in my research.  This study was 
designed in order to minimize any undue influence by the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere or University Enterprises.  There was no agenda on my part or on the part 
of the University of the Southern Hemisphere to influence the findings of this study. 
Before beginning the interview portion of the data collection, I engaged in some 
preliminary background investigations on each company in my sample in order to 
familiarize myself with each one.  During this process, I sought clarification on some of 
this background from the director of University Enterprises.  This background 
investigation was critical in both determining my sample and arriving prepared and 
knowledgeable at my interviews (Hammer and Wildavsky, 2003). 
Initial background investigation on each of the 30 companies in the University 
Enterprises portfolio indicates a high level of collaborative activity in the founding and 
continual operation of each venture.  Many companies emerged from a variety of 
collaborative research efforts.  Some companies emerged from research conducted by 
an established research lab in a given department at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere.  Other companies emerged from research conducted across multiple 
departments within the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  And some companies 
emerged from research conducted by researchers at multiple organizations.  
I selected six companies from the 30 companies in the University Enterprises 
portfolio.  The selection of companies from the same university enables me to control 
for such factors as the university culture, norms, policies, and agendas as much as 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possible.  Each of the companies in my sample is a biotechnology company, a medical 
technology company, or a company with business interests in at least one of these 
industries.  Medical technology and biotechnology are interdependent industries in the 
life sciences that thrive on complementary knowledge.  These industries contribute to a 
common regional economic capability (Brink, Dahlander, and McKelvey, 2007).  
Therefore, this selection of companies is appropriate, given the context of university’s 
position as a leading biotech hub for the Asia‐Pacific region and given biotech’s position 
as a center of gravity for academic research commercialization activities.  Table 3.1 
offers an overview of the six companies. 
Table 3.1.  Sampled academic spin‐off companies 
 
 
Company name 
(pseudonyms) 
Year 
founded (IP 
origins) 
 
Basic description Company ownership 
Foxtrot 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
 
2007 (2005) Development of drug 
compounds for the 
treatment of fibrosis 
 
Private – backed by venture capital 
Delta 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
2005 (2003) HIV treatment Private – backed by private investors and 
venture capital 
 
Echo Technology 
Solutions 
 
2004 (2001) Digital pulse technology 
(medical imaging, mining, 
defense, materials analysis) 
 
Private – backed by private investors 
Beta Health 
Services 
 
1999 Computerized cognitive 
tests for the 
pharmaceutical industry 
 
Public  
Alpha 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
 
1997 (early 
1990’s) 
 
Development of drug 
compounds for the 
treatment of 
neurodegenerative 
diseases 
 
Public  
Charlie Medical 
Technologies 
 
2003 (mid 
1990’s) 
Replacement sphincter for 
bladder control 
Private – backed by venture capital 
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Qualitative case study methods 
This research topic is appropriately answered through case study methodology 
because of the inductive theory‐building nature of case study methods (Creswell, 2003, 
1998).  In contrast to theory‐testing methods, theory‐building methods fill in gaps where 
theories are missing and concepts are not fully explained.  According to my literature 
review, the subjects of academic spin‐off companies and academic entrepreneurship 
have gained recent traction in various areas of scholarship.  Some recent and related 
studies (e.g. van Burg, Romme, Gilsing, and Reymen, 2008; Mosey, Lockett, and 
Westhead, 2006; Johansson, Jacob, and Hellström, 2005; Murray, 2004; Shane and 
Stuart, 2002; Lowe, 2001) employ qualitative methods.   
Case study methodology enables me to confront emerging research with existing 
concepts, and it enables me to bridge a variety of concepts, theories, and ideas in novel 
ways.  This is an attempt to do what Siggelkow (2007) notes are one of the aspects of 
case studies – “pointing to gaps and beginning to fill them” (p. 21).  Additionally, higher 
education scholarship is less interested in this subject, and much of the complementary 
literature comes from disciplines outside of education research.  This research is 
pursuing insight into complex social processes across multiple constructs – 
characteristics that favor case study methodology (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
The study of knowledge access, creation, and transfer is the study of unfolding 
social processes in academic spin‐off companies, which appropriately lends itself to 
qualitative inquiry (Van Maanen, 1979).  An underlying philosophy guiding this research 
is based on Van Maanen, Sørensen, and Mitchell’s (2007) description of organizational 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research’s aim to “speculate, discover, and document, as well as to provisionally order, 
explain, and predict, (presumably) observable social processes and structures that 
characterize behavior in and of organizations” (p. 1145).  The literature review and the 
research questions cover the initial steps of speculation and discovery.  The remainder 
of the dissertation process will cover the documenting, ordering, explaining, and 
predicting steps. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
 
Data collection 
In order to collect interview data for each of the companies in my sample, I spent 
one month in Australia from November to December of 2008.  During that time, I 
interviewed 15 respondents at their respective workplaces.  I conducted interviews by 
phone with three additional respondents during July and August of 2009.  Prior to my 
fieldwork in Australia, I identified an individual affiliated with each company who would 
serve as my respondent and initial point of contact at that company.  For each case 
study company, I employed a snowball sampling method (Ortiz, 2003).  In each case, as 
appropriate, the initial respondent referred me to other individuals who I eventually 
interviewed for my study.  Because of the position of each of my initial respondents and 
their active status in each of their respective companies, I was able to receive “high 
quality referrals” through my sampling method (Hammer and Wildavsky, 2003).  Each of 
the initial respondents was a company scientist with a University of the Southern 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Hemisphere affiliation who played a key role in the development of a company’s 
intellectual property.   
The subsequent respondents consisted of individuals in a variety of roles 
associated with the various companies.  Some individuals were academic scientists.  
Other individuals were non‐scientists who held senior leadership roles in their 
respective companies.  During my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to interview one 
individual from each of two separate venture capital firms that have invested in 
University of the Southern Hemisphere spin‐off companies, including companies in my 
sample.  Their responses enriched my understanding of the general context of spin‐off 
companies, and they provided additional details about some of the companies in my 
sample. 
In order to gain access to respondents who were not available during the time of 
my fieldwork in Australia, I conducted three additional interviews by phone during July 
and August of 2009.  I identified one of these respondents through my snowball 
sampling methodology by using email contact to a previous respondent for a referral to 
a respondent.  I arranged the other two interviews through direct contact with the 
respondents. 
I interviewed a total of 18 individuals.  The interviews followed a semi‐structured 
protocol.  The average interview lasted 54 minutes.  The interviews ranged in length 
from 42 minutes to 81 minutes.  I digitally recorded each interview.  Each interview was 
professionally transcribed by an Australian transcription service.  I selected an Australian 
service provider in order to minimize any difficulties with comprehending the accents of 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the participants.  In order to protect confidentiality, I will refer to all company names 
and names of company officials and scientists through pseudonyms.  Pseudonyms were 
randomly generated using an online application 
(http://www.kleimo.com/random/name.cfm).  
Data also consisted of 287 company documents.  I systematically collected press 
releases and annual reports for each of the companies in my sample.  These materials 
came from publicly available online sources.  Two of the companies in my sample are 
publicly traded.  I used Australia Stock Exchange company filings to access documents 
for these two companies, which resulted in the availability of considerably more 
documents for these two companies than for the other four private companies.  The 
two publicly traded companies were also the two oldest incorporated companies in my 
sample, which led to a longer history of available documents associated with each one.  
Table 3.2 describes the break down of data sources. 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Table 3.2.  Breakdown of data sources 
 
 
Company or affiliation 
 
Number of 
documents 
 
Interviews 
Foxtrot Pharmaceuticals 
 
6 4 – 3 scientists; 1 non‐scientist 
Delta Pharmaceuticals 
 
3 2 – 2 scientists 
Echo Technology Solutions 
 
9 2 – 1 scientist; 1 non‐scientist 
 
Beta Health Services* 
 
98 3 – 2 scientists; 1 non‐scientist 
 
Alpha Pharmaceuticals* 
 
164 
 
3 – 3 scientists 
 
Charlie Medical 
Technologies 
 
7 2 – 1 scientist; 1 non‐scientist 
Venture capital 
professionals 
 
N/A 2 – one from each of two local venture 
capital firms 
 
  
*Denotes a publicly traded company 
 
 
Analysis 
 
I conducted preliminary analysis of my interview data during the course of my 
fieldwork in Australia.  I listened to each interview and took very detailed notes from 
each interview.  This process enabled me to generate specific follow‐up questions about 
each company during the interviews with snowball‐sampled participants.  It also 
enabled me to get a sense of the whole and develop a general understanding of my 
interview data (Creswell, 2003). 
My formal analysis consisted of coding the interviews and documents.  I 
approached the coding process with a simple question of what’s going on?  (Charmaz, 
2004).  The initial process of open coding led to the emergence of themes that were 
both consistent with some of the original concepts of my dissertation proposal (Yin, 
1994), and they produced new themes as well as a refined understanding of existing 
 
 89 
themes that I explored in my proposal.  I gradually reduced the number of codes into 
meaningful categories that addressed the research questions.  I treated writing as part 
of the analytical process (Coylar, 2009), often alternating between coding and writing in 
an attempt to make sense of my interview data. 
I collected documents for each company and coded them in roughly the same 
way as I coded the interviews (Love, 2003).  As with the interview coding, the document 
coding process yielded both new themes and refined themes with respect to my original 
dissertation proposal.  Because many of the documents that came from the two publicly 
traded companies were reports written for an investor audience, I approached them 
with respect to the messages that they convey over time.  I considered the degree of 
condensation within the documents to the extent that company information was 
compressed into somewhat vague language (Thomas, 1997), as is consistent with the 
press strategies of publicly traded companies.  Ultimately, I considered many of these 
public company documents en masse rather than individually, in that much of the 
company information repeated from document to document.  As such, the value of the 
large numbers of documents for these two companies is in their ability to show 
continuity and change over time.   
Crafting the literature review was also part of the research design and analytical 
processes.  The literature review was an active and ongoing part of my dissertation work 
that enabled me to enter the scholarly discourse around my chosen research topic and 
its supporting theories and concepts (Montuori, 2005).  Prior to my fieldwork, I crafted a 
literature review that reflected my initial reading of the concept of academic research 
 
 90 
commercialisation from the organizational and knowledge transfer perspectives.  In 
essence, the literature review enabled me to familiarize myself with my field and 
context of study, and it informed my research design (Boote and Beile, 2005).  Upon 
completion of my fieldwork and throughout my coding and analysis, I continued to read 
and refine my literature review.  An ongoing review of literature throughout the analysis 
of my data enabled me to make sense of the emerging themes and to ultimately craft a 
conceptual framework that would inform the reader of this dissertation of the 
knowledge being contributed through this process (Rocco and Plakhotnik, 2009; Reason, 
2008).  I treated the literature review and the writing of it as a critical part of the craft of 
my dissertation research study and the analysis of data (Coylar, 2009). 
 
Reflexive self‐awareness in the research process 
 
The reflexive nature of qualitative research 
One of the aspects of qualitative research is the involvement of the researcher in 
the research process (Goodwin and Horowitz, 2002).  Qualitative case studies do not 
follow a positivist paradigm in which the researcher is completely detached from the 
research process.  In the development of qualitative case studies, the researcher is not 
detached.  In social research, the researcher uses research tools, and they, themselves, 
become research tools (Jenkins, 1995).  Mauthner and Doucet (2003) note, “As social 
researchers, we are integral to the social world we study (p. 416).  As such, they argue 
that researchers in the social sciences, particularly doctoral students, both influence and 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are influenced by their research.  They propose the building of a certain level of 
reflexivity into the data analysis process. 
The purpose of this section is to engage in reflexive thought and a process of 
self‐awareness in order to determine my level of integration into the social world that I 
am studying.  In a response to critiques about his book, The Coming Crisis of Western 
Sociology, Gouldner (1973) reengages his arguments about reflexivity in social research.  
He writes, “The lives of all serious sociologists are profoundly linked with their 
sociologies…there were indeed men behind the theories it criticized and this, after all, 
was the central thesis of the book” (p. 1079).  In this spirit of Gouldner, I seek self‐
awareness about my role in the research in which I engage.  I do so by discussing my 
role as both an insider and an outsider with respect to the research context and discuss 
how that role will influence the conclusions that I draw from my research. 
 
Balancing insider and outsider perspectives 
This dissertation is meant to carefully integrate and balance insider and outsider 
perspectives while leaning towards an outsider mode of inquiry.  As a researcher, I am 
entering the world of academic commercialization and university‐business relations to 
some degree as an outsider.  I have never worked professionally in such a capacity.  I do 
not have an insider’s perspective on the idiosyncrasies of academic research 
commercialisation, technology transfer, or new business development because I lack 
tacit working knowledge that only a professional would possess.  I am not, however, 
naïve to this area of research.  Previous research projects and professional conferences 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have put me in contact with numerous professionals from the field.  My knowledge of 
the institutions of higher education and business provide me with a generalist’s 
perspective of university‐business relationships that allows me to make meaning of my 
experiences.  Likewise, my decision to explore such relations in Australia adds another 
degree of complexity to my outsider status.  As an American, conducting research in a 
foreign country makes me an outsider to the tacit understandings of the research 
context (i.e. Australian culture).  On the other hand, I have travelled to Australia several 
times prior to and including the time spent conducting this research and established a 
professional network within the University of the Southern Hemisphere community.   
The outsider’s perspective in scholarship affords the researcher with a 
defamiliarizing experience, which elevates the researcher’s mindfulness – or a conscious 
willingness to avoid simplified assumptions about the world (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2006).  
Daft (1983) argues that allowing room for error and surprise is a key feature to the craft 
of organizational research.  Routines and assumptions would be embedded in a tacit 
working knowledge of academic commercialization, technology transfer, and new 
business development.  This would subsequently guide my research in an overly familiar 
way and likely limit the necessary element of surprise.  Since I am beginning with some 
degree of ambiguity in this subject area, my research design is meant for my findings to 
surprise me and lead me to learning something truly new.  This dissertation is not meant 
to be so linear that it acts as nothing more than a problem solving project but rather it is 
meant to be more of a sensemaking exercise that can surprise and yield theoretical 
insights (see Weick, 1989).  It also allows me to generate a certain degree of richness in 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my case study output.  I employ my own requisite variety of theories, concepts, and 
ideas that can subsequently lead to rich insights without the clutter and bias of 
preconceived notions or assumptions about my topic (Weick, 2007). 
Merton (1972) explored the differences between insider and outsider 
perspectives.  According to Merton, “extreme insiderism” within scholarship is a form of 
“group solipsism” in which groups possess a monopoly of knowledge about themselves 
in which possession of that knowledge is a privilege unto itself.  “According to the 
doctrine of the Insider, the Outsider, no matter how careful and talented, is excluded in 
principle from gaining access to the social and cultural truth” (p. 15).  From a research 
perspective, maintaining some degree of detachment provides some level of objectivity 
in research in which myopia is minimized. 
Merton illustrates how we are all insiders and outsiders in that everyone is a 
member of multiple groups, which form an individual’s “status set.”  In this research, I 
am an insider to higher education, an insider to the vernacular of business, an outsider 
to technology transfer and new business development, an outsider to Australian society, 
and an insider to western culture.  These characteristics give me what Merton would 
describe as “crosscutting” status in that these characteristics and my representative 
status in each overlap.  My insider status within higher education, business vernacular, 
and western culture allows me to cope with my status as an outsider to technology 
transfer and Australian higher education.  Ultimately I hope to achieve what Merton 
describes as a necessary role for social scientists.  “The role of social scientist concerned 
with achieving knowledge about society requires enough detachment and trained 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capacity to know how to assemble and assess evidence without regard for what the 
analysis seems to imply about the worth of one’s group” (Merton, 1972, p. 41). 
Ultimately, this dissertation must contribute to higher education scholarship 
because of its genesis in a higher education program of study.  That being said, one of 
the strengths of higher education scholarship lies in its interdisciplinary design that 
allows for a structured blend of insider and outsider perspectives that together facilitate 
the element of surprise inherent to an outsider’s perspective with careful attention to 
the research trends of the field that an insider’s perspective affords.  This dissertation 
utilizes the outsider’s perspective on two dimensions.  From the research level of 
analysis, my position outside of the technology transfer profession and the country of 
Australia affords me the element of surprise that is necessary for yielding theoretical 
insights.  From the meta‐level, the research design of looking at academic spin‐off 
companies from the outside by talking to people from business firms about the 
university will surprise me more than if I talked exclusively to people from within 
universities. 
 
Theory construction 
 
Plausibility 
One of the goals of this dissertation is to develop theoretical propositions that 
are plausible, insightful, and surprising.  Weick (1989) contends that the process of 
developing theory is akin to the art of “disciplined imagination” whereby “a good theory 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is a plausible theory, and a theory is judged to be more plausible and of higher quality if 
it is interesting rather than obvious, irrelevant, or absurd, obvious in novel ways, a 
source of unexpected connections, high in narrative rationality, aesthetically pleasing, or 
correspondent with presumed realities” (p. 517).  When taking this approach to 
developing theoretical propositions, future researchers can presumably develop 
different follow‐up questions more easily because conventional wisdom has been 
challenged. 
Beyond the possession of some initial ideas, I approach this dissertation without 
any preconceived conclusions or anything that I am eager to prove or disprove.  
Although I begin this process with some initial ideas as well as some propositions that 
emerged within my literature review, I am open to this research process disconfirming 
some of these initial ideas.  Disconfirmed assumptions offer new learning opportunities 
(Weick, 1989).  Mintzberg (2005) writes, “Theory is insightful when it surprises, when it 
allows us to see profoundly, imaginatively, unconventionally into phenomena we 
thought we understood” (p. 361).  Similarly, Merton (1972) articulates, “You have 
nothing to lose but your claims.  You have a world of understanding to win” (p. 44).  I 
seek to adhere to Kilbourn’s (2006) assertion that dissertations should reflect ‘genuine’ 
inquiry that originates from ideas and haunches but seeks no agenda regarding the 
conclusion. 
Qualitative research allows the theory building process to yield insights in a way 
that differs from the approach taken by quantitative researchers.  Quantitative research 
uses methods to deductively validate claims made about a particular phenomenon. 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Thus, theories that emerge from quantitative research are said to represent validated 
knowledge.  However in social science research, the plausibility of a theory or 
proposition can substitute for validity (Weick, 1989).  Van Maanen, Sørensen, and 
Mitchell (2007) argue that theorizing extends beyond the striving for validated 
knowledge.  They write, “[T]he point of theorizing, when viewed as a cognitive process, 
is not simply to produce validated knowledge but, rather, to suggest plausible 
connections and relationships that have not yet been glimpsed” (p.1148).  This relates 
to the approach to theory building as suggested by Weick (1989) and Mintzberg (2005).  
The seeing of things in ways that challenge our assumptions and the use of disciplined 
imagination is an inductive approach to theory building that can be achieved through 
qualitative research. 
 
Middle range theorizing 
As a dissertation, this research project is designed to catalyze future research 
about my topic.  As a doctoral student, I do not intend for this dissertation to represent 
a culmination of sorts but instead lead to a productive research career.  As such, my 
intent is not to “crack the code” of academic spin‐off companies or propose a meta‐level 
theory of academic spin‐off companies.  My goals are more humble and more 
pragmatic.  My intent is to plausibly explain various aspects of university spin‐off 
companies with respect to knowledge.   
The goals of my dissertation research and the output I expect to achieve align 
with the philosophy of middle range theorizing.  By using this as a guiding principle in 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the dissertation, I hope to minimize what Bourgeois (1979) suggests as a conflict in the 
broader behavioral sciences.  One the one hand, theories developed at an unnecessarily 
high level of abstraction and distant from actual observations yield noncomparable 
findings.  On the other hand, heavy empiricism “carries the risk of running rampant” (p. 
443) while yielding nothing more than description.  The research questions proposed in 
this dissertation are meant to be of manageable scope, which Weick (1989) argues is 
compatible with middle range theorizing. 
Middle range theorizing is compatible with the careful management of insider 
and outsider perspective.  Using Evered and Louis’s (1981) distinction of insider and 
outsider modes of inquiry in organizational research, the aim of my inquiry falls 
somewhere between universality/generalizability and situational relevance.  The type of 
knowledge I acquire will likely fall between universal theory and praxis.  My 
methodology falls between completely detached neutrality and total immersion. 
 
Improvisation and surprise 
Creating a research environment from which one can be surprised and 
subsequently offer plausible middle range theoretical propositions can be achieved by 
practicing the art of improvisation.  On some level, this dissertation is an exercise in 
improvisation that follows from Weick’s (1998) essay on the relationship between jazz 
improvisation and theorizing.  In jazz improvisation, musicians have “little choice but to 
wade in and see what happens.  What will actually happen won’t be known until it is too 
late to do anything about it” (p. 548).  Theorizing has similar qualities in that the theorist 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uses the tool of sensemaking to see what exists in hindsight and to offer plausible 
explanations of what happened. 
A dissertation is a bit like jazz improvisation.  Like a musician’s work, a researcher 
starts with something, not nothing.  A musician may start with a melody.  A researcher 
might begin with a theory, a conflict, a conjecture, or an idea.  In this research, I am 
beginning with tenets of organizational theory that help in understanding academic 
commercialization and academic spin‐off companies as well as a corresponding gap that 
needs further explanation.  Improvisation creates conditions that surprise the musician 
or researcher.  But musicians and researchers are skilled individuals who can take that 
surprise and respond creatively with their skill sets within a disciplined framework, or as 
Weick (1998) describes as a “flexible treatment of preplanned material” (p. 549).  
Improvisation allows for the end result of that first brush stroke, melody, or conjecture 
to be different each time it is engaged.  No two dissertations are the same, but many 
originate from similar ideas based in similar bases of literature.  But each researcher is 
an artist who improvises in a disciplined way toward a compelling end product.  This 
dissertation is an exercise in these principles. 
 
Limitations 
  Like any research methodology, qualitative case studies are subject to 
limitations.  Sample size is an inherent issue with qualitative research.  I have sought to 
balance the breadth of my data with the richness and thickness that stems from 
analysing a manageable level of qualitative data (Goodwin and Horowitz, 2002). 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Generally, I sought to achieve a “large enough n” that was sufficient for answering my 
proposed research questions.  I could always add “one more company” to my sample of 
cases, or I could always try to find “one more interviewee” to increase the richness of 
the findings.  I was satisfied with my sample size when my analysis felt saturated and 
redundant and when I could offer a rich and structured analysis with the data at hand. 
Generalizability is another inherent limitation to qualitative research.  My study 
offers insight into knowledge creation in the context of academic research 
commercialization vis‐à‐vis spin‐off companies.  I sought to control certain “variables” of 
my research context by focusing my companies with activities in a shared industry (life 
sciences) and with connections to a common university.  On the one hand, this 
potentially limits the conclusions of my study to this research context.  On the other 
hand, well‐articulated conclusions from this study offer directions for future research 
and form the basis of a line of scholarship.  This is consistent with the theory‐building 
nature of qualitative research.  Additionally, this study was not designed as a consulting 
case, nor do I have any stake in the study’s outcome beyond the discovery of meaningful 
insight.  Therefore, I am not motivated to conclude with a set of best practices but can 
instead allow for plausible explanations that guide future inquiry. 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Chapter 4 – The Case Study Context 
 
 
The general context of the case studies 
 
Overview 
The case study companies to be presented in this dissertation are examples of 
spin‐off companies associated with the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  In order 
to effectively present the cases and offer an analysis of the various themes that cut 
across those cases, it is necessary to discuss relevant aspects of the context in which 
those companies operate.  As such, the beginning three sections of this chapter focus on 
developing the context for the benefit of the reader.   
The next section discusses the overall state of academic research 
commercialization in Australia with respect to overall commercialization trends and 
matters of intellectual property as they apply to academic scientists who are involved in 
commercialization efforts.  Private sources of funding are a hallmark of the 
commercialization of academic research.  As such, the second section discusses the 
overall aspects of private venture capital funding in Australia and the ways in which the 
needs of venture capital stakeholders drive the various elements of academic research 
commercialization with respect to spin‐off companies.  Finally, the third section will 
introduce the technology transfer office at the University of the Southern Hemisphere 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and discuss its role in academic research commercialization.  The second half of this 
chapter introduces the six academic spin‐off companies that are the subject of the study 
and offers the reader a general business description and scientific description of each 
company. 
 
Academic research commercialization in Australia 
Australian research universities are increasingly pursuing the commercialization 
of academic research as means to advancing the country’s national system of 
innovation.  The policies that guide academic research commercialization in Australia 
have both similarities and differences to those in other countries.  On an international 
comparative scale, the commercialization of academic research in Australia falls 
between what Harman and Harman (2004) describe as top‐down and bottom‐up 
policies.  They define a top‐down policy approach as one in which government initiative 
heavily drives innovation policy and research commercialization.  They define a bottom‐
up policy approach as one in which universities are competitive in the marketplace 
through their ownership of intellectual property.  In their paper, they describe Swedish 
policy as top‐down and characterized by government‐led initiatives that discourage 
academic scientists from commercializing their research results.  In contrast, they 
describe the United States as bottom‐up and characterized by competition at the 
university level and university ownership of intellectual property as prescribed by the 
Bayh‐Dole Act of 1980. 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The ownership of intellectual property that is generated through the course of 
academic research has been subject to a variety of shifting policies in Australia.  These 
policies have varied at the state and institutional level.  According to Australian common 
law, employers assert the right of ownership to any intellectual property created by 
employees in the scope of their employment responsibilities.  Australian universities 
have varied in their policies with respect to ownership of intellectual property 
generated by academic scientists (Harman and Harman, 2004).  In 2000, the University 
of the Southern Hemisphere transferred ownership of intellectual property from the 
university to its academic staff.  This policy was not been successful in catalysing 
innovation because it placed the burden of commercialization on the individual 
scientists who own the intellectual property.  At the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere, the establishment of University Enterprises was meant to reduce this 
burden.   
Today, University of the Southern Hemisphere intellectual property policy 
reflects several key changes.  The university reversed its intellectual property policy in 
December 2007.  As a result, from that point forward, the university owns intellectual 
property (scholarly works excluded) developed by its academic staff.  This policy differs 
somewhat from that which applies to American universities.  Under the Bayh‐Dole Act, 
American universities own the intellectual property that results from academic research 
funded in any part by federal money.  University of the Southern Hemisphere policy is 
more sweeping because it makes no distinction of ownership based on the source of 
research funding. 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Venture capital in Australia 
Academic research commercialization that occurs through the formation of a 
new spin‐off company is heavily dependent on private money as a source of support for 
the ongoing research activities that are critical for the building of successful business 
ventures.  Venture capital is the source of much of this private money.  Venture capital 
firms are private investment firms that pool private financial resources – usually those 
of wealthy individuals – and invest those resources in new companies.  Venture capital 
firms typically invest in a diversified portfolio of start‐up companies in order to spread 
the risk of investing in such businesses.  The expectation is that many new companies 
will fail within 3‐5 years of their founding, but the few companies that don’t fail will 
often lead to high rates of return for their investors.   
Venture capital is an institutionalized means of private investment in start‐up 
companies.  In contrast, some wealthy individuals will directly invest their resources in 
new companies.  These individuals are usually referred to as angel investors.  Most of 
the companies in my sample received some form of venture capital as they were 
established and beginning to operate.  Alternatively, some companies were solely 
funded by private angel investors.   
Because venture capital is an institutionalized practice that can affect the 
momentum of an academic spin‐off company, including aspects related to its knowledge 
development, it is important to discuss the general context of Australian venture capital 
as it applies to the cases in this dissertation.  In order to understand the context of 
Australian venture capital, it is important to offer a brief review of the Australian 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innovation system and the efforts by the Australian federal government to catalyze 
business growth.   
A recent paper by Lerner and Watson (2008) reviews the status of the Australian 
venture capital industry.  They cite a 2005 Australian government report, which argues 
that the nation’s venture capital industry was relatively “underdeveloped, showed low 
investment levels, a lack of capital formation and scale, and a very low number of 
investment managers with a proven track record” (p. 10).  They also compare venture 
capital data from several mature market nations and find that Australia’s venture capital 
market is relatively modest in size.  They find that Australian venture capital lags behind 
that of developed venture capital markets such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom as well as behind that of emerging venture capital markets such as Canada, 
South Korea, and Sweden.   
Of critical importance to the context of this dissertation research, Lerner and 
Watson note that the lagging venture capital market in Australia is not indicative of a 
lack of promising opportunities in academic science.  Their data shows that Australia has 
a relatively high proportion of scientific publications relative to the size of the nation’s 
population.  It shows a respectable growth rate in the number of scientific publications 
emerging from Australian universities.  However these figures, taken in the context of 
the relatively low level of venture capital investment in Australia, indicate a disparity 
between the innovative potential from academic research and the willingness to invest 
venture capital dollars towards the commercialization of that research.  In other words, 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Australian research universities are an under‐tapped market for possible investments by 
venture capital. 
One of the respondents in my sample was a venture capital professional who 
works with a firm that has invested in University of the Southern Hemisphere spin‐off 
companies.  This individual has worked in both the United States and Australia and 
commented in a way that reflects Lerner and Watson’s point about the under‐tapped 
Australian academic market for possible investments. 
Yeah, I mean one of the advantages being down here [in Australia] is that the 
opportunities [are] not as picked over as it might be in Boston or San Francisco 
so there are generally new ground breaking technologies that exist here but just 
need to be commercialized in the right way (Respondent #7). 
Similarly, an academic scientist who is a member of one of the spin‐off companies in my 
sample noted: 
Well [the region] is, from an academic perspective I might say is probably a 
world leader in medical research.  As far as venture capital, it’s pretty isolated 
really (Respondent #15). 
 
A 2005 policy report on Australia’s innovation system that was commissioned by 
the Australia Department of Education, Science, and Training (Howard Partners, 2005) 
implies that Australian venture capital is somewhat risk adverse.  They note that 
companies, which are candidates for possible venture capital funding, should fit an 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“ideal type” (p. 42) and that a disconnect exists between the ideal type of venture 
capital funding candidate and the reality of academic research results.   
Some of the respondents in my study spoke of the Australian venture capital 
community with respect to their willingness to accept risk.  One respondent noted: 
My experience recently has been that they are looking for later stage 
opportunities” (Respondent #12).   
Later stage business opportunities have a lower risk of failure than early stage 
opportunities.  Another respondent notes: 
I think that the Australian venture capital community is quite risk adverse and 
doesn’t seem to be sufficiently sophisticated enough yet to propose evaluations 
and strategies that address the inherent disconnect between what inventors are 
likely to value their technologies at, and what venture capitalists are likely to 
value their technologies at (Respondent #14). 
 
A recent policy report (Cutler and Company, 2008) illustrates another challenge 
of Australian venture capital.  The networks of Australian venture capital are not 
sufficiently linked to the networks of major American venture capital firms.  The report 
notes that this trend is problematic in the raising of necessary downstream funding for 
entrepreneurial ventures.  Herpin, Karuso, and Foley (2005) note that Australian venture 
capital firms lack the resources to provide additional follow‐on rounds of funding that is 
necessary for many of their investee companies to succeed in the marketplace.  In a 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sense, many entrepreneurial ventures, including those spun‐off from universities, enter 
the marketplace with an insufficient amount of requisite capital funding. 
These issues were evident in the analysis of one of the spin‐off companies in my 
sample – Delta Pharmaceuticals – that I will further discuss later in this dissertation.  
Briefly, a group of Australian and American venture capital firms invested in Delta and 
provided it with funding for some of its early R&D work.  Continued funding was 
contingent upon research results that satisfied the investors.  One of the American 
venture capital firms was not sufficiently satisfied with Delta’s results to provide 
additional funding, and the Australian investors did not provide follow‐on funding. 
In summary, venture capital firms provide entrepreneurial ventures such as 
academic spin‐off companies with necessary funds to conduct costly R&D and develop 
their nascent businesses.  Australia has an under‐developed venture capital industry, 
which potentially hinders the transfer of academic knowledge from the university 
environment to the commercial environment.   
 
University Enterprises – The technology transfer office 
Academic research commercialization at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere is currently managed through its technology transfer office – University 
Enterprises.  University Enterprises is structured as a taxable private company that is a 
subsidiary of the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  According to the 2008 
University of the Southern Hemisphere Annual Report, University Enterprises earned 
$7.8 million in licensing income.  A CEO leads University Enterprises and its staff of 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twenty associates spanning a variety of responsibilities.  It consists of three primary 
functions – business development, new venture support, and asset management.  The 
business development team provides a range of services that includes securing 
agreements with venture capital firms for investment in university spin‐off companies, 
representing the university’s fiduciary and investment interests on boards of spin‐off 
companies, and the licensing of university technology to existing companies.  The new 
venture support team is responsible for assisting university spin‐off companies in a 
variety of operational capacities.  The asset management team is responsible for 
managing the legal aspects of the intellectual property in the University Enterprises 
portfolio. 
The current reporting relationship between the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere and University Enterprises is complex.  University Enterprises is a subsidiary 
of UBIZ Pty. Ltd., a wholly‐owned company of the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere that is responsible for each of the university’s commercialization 
businesses, including consulting programs, and curriculum licensing.   
A three‐member board of directors oversees the CEO of University Enterprises.  
Currently, the board consists of the senior vice principal of the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere who is responsible for overall administration and management of 
the university; the deputy vice chancellor of research at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere; and the vice principal of commercialization at the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere and CEO of UBIZ, Ltd.). 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The reporting relationship between the University of the Southern Hemisphere 
and University Enterprises has changed since its founding in late 2003.  The group that 
became University Enterprises was originally a division of Southern Hemisphere 
Extension (SHE).  SHE was a separate, for‐profit, private university that was affiliated 
with the University of the Southern Hemisphere and whose mission was to enroll fee‐
paying students and engage in other commercial activities.  SHE was established in 
1998, was closed, and many of whose activities subsequently merged with the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere in 2005 under UBIZ   
University Enterprises was incorporated by SHE’s Ventures and Investments 
Division on October 29, 2003.  Prior to SHE’s disbanding, the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere purchased University Enterprises.  Ownership of University Enterprises was 
transferred from SHE to the University of the Southern Hemisphere on December 23, 
2003.  At that point in time, University Enterprises became a wholly‐owned subsidiary 
company of the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  The university’s rationale for 
the purchase of University Enterprises was the consolidation of its research 
commercialization and technology transfer activities.  As the university notes in its 2004 
annual report, the purchase of University Enterprises “has enabled a greater focus and 
resourcing of the commercialization of the University’s research activities” (p. 68).   
On June 30, 2007, the university sold its shares in University Enterprises to its 
UBIZ subsidiary company.  According to the university’s 2007 annual report, the 
rationale for this change in the reporting relationship between the university and 
University Enterprises was to further streamline commercialization activities.  The 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report’s stated goal was to create a single management and governance structure for 
commercialization activities. 
Based on the analysis throughout the course of this dissertation research, it is 
evident that the establishment of University Enterprises and the continued changes to 
its reporting structure represent a more focused emphasis on commercial activities – 
particularly the commercialization of academic research – on the part of the University 
of the Southern Hemisphere.  The spin‐off companies in my sample have founding dates 
that span almost a fifteen‐year period.  During that time, the university’s role in 
research commercialization has evolved from one of ambivalence to one of active 
engagement.  As such, the university’s role as a facilitator of knowledge transfer has 
evolved.  The interviews for this dissertation suggest that the leadership of the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere has varied in their prioritization of 
commercialization activities.   
Prior to the 2003 establishment of University Enterprises, research 
commercialization at the university was scattered throughout the organization.  The 
respondents who were involved in the founding of spin‐off companies before 2003 
generally described their experiences with the university in respect to 
commercialization activities as negative or, at best, ambivalent.  Some respondents 
described the university’s commercialization pre‐2003 processes as “a free for all,” “a 
nightmare,” and “laissez‐faire.”  Other respondents associated with more recent spin‐off 
companies generally describe a more positive relationship with the university in respect 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to commercialization activities.  These respondents were generally positive in describing 
their interactions with the staff of University Enterprises. 
In summary, University Enterprises plays an important role in transfer of 
academic knowledge from the university to the commercial sector.  In this dissertation, 
the role of University Enterprises in the development of academic spin‐off companies 
will vary from case to case. 
 
Date Event 
 
1998 Southern Hemisphere Extension (SHE) is established  
 
October 29, 2003 University Enterprises is incorporated as a part of SHE 
 
December 23, 2003 Ownership of University Enterprises is transferred to the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere 
 
2005 University of the Southern Hemisphere closes SHE and transfers many SHE 
activities to a newly created subsidiary company, UBIZ 
 
June 30, 2007 University of the Southern Hemisphere sells its shares in University Enterprises to 
UBIZ 
 
 
Table 4.1 – Timeline of key University of the Southern Hemisphere commercialization activities 
 
Introduction to the six academic spin‐off companies 
 
Alpha Pharmaceuticals 
Alpha Pharmaceuticals is a company engaged in the development of drug 
treatments for neurodegenerative diseases, primarily Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s 
disease.  The company was formally established in 1997.  Over the years, the company’s 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R&D has yielded a library of chemical compounds.  Leading compounds have been 
subject to clinical trials.  From 2000 to 2005, the company’s first major chemical 
compounds progressed through various clinical trial stages, but further trials were 
suspended because of toxicity issues related to the compound.  In 2005, the company 
launched clinical trials of its second, and current, leading compound.  In 2008, it began 
to conduct pre‐clinical testing of additional leading compounds. 
The collective work of three scientists – Marlin Guitierez (PhD), Elwood Feagley 
(MD/PhD), and Rod Pfrogner (MD) – has largely comprised what has become Alpha 
Pharmaceuticals.  Marlin Guitierez is a neurologist at a U.S. Ivy League University.  
Elwood Feagley is an Australian‐based medical researcher with a specialization in 
psychiatry who completed his PhD at the University of the Southern Hemisphere under 
the supervision of Rod Pfrogner and who did his post‐doctoral fellowship under the 
supervision of Marlin Guitierez.  Rod Pfrogner, trained in medicine and pathology, is a 
researcher at the University of the Southern Hemisphere who has spent much of his 
career researching Alzheimer’s and other neurodegenerative diseases.   
  The work of these three scientists has collectively centered on the amyloid 
precursor protein (APP) as the gene associated with Alzheimer’s disease.  The APP gene 
has been shown to have metal‐binding sequences, thus suggesting that Alzheimer’s 
disease is a disease of metal toxicity in the brain that occurs when naturally occurring 
metals in the brain bind with the protein to form plaques.  The chemical compounds 
that Alpha has developed and is testing are aimed at dissolving the plaques that form in 
the brains of patients with Alzheimer’s disease.  Alpha’s work is also aimed at studying 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these same compounds in the treatment of other neurodegenerative diseases that are 
believed to be caused by metal toxicity. 
 
Beta Health Services 
Beta Health Services is a medical technology company that specializes in 
cognitive testing services.  The company was founded in 1999.  It licenses the use of its 
cognitive tests to customers and provides them with end‐to‐end support such as the 
management of real‐time testing data.  Its cognitive tests are sold to four major 
markets.  The first is its clinical trials market in which the company licenses its cognitive 
tests to large global pharmaceutical companies for use in clinical trials.  The second is its 
academic market in which the company licenses an academic version of its tests to 
university researchers.  The third is its sports market in which the company licenses its 
tests to sports teams and sports clubs in order to determine cognitive change in athletes 
suffering concussion.  The fourth is its workplace market in which the company licenses 
its tests to occupational health professionals.   
At one point, Beta also engaged in the drug development business.  The 
company in‐licensed intellectual property associated with a Parkinson’s project and an 
Alzheimer’s project from other biotechnology companies.  Much of the work for these 
projects was subsequently contracted to scientists in external labs.  The company’s role 
in these projects was mostly project management.  The company divested these drug 
development projects in 2005 in order to remain focused on its core competency – 
cognitive test development. 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Gordon Kirts (PhD) and Lewis Caples (PhD) are Beta’s scientific co‐founders.  
Gordon Kirts is a neurologist who worked at the University of the Southern Hemisphere 
who had a secondary interest in computer programming.  As a result of these combined 
interests, he recognized the potential for computerized tests of cognition.  He also 
recognized a niche for an effective test that could measure cognitive change in people 
over time.  He collaborated with a colleague, Lewis Caples, in the founding of the 
company.  Lewis Caples is a neuropsychologist who had previously worked at the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere and was a professor at another local university.  
The two scientists initially met one another at a neuroscience conference. 
 
Charlie Medical Technologies 
  Charlie Medical Technologies (CMT) is a medical device company whose 
technology is applied to incontinence care.  The company was formally established in 
2003, however the genesis of the company dates to the mid 1990’s.  During the mid 
1990’s, a group of researchers in the department of anatomy and cell biology had an 
idea for the use of smooth muscle as a replacement sphincter.  The subsequent 
development of the replacement sphincter represents the basis of the company’s 
current core technology.  The company’s ColoNovus device is currently undergoing 
clinical trials in Australia and is aimed at treating urinary incontinence.  The company’s 
FaecalCare System is a computer‐based device that removes and disposes fecal waste 
and is used in patients who have had a colostomy. 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 The original group of University of the Southern Hemisphere scientists who were 
involved in the early work on the development of the replacement sphincter formed a 
small company called F5.  F5 secured about $1 million in funding from government and 
private sources so that they could conduct some pilot studies.  The initial pilot studies 
were conducted in the founders’ lab at the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  
After two and a half years of pilot studies, F5 needed to raise more money, so they 
partnered with a large Australian medical devices company called Gamma Industries.   
  F5 and Gamma formed a collaboration based around access to Gamma’s 
implantable electrical stimulation technology, which was necessary for the further 
development of the replacement sphincter.  Gamma was interested in the technology 
that F5 was developing.  At that time, Gamma had a technology for spinal cord injury, 
and the company was looking to further the application of that technology.  As a result, 
Gamma became interested in continence control as a potentially treatable condition of 
people suffering from spinal cord injury. 
 
Echo Technology Solutions 
  Echo Technology Solutions is a diversified technology company that focuses on 
pulse processing technologies for the rapid, accurate detection and measurement of 
radiation.  It was founded in 2004.  The company’s core detection technology is applied 
to business activities in four major categories – medical imaging, defense and security, 
minerals exploration and analysis, and materials analysis.  In the medical imaging sector, 
the company’s technology is applied to increase the resolution, speed, and accuracy of 
 
 116 
medical images while reducing patient exposure to radiation.  Likewise, the same 
concept applies to the company’s defense and security business sector in that the 
technology seeks to increase the resolution, speed, and accuracy of the cargo screening 
processes in air and sea ports.  In the minerals exploration and analysis (mining) sector, 
the company’s technology enables faster and more accurate detection of minerals with 
deeper geologic penetration and light equipment loads.  Finally, the company’s 
technology is applicable to other industrial applications requiring accurate analysis of 
materials. 
  Echo Technology Solutions originated from research efforts at the University of 
the Southern Hemisphere.  Company founder Rick Avans (ABD) started a PhD program 
in electrical and electronic engineering at the university.  His initial research efforts 
focused on detection technologies in the context of humanitarian land mine clearance.  
His research efforts initially used several detection methods, but he encountered similar 
shortcoming across each method.  Specifically, most detection methods were limited to 
either very low signal strength that yielded slow or inconclusive results, or there were 
high signal strength methods that yielded corrupted results.  His subsequent research 
efforts sought to improve the accuracy and speed of gamma ray detection.  The 
technology that ultimately underlies the intellectual property at Echo stems from the 
improved detection methods developed during his doctoral program. 
 
Delta Pharmaceuticals 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 Delta Pharmaceuticals is a biotechnology company focused on the development 
of novel therapies for HIV and Hepatitis C.  The company, which stemmed from research 
at the University of the Southern Hemisphere department of microbiology and 
immunology, was started in 2004.  The company is currently engaged in advanced 
animal studies, which are being conducted in anticipation of human clinical trials. 
  Wesley Chabot (MD) is a researcher and head of a lab in the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere department of microbiology and immunology.  In 2003, he was 
working with a post‐doctoral scientist to develop an assay system (a procedural test) for 
the measurement of a type of immunity in monkeys.  They realized that the injections 
they were making in the monkeys in the process of developing the assay were actually 
enhancing the immunity in the monkeys.  In other words, the development of the assay 
for the measurement of immunity led to a serendipitous discovery of an increase in 
actual immunity. 
 
Foxtrot Pharmaceuticals 
Foxtrot Pharmaceuticals is a biotechnology company that is currently engaged in 
pre‐clinical‐trial phase research on drug compounds that have the potential to treat 
fibrosis that occurs in such chronic diseases as kidney disease, heart failure, pulmonary 
fibrosis, and arthritis.  In short, fibrosis is the irreversible scarring of tissue, which 
reduces the ability of organs to properly function.  Foxtrot is a young company – 
founded in mid 2006. 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Members of the company’s scientific team are based at a University of the 
Southern Hemisphere multi‐disciplinary research institute known as Veritas 
(pseudonym).  Tim Holford (PhD) is a chemist who runs an organic chemistry lab that 
makes chemical compounds.  Maurice Gillock (PhD) is a senior research fellow who also 
runs a lab at the Veritas in the area of biochemistry and molecular biology.  Jerold 
Carlsten (PhD) is a medical researcher who works at a local hospital that is affiliated with 
the University of the Southern Hemisphere’s department of medicine.  Initially, Jerold 
Carlsten was working with an off‐patent drug from Japan and South Korea that was 
believed to demonstrate anti‐fibrotic qualities.  He approached Tim Holford about the 
possibility of developing some drug molecules in an attempt to increase the potency 
and novelty of the drug.  Maurice Gillock facilitated the connection between Jerold 
Carlsten and Tim Holford.  When Jerold learned that Maurice was relocating to the 
Veritas, he asked Maurice if he knew any chemists who could collaborate on the drug 
project, so he subsequently introduced Jerold to Tim.   
In addition to these individuals, Jerold Carlsten also had research collaborations 
with two other scientists who have subsequently worked with Foxtrot.  One is currently 
a clinical endocrinologist and medical researcher in Canada and a former University of 
the Southern Hemisphere professor.  The second is the head of the clinical 
pharmacology unit at another Australian research university and has experience in the 
design of clinical trials. 
  Foxtrot is the product of multi‐disciplinary science.  In general, Tim’s lab is 
involved in the development of drug compounds.  Those compounds are then 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periodically transferred to Jerold Carlsten’s lab for proof of concept studies in animal 
models and cell culture models.  The other scientists consult on matters of clinical 
significance. 
 
Chapter summary 
  This chapter has discussed various contextual aspects that will apply to the 
specific case study spin‐off companies, which will be developed in the upcoming 
chapters of this dissertation.  In summary, local aspects of the university environment, 
and broader policy and business market aspects at the national and international levels 
affect the activities of the academic spin‐off companies in this dissertation.  The 
Australian venture capital industry as well as the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere’s research commercialization efforts will play an integral background role 
throughout this study. 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Table 4.2 – Chapter summary table 
 
 Year 
founded 
(origins) 
 
Basic 
company/science 
overview 
Organizational structure and 
geography 
Ownership and 
funding 
Intellectual property Academic relationships 
Alpha 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
 
1997 
(early 
1990’s) 
 
Development of drug 
compounds for the 
treatment of 
neurodegenerative 
diseases 
 
13 local employees; current and 
past clinical trial sites in 
Australia, Boston, London, and 
Uppsala (Sweden) 
 
Public  22 patents and patent 
applications; library of 
400+ drug compounds 
Key relationships with the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere, a U.S. Ivy League 
University; active academic publications and 
presentations 
 
Beta Health 
Services 
 
 
1999 Computerized 
cognitive tests for 
the pharmaceutical 
industry 
 
30 mostly local employees; 
second office in New Haven; 
active student internship 
program 
 
Public  Patents on its cognitive 
test application; much 
tacit expertise 
Various ties to the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere and other American universities 
through connections to individual researchers 
and post‐docs; active academic publications 
and presentations 
 
Charlie Medical 
Technologies 
 
2003 
(mid 
1990’s) 
Replacement 
sphincter for bladder 
control 
3 national employees; 8 board 
members; local and national 
R&D activities 
 
Private – backed 
by venture capital 
One patent granted each 
in Australia and the U.S.; 
10 currently filed patent 
applications; tacit 
expertise developed in 
partnership with Gamma 
and FaecalCare 
 
Key research contracts with the University of 
the Southern Hemisphere; limited relationship 
with University Enterprises over IP matters; 
restricted academic publications and 
presentations 
 
Echo Technology 
Solutions 
 
2004 
(2001) 
Digital pulse 
technology (medical 
imaging, mining, 
defense, materials 
analysis) 
 
3 local employees; 1 non‐
executive chairman 
Private – backed 
by individual 
private investors 
1 Australian patent  Informal relationships with the University of 
the Southern Hemisphere; limited recent 
academic presentations 
 
Delta 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
2005 
(2003) 
HIV treatment  Drug development work is 
conducted by a 6‐person, 
globally‐dispersed project team 
 
Private – backed 
by venture capital 
and philanthropic 
support 
 
At least 2‐3  Research contracts with the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere; academic publications 
and presentations; University Enterprises 
helped the company attract venture capital 
investors 
 
Foxtrot 
Pharmaceuticals 
 
 
2007 
(2005) 
Development of drug 
compounds for the 
treatment of fibrosis 
 
1 CEO; 4 board members; 4 
scientific advisory board 
members; mostly local 
Private – backed 
by venture capital 
Library of 50+ drug 
compounds; 3 pending 
patent applications 
Embedded relationships with Veritas; 
University Enterprises plays an active role; ties 
to key scientists in Australia and Canada; no 
active academic publications or presentations 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Chapter 5 – Academic Spin‐off Companies as Virtual Companies 
 
Introduction 
  This chapter presents two companies – Delta Pharmaceuticals and Charlie 
Medical Technologies – whose social structures most closely resemble that of an 
archetypical virtual company, with ambiguous organizational boundaries and loose 
coupling among its members.  These features complicate the observation of such 
companies such that the companies defy the otherwise pedestrian view of an 
entrepreneurial venture.  One does not simply walk into a company whose structure is 
virtual, as there are no specific offices or labs per se.  Instead, the observation of an 
academic spin‐off company with a virtual structure evolves into an exploration of a 
major project.  In the case of the two companies presented in this chapter, the 
“company” was a social structure organized around a commercially funded R&D project 
that sought to bring a therapeutic drug or medical device to market with the goal of 
helping people with certain medical conditions.  Additionally, the companies in this 
chapter were not entirely “spun off” from the university in that the social organizational 
structure of each company blurs with that of the academic environment.   
  The two companies discussed in this chapter were founded for similar reasons 
and with similar goals.  Each company’s respective founders recognized an opportunity 
to apply academic knowledge to the development of medical treatments.  For Delta, 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the founders organized around an R&D project to bring an HIV drug treatment to 
market.  For CMT, the founders organized around an R&D project to bring a medical 
device for the treatment of continence control to market.  Commercialization provided 
the founders of each company with funding and collaborative resources that enabled 
their respective R&D projects to materialize.  Strategically, both companies are 
organized as speculative R&D projects.  The projects are exploratory in nature in that 
the final efficacy of each project is not yet determined – Delta’s HIV treatment and 
CMT’s replacement sphincter are still under varying stages of clinical trials in order to 
ascertain if they will safely work in humans.  Each company has intellectual property 
around their respective projects, but they have few resources that they can exploit for 
revenue in the marketplace.  Therefore, the academic credibility of each R&D project is, 
to varying degrees, a legitimizing aspect of each company that enables it to continuously 
attract funding in support of its mission.  Each company maintains idiosyncratic 
relationships with the University of the Southern Hemisphere, as the source of each 
company’s academic legitimacy varies across academic networks.  However the virtual 
structure of each company blurs the boundary between themselves and the university. 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Delta Pharmaceuticals 
 
Goals and strategies 
  Strategically, Delta is organized around the exploration of new knowledge 
(March, 1991).  Like other drug development projects, Delta’s project for the 
development of an HIV treatment is long‐term.  It requires animal tests and multiple 
rounds of human clinical trials.  Strategically, the company has few, if any, knowledge 
resources that it can currently exploit for revenue.  It does own intellectual property 
that it could exploit if the drug development is ultimately successful or could attempt to 
sell or license if the project ultimately fails.  The company’s affiliations with the 
academic community as well as its scientific productivity are leveraged for the purposes 
of gaining additional funding from investors.  Beyond this, Delta is a speculative R&D 
project. 
  Delta is a virtual company.  The company itself is an ownership structure among 
its investors that owns intellectual property.  Two American and two Australian venture 
capital firms provided the first round of funding for Delta’s project.  There is a distinct 
separation between the company and its actual drug development project.  Delta, as a 
company, has no discernable operations.  However Delta, as a drug development 
project, has a discernable project team and operations.  BioMedicine Services Pty. Ltd. 
(BMS) (pseudonym), a local drug development service company, is an operational proxy 
that coordinates the Delta project’s loosely coupled R&D on behalf of the Delta 
investors. 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Delta founder Wesley Chabot had a connection to Jackson Dellow, who is the 
founder and director of BMS.  BMS became involved when Delta was beginning the 
commercialization process and seeking to raise funds from venture capital firms.  BMS 
became the operational entity behind Delta.  Once Delta received its first round of 
venture capital funding ($6 million), Wesley Chabot’s lab at the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere was engaged in a major animal study in the development of the 
HIV treatment.  Subsequent funding for Delta came through a philanthropic channel 
that was arranged through BMS and a major American Research University (ARU) with 
an affiliated medical center.  Upon the solidification of this new $4 million funding 
arrangement with ARU, BMS shifted its reporting relationship from Delta to ARU and 
subsequently assumed the drug development role.  Wesley Chabot’s lab at the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere had no further involvement in the Delta project 
after 2007, although Chabot is occasionally consulted. 
BMS currently operates the Delta project under a funding contract from ARU.  
BMS manages a six‐person project team that is globally dispersed.  The project team 
consists of functional area representatives, a regulatory expert, a clinical expert, a 
toxicologist, and a basic researcher.  BMS also maintains a global network of experts 
that it consults on behalf of the Delta project as needed.  The corporate entity of Delta is 
incorporated in both Australia and the United States for the purposes of its venture 
capital investors who are located in each country. 
The company’s current structure is a function of both the institutional 
constraints of the commercial marketplace – as exhibited by investor’s monetary 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influence over the drug development project – and the academic scientific community 
that has played an instrumental role in legitimizing and sustaining the company’s R&D.  
This consequent structure of the company has yielded new knowledge, despite the 
company’s inability to generate a financial return for its investors up to this point in 
time.  Because the Delta drug development project has progressed in a linear fashion 
among various stages, knowledge has been codified and distributed among the parties 
involved in each stage.  BMS – in its role as project manager for Delta’s drug 
development project – has played an important role in assimilating, organizing, and 
distributing knowledge throughout a global network of epistemologically diverse 
experts that have contributed to this project.  Thus, the Delta virtual company structure 
is a function of requisite epistemological diversity and multi‐institutional pressures, 
which has led to the creation of knowledge as evidenced by the rhythm and order of the 
project team. 
 
Epistemological factors 
  One of the factors behind Delta’s virtual structure is the global distribution of the 
independent experts and intellectual diversity that BMS has assimilated for the 
company’s R&D.  Much like the Human Genome Project (see Powell and Grodal, 2005), 
Delta is a loosely coupled confederation of scientists, each of whom have independent 
affiliations to other organizations and institutions.  By virtue of this structure, each 
participating scientist is a bridging tie (Fleming and Marx, 2006; Burt, 1992) between 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Delta and other institutions, which enables Delta to cast as wide a net as necessary in 
pursuit of knowledge resources. 
  The global nature of the project team enables BMS to assimilate the most 
relevant knowledge and expertise for the purpose of advancing the project.  This form 
of organization provides Delta with flexibility as the project evolves among various 
stages.  Through its coordinating role, BMS captures knowledge of the participating 
parties and transfers it to subsequent parties as needed.  The research group had been 
based in Denmark and is now located in the United Kingdom.  The clinical group is based 
in London.  The manufacturing group was based in San Francisco and is now located in 
Belgium.  The toxicology expert was previously based in the United Kingdom and is 
currently based in Australia.  Researchers from ARU in the United States serve as 
scientific advisors. 
  Despite the origins of the company in a University of the Southern Hemisphere 
research lab, Delta’s relationship with the University of the Southern Hemisphere as a 
source of knowledge resources has gradually abated since the company’s founding.  The 
changing nature of this relationship reflects the both the company’s funding structure as 
well as the stage of the company’s drug development project.  Upon the formal 
incorporation of the company and the receipt of the first round of funding for animal 
tests, Wesley Chabot’s University of the Southern Hemisphere lab was the base of the 
company’s research activities.  His research lab focused exclusively on the project.  
These researchers analyzed blood samples from monkeys that came from an on‐campus 
primate lab.  Everyone in the lab, including students and post‐docs, committed research 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efforts to the project that was now funded under contract by the investors in Delta, 
which blurred the boundary between academic and company research.  For example, 
doctoral students in the lab who were involved in the project could use data in their 
dissertations, but agreements with the company required that publication of a 
dissertation using company data be delayed for one year.  Wesley Chabot’s lab 
completed the first round of funded research, but subsequent rounds of investor 
funding were not immediately secured because of one investor’s reluctance.  As a result 
of this funding shift, the social structure of Delta and the R&D project shifted and did so 
in a direction that reduced the role of the University of the Southern Hemisphere as a 
source of knowledge. 
  The role of Wesley Chabot’s lab changed as the funding structure of the 
company shifted.  When one of Delta’s investors decided to suspend the funding of the 
project, the company’s operational team from BMS sought input from outside experts 
about the viability of the project and potential future courses of action.  The search for 
experts went beyond the University of the Southern Hemisphere and extended through 
BMS’s global network of ties.  Through BMS’s network, Delta secured the support of an 
investor and a research group at ARU.  The ARU group provided a knowledge base that 
complemented the resources that BMS had assimilated and increased the requisite 
variety of knowledge resources (Weick, 1979; Ashby, 1956) available to the project 
team. 
When we were talking with ARU, our (BMS’s) skills don’t overlap at all; ARU is an 
excellent group of research physicians and also have very strong immunology, 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primary immunology, knowledge.  So, and our expertise is in the conduct of 
development programs from manufacture through (toxicology) and into the 
clinic. So the skill set really complemented itself very well and no one   I don’t 
feel I can be a better HIV physician than they are and they don’t think that 
they’re better developers than we are. So we actually work together really well 
as a result of that (Respondent #18). 
 
  Delta’s current structure as a virtual project team is globally dispersed and 
operates on a rhythm, which is focused on the development of the project (Bauer, 
2007).  The work conducted under the direction of Wesley Chabot’s lab at the University 
of the Southern Hemisphere focused on animal studies.  Subsequent steps under the 
project team structure consisted of the manufacture of a drug and corresponding 
toxicology studies.  The researchers affiliated with ARU have taken part of the Delta 
project under development as an HIV treatment for developing countries.  The project 
team members belong to other respective institutions, and BMS acts as the coordinating 
entity that connects the members of the project team and acts as the focal point of the 
project team network.  The project team meets in person on an annual basis, which 
provides a touchstone for the rest of the time when members of the team communicate 
through virtual methods. 
[The virtual project structure is] fairly standard methodology.  And we have 
functional area representatives who sit on the project teams and we have a 
regulatory person, a clinical person, a toxicologist, a basic researcher and then 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you know we have other functional expertise come to the table as we need to.  
And we (BMS) run all of those project team discussions, we have formal 
meetings once a month and we do that via teleconference calls... So you know 
we’ve got people all over the planet who are inputting into the development of 
this product and so that’s how we run our program (Respondent #18). 
 
  The changing role that a single university research lab can play in a drug 
development project like that of Delta also reflects the stage of the R&D.  In the case of 
many academic spin‐off companies, the scientific founders and the managers of the 
company differ with respect to their views about the role that academic scientists 
should play in the venture.  In Delta’s case, an academic scientist expressed frustration 
with the stage‐gating of the project and would have preferred that the investors 
concurrently fund each stage of the R&D, while a manager indicated that the role of 
academic scientists changes when the company reaches the development phase. 
I think things would have gone quicker if the VCs had funded it all the way 
through clinical trials because it came to a decision, ‘Fine, what should we do 
now?’ (Respondent #10). 
 
So I guess that the key emphasis is when you’re in development, there’s often 
very little that an academic group can bring and that’s a terrible gross 
overstatement but it might give you an idea of how I view this sort of activity. 
Academic groups are really good at you know research questions with an open‐
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ended outcome, potentially. They are really poor at specific development 
activities (Respondent #18). 
 
  Consequently, Delta’s R&D project and its knowledge base – while rooted in 
academic science – is no longer embedded in a single university or disciplinary 
community.  As the company’s structure has evolved and has assumed the form of a 
virtual project team, the distinction between academic research and commercial activity 
is clearer.  Academic scientists are conducting a smaller proportion of the Delta project 
work.  Likewise, as the project shifts from research to development, industry experts are 
assuming a greater proportion of the work. 
 
Institutional factors 
  Institutional factors have impacted the structure of Delta, especially its shift from 
a local lab‐based structure to a global virtual structure.  Delta represents an interesting 
example of an academic spin‐off company whose academic credibility was questioned.  
Scientists affiliated with the American Research University and its affiliated hospital 
reaffirmed the academic credibility of the Delta project, which subsequently expanded 
the company’s network structure and shifted it to its present structure as a virtual 
company.  The company’s academic credibility is rooted in the network of scientists that 
contribute to its R&D.  This academic credibility enables the company to receive 
funding, which strengthens its overall legitimacy. 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 In the case of an R&D project that is based on the exploration of new knowledge 
and the speculation of a long‐term commercial payoff, the actions of investors can 
greatly influence the nature of scientific work. This represents an example of 
commercial institutional pressures limiting Delta’s academic activities (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966) in that the pressures to minimize an investor’s commercial risk 
interfered with the company’s scientific objectives.   A threat of discontinued funding 
after the initial round of VC‐funded animal tests, which was the result of investor 
dissatisfaction with research results, nearly derailed Delta.  Wesley Chabot’s lab 
received funding from a combined pool of four VC firms for the purposes of conducting 
the first round of animal tests and determining the efficacy of the proposed HIV 
treatment.  The results of the lab work conducted by Wesley Chabot and his colleagues 
indicated that their treatment delayed AIDS and demonstrated a ten‐fold reduction in 
viral load.  However, one of the U.S. VC firms was less enthusiastic about the results. 
“One of the venture capital groups, one in the US, felt – sent this data out for 
external research and felt that it was maybe not enough, that it wasn’t as 
spectacularly successful as they’d hoped.  We were all pretty excited about it 
because I thought it was a good result” (Respondent #10). 
 
  In an effort to determine next steps and to reinvigorate the project, Delta 
underwent a subsequent sequence of events in which BMS ascertained the project’s 
credibility by meeting with outside research experts while securing a $4 million 
investment that reflected investor confidence in the scientific potential of the R&D 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project.  BMS engaged in a worldwide effort to find additional funds by speaking to 
other academic scientists in order to determine the long‐term scientific potential of the 
project.  In essence, BMS was seeking to ascertain the academic legitimacy of the Delta 
drug development project.  BMS was successful in finding a new source of funds, and 
arranged a complex funding structure that involved the Amercian Research University 
and its affiliated hospital.  The Australian and American VC firms that initially invested in 
Delta’s first round of R&D were able to see a continuation of the company’s R&D efforts 
without having to invest additional money.  To be considered a viable R&D stage 
commercial entity and to sustain its commercial legitimacy, Delta required a stronger 
degree of academic legitimacy.  These actions illustrate how academic and commercial 
legitimacy are not mutually exclusive.   
The priorities of VCs change over time and if you, no matter how clearly you lay 
out a plan that seems logical – if you achieve this, you achieve this, you achieve 
this, you achieve this, and then you keep going forward, but they can just say, 
‘Well, we’re just not going to put anymore money in this.’  It’s not a – it’s a 
commercial decision and they have other priorities (Respondent #10). 
 
  In an effort to signal the academic credibility, Delta has remained relatively 
transparent to the academic community, which has strengthened the overall legitimacy 
of the company.  In addition to BMS’s efforts in recruiting scientists to participate in 
Delta’s R&D (their participation thus provides the company with a vote of academic 
confidence), the company has signalled its academic credibility through traditional 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academic channels.  Research results related to Delta’s R&D have been widely 
disseminated through conferences and publications.  The company has maintained a 
policy of open dissemination of knowledge provided that research results are initially 
reviewed for intellectual property concerns and subsequently protected as necessary.  
As is the case with the other companies in my sample, academic legitimacy is an 
important aspect in the raising of funds.  In this case, academic legitimacy was especially 
important in raising a necessary second round of funds to support the continued R&D of 
the Delta drug development project. 
If we were you know going out to talk to investors, they often want external 
validation of your data and that comes in a couple of forms:  one is in a well‐
convened and credible scientific advisory board where people can basically say, 
‘Look, we think there’s something in this’ and then secondly, in peer‐review 
publications because, you know, that’s a means of putting to the world that 
you’ve got, you know, something that you’re prepared to share and that the 
methodology or the intellectual property has some merit to it (Respondent #18). 
Venture capital professionals interviewed for this study articulated similar trade‐offs 
between the balancing of intellectual property concerns with the value that is gained 
from disseminating research results.  One individual summarized this generally shared 
perspective. 
Yes, that’s something that needs to be managed pretty closely.  There’s two 
sides of that obviously, first of all the company is funding the work, funding the 
pattern prosecution, yet the core asset is the intellectual property in most of 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these companies so that has to be managed and controlled pretty acutely, so 
there’s no problems with inappropriate early disclosures which can ruin the IP 
position and therefore ruin the prospects for that technology to be developed, 
but that’s on the one hand, on the other hand there’s nothing stronger than 
having a technology which has strong data, strong IP position and externally 
validated peer review publications, so its really a timing issue (Respondent #7). 
 
The global academic community – as opposed to the local affiliation with the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere – has been the source of Delta’s scientific 
credibility, which has subsequently solidified its commercial legitimacy as an R&D‐stage 
venture.  Despite this, the University of the Southern Hemisphere did play a role in the 
company’s commercialization.  Delta is a private company backed by venture capital.  
University Enterprises helped the company founders present funding proposals to 
venture capital groups.  A certain Australian venture capital firm was not interested in 
being a sole investor because, by the time of the presentation, the technology had 
advanced beyond the seed stage during which they would usually invest.  Yet Wesley 
Chabot’s research group needed funds to conduct another battery of expensive tests.  
So University Enterprises helped arrange additional funding with a major Australian 
venture capital firm.  University Enterprises then helped Delta secure additional funds 
from two United States venture capital firms in anticipation of future human clinical 
trials.  United States venture capital was sought because venture capital funding for 
more expensive phase one and phase two clinical trials is not as readily available in 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Australia as it is in the United States.  By October 2005, the four venture capital firms 
had contributed a total of $6 million to Delta.  In essence, University Enterprises 
championed the company by enabling the investors to understand its potential. 
  Because of the speculative nature of Delta’s R&D, investors in academic spin‐off 
companies like Delta require intellectual property protections, which provide them with 
knowledge assets to exploit as necessary.  University Enterprises helped the company in 
securing intellectual property protections, which further symbolizes its commercial 
legitimacy.  In 2004, with the help of University Enterprises, Wesley Chabot filed a 
provisional patent on his research.  Delta Pharmaceuticals owns the intellectual 
property, but it granted a license to ARU for the purposes of the ongoing R&D.  These 
protections have enabled the subsequent publication and presentation of academic 
papers based on Delta research. 
  University Enterprises did play a number of roles in helping Delta file its 
intellectual property protections and arrange venture capital financing (Jain, George, 
and Maltarich, 2009; Wright, Lockett, Clarysse, and Binks, 2006; Colyvas, et al., 2002).  
BioMedical Services also played an important role by serving as the operational team 
that championed the enterprise, which would bring commercial discipline to the 
company in order to help attract investors.  The presence of BMS as an operational 
team behind Delta is a symbolic action of order and commercial discipline that can bring 
legitimacy to the company from the perspective of investors (Zott and Huy, 2007).  The 
actions of University Enterprises and BMS helped Delta navigate the commercial 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institutional terrain and ultimately achieve a balance between academic and 
commercial legitimacy. 
 
Creating knowledge 
  Knowledge creation at Delta is discernable in two major ways.  The first was 
when the company’s R&D was localized in a single lab at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere.  This structure enabled “bench level collaboration” (Zucker, Darby, and 
Armstrong, 2002) and the mutual sharing of tacit knowledge and the codification of this 
shared knowledge in to something explicit.  Codification was evident in that research 
publications emerged from this shared work, and knowledge resources were sufficiently 
transferred when the R&D shifted away from the original lab. 
  The second discernable aspect of the company’s knowledge creation was when 
BMS reorganized the R&D as a virtual project team and assumed the role as the 
coordinating mechanism through which knowledge was codified and transferred among 
participating scientists.  As the coordinating entity behind the Delta project, BMS played 
an important role of transferring knowledge and determining which aspects of 
knowledge were relevant for other parties.  This was evident in the shifting of the 
project from Wesley Chabot’s lab at the University of the Southern Hemisphere to the 
American Research University. 
Because the R&D knowledge associated with the company now resided with us 
(BMS), when we went off to work for ARU we basically took all of our knowledge 
associated with the manufacture and the technology with us. So there wasn’t 
 
 137 
much of a need for some of the primary research information to be transferred 
over; we already had all the reports and documentation and knowledge about it. 
So it was very much as a service provider that they were engaged and there 
wasn’t a lot of scientist‐to‐scientist interaction... I mean, it went extremely well; 
it went – there was almost no hesitation in time and activities because we had 
the same team in‐house at BMS and then we just applied those people to – you 
know, and the learnings that we had, to our new contractors. (Respondent #18).  
 
  BMS’s coordinating role on behalf of Delta creates order from an otherwise 
disordered structure, and in doing so it organizes to create knowledge and achieve 
closure in the hand‐offs among members of the virtual project team (Patriotta, 2003).  
The progression among stages in the project represent closure in the sense that one 
group completes its part and then hands off what it learned to the next group.  This was 
evident in the in the shift between the work conducted in Wesley Chabot’s lab and the 
subsequent hand off to members of the virtual project team that BMS organized on 
behalf of Delta.   
I think for us the recognition that the technology has a life of its own and it’s 
been carried forward into clinical trials by people who are hopefully good at that, 
that allows us to step back from it and do the things that we are good at 
(Respondent #10). 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 The Delta drug development project has progressed along a series of steps.  Each 
step represents closure and passes knowledge to the subsequent steps.  In the case of 
Delta, the drug development project progressed from animal studies, drug manufacture, 
and toxicology studies.  At the time of this writing, Delta was preparing to enter human 
clinical trials.  One of the respondents sums up the knowledge creation process in this 
sort of drug development project.  
It’s a long process in my view, and it’s just a lot of little steps.  Sometimes what 
you’re doing has a direct path that way, and then other times your bit of 
knowledge contributes to someone else’s bit of knowledge that eventually finds 
its way to some sort of clinical outcome or community outcome (Respondent 
#10). 
 
  Delta was commercialized and organized to address a specific R&D challenge – 
the development of an HIV treatment.  HIV is a devastating virus that continuously 
challenges scientists in the search for efficacious treatments.  Knowledge about HIV is 
generated in the search for treatments.  The disease continues to challenge scientists 
and other researchers, and it is this ongoing activity that enables knowledge to be 
created. 
  Because the viability of Delta’s R&D project is subject to its ability to raise money 
in support of the project, the knowledge that the company ultimately creates is subject 
to the value that its investors perceive.  Thus, knowledge creation at Delta is 
situationally contingent upon the institutional dynamic among academic scientists, 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investors, and managers (Knorr‐Cetina, 1981).  Either party can influence or constrain 
the R&D and, therefore, impact the creation of knowledge. 
 
Charlie Medical Technologies 
 
 
Goals and strategies 
 
  Charlie Medical Technologies (CMT) is a medical device company whose goal is 
to develop a replacement sphincter using transplanted smooth muscle tissue.  CMT is an 
R&D stage company and is currently focused on the development and testing of its 
device.  As an R&D stage company, it has largely pursued a strategy of knowledge 
exploration in that it has directed its efforts at creating practical knowledge around 
smooth muscle, implantable device technology, and continence control.  At the time of 
this writing, the company does not have an end product that it can exploit for revenue 
in the marketplace.  However the company was able to strategically exploit its R&D 
through a 2007 merger with another start‐up company, FaecalCare Holdings.  CMT 
merged with FaecalCare in order to exploit a mutual expertise around a related area of 
continence control R&D. 
  The founding of CMT itself was a strategic arrangement between a group of 
researchers at the University of the Southern Hemisphere (known as F5) and their 
partnership with Gamma Industries.  CMT was actually a “clean company” that was 
created between both parties as a mechanism for the raising of venture capital funding 
in support of the R&D platform around the replacement sphincter technology.  The 
collaboration between F5 and Gamma started in the late 1990’s.  Prior to this 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collaboration, F5 secured about $1 million in funding from government and private 
sources so that they could conduct some pilot studies in the area of smooth muscle.  F5 
subsequently collaborated with Gamma for the purposes of receiving additional funds 
and complementary technology.  F5 and Gamma formally established CMT as a clean 
company in 2003.   
  CMT has subsequently received additional funds. Gamma provided an initial 
investment in CMT when the company was founded in 2003.  In 2004, CMT received a 
$2 million investment from an Australian venture capital firm.  As a result of the 2007 
merger between CMT and FaecalCare, the investors in FaecalCare provided an 
additional $1.75 million investment in the merged entity.  Additionally, CMT received an 
AusIndustry R&D start grant for up to $946,000. 
  CMT is a private company, and FaecalCare is now a wholly‐owned subsidiary of 
CMT.  The management structure of CMT consists of a chief executive officer, a chief 
operating officer, and a chief technology officer.  The company and its managers are 
based in a major Australian metropolitain region that differs from that of the University 
of the Southern Hemisphere and the other companies in this sample.  The company is 
governed by an eight‐member board of directors.  It contracts with various researchers 
at the University of the Southern Hemisphere for much of its R&D.  It also contracts with 
Gamma for the manufacture of its medical devices.  It maintains clinical trial sites at 
private hospitals in two major Australian cities.  It also maintains a clinical trial site at a 
hospital, which is affiliated with another large Australian university.  The company is 
largely a virtual operation, as many of its R&D functions are loosely coupled and 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distributed among various organizations.  Furthermore, the original founding scientists 
from F5 are mostly uninvolved with the current company. 
  The current structure of CMT is a function of a shifting epistemological and 
institutional landscape.  The F5 group initially organized as a community of practice 
within the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  Their community eventually 
extended to include members of Gamma Industries.  After F5 and Gamma launched 
CMT, the company gradually began to shift from a research focused operation to a 
device development operation, which, in part, reduced the role of the founding 
scientists.  Consequently, CMT is organizationally separate from its founders.  The 
founding scientists’ lack of current involvement with the company has decoupled the 
community of practice from the company, which, organizationally, has left CMT as a 
virtual entity with mostly loosely coupled participants.  Knowledge is created in a 
distributed manner and organized through the company’s management structure.  The 
organization of CMT has largely coincided with the funding that has supported its R&D.  
 
Epistemological factors 
  In order to understand the organization of CMT and its practices, one must trace 
the path of the company’s R&D.  The University of the Southern Hemisphere founders 
of the company – a group known as F5 – initially organized to pursue the development 
of a replacement sphincter using the transplant of smooth muscle.  Prior to any formal 
incorporation, the group simply got together with a speculative idea about the 
possibility of creating a replacement sphincter.  The R&D platform has progressed along 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a path of organization that began informally within the F5 group, which subsequently 
included formal collaboration with Gamma Industries; then became the R&D platform 
of the newly established CMT company; and finally became incorporated into a joint 
R&D program through the merger of CMT and FaecalCare – an arrangement in which 
only one of the original F5 group members has any current involvement.  In essence, the 
replacement sphincter R&D platform has passed through various hands, ranging from a 
community of practice within the University of the Southern Hemisphere (F5) to a 
virtual private company (CMT).  This trajectory has captured the knowledge created in 
steps along the way and has progressively embedded knowledge in each organizational 
stage. 
  The origins of CMT date to the early 1990’s when F5 had an idea about the use 
of smooth muscle as a replacement sphincter.  There was no existing research on this 
idea, nor did the F5 group discover any existing intellectual property in the patent 
literature.  F5 subsequently incorporated in order to raise some money for the purposes 
of doing initial animal tests around their idea.  It was a speculative idea at the time, but 
F5 wanted to push it forward to see if it would work and develop a proof of concept.  
This type of shared passion for the pursuit of an idea is a characteristic of a community 
of practice. 
Well there were three of us who had the initial discussions and then we got 
together with a few people who were interested in pushing the idea and maybe 
could have helped us to raise some money and we formed a small company 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which was called [F5], which means it had seven people really it sort of meant.  
Seven of us got together eventually (Respondent #8). 
 
Well we had an idea, we didn’t have any research; we had done no research on 
the idea.  We knew the area but we hadn’t actually done any research at that 
stage.  So we formed the company, we raised enough money to do some pilot 
studies... The first things we did was to patent the work and to… or to patent the 
idea and then to start some experimental work in animals, rabbits actually, but 
in animals (Respondent #8). 
At the time F5 conducted their initial round of animal tests, the R&D was situated in a 
lab at the medical school of the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  Despite the 
situating of the R&D in a University of the Southern Hemisphere lab, the boundaries 
between academic and commercially funded work were relatively clear.  Students and 
post‐docs were not involved in any of F5’s work.  Instead, through the use of their 
commercial funds, they hired employees to work on their project.   
  Upon the completion of the initial round of commercially funded tests, which 
yielded successful results, F5 decided to raise additional funds.  The search for this next 
round of commercial funds led to a collaboration between F5 and Gamma Industries – a 
large Australian medical device company.  From the perspective of F5, the relationship 
with Gamma was a local source of funds and complementary expertise to support their 
R&D objectives. 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Gamma is a company that has developed medical devices using implantable 
electrical stimulation [which we needed] and so they were the obvious company 
to talk to.  We did talk to some companies outside Australia but it was much 
easier to deal with a company inside the country (Respondent #8). 
From the perspective of Gamma, the collaboration with F5 was an opportunity to utilize 
their expertise in the area of implantable medical devices in a new area of medical 
device development as an adjacent business opportunity. 
So with the fact that [Gamma] was exploring outside the hearing domain, and 
had already spent some considerable millions of dollars developing a broad 
based stimulation platform – that was an asset within [Gamma] – and [F5] came 
along and said ‘we’re thinking of something totally leftfield from what’, but 
because we could use that asset, [Gamma] went ‘well okay’ (Respondent #16). 
  The collaboration between F5 – a group of university scientists conducting R&D 
around a replacement sphincter – and Gamma – a large medical device company that 
primarily served the market on hearing – provided opportunities for novel combinations 
of knowledge.  The collaboration broadened the requisite variety of the R&D project 
(Weick, 1979; Ashby, 1956) and increased its novelty and complexity (Simonton, 2004).   
You had an entity that knew all about stimulation, you had an entity that knew 
all about transplantation of smooth muscle and the cellular mechanisms, a little 
bit about stimulation, not, not huge amounts, and so you were having these two 
groups come together (Respondent #16). 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 Organizationally, the collaboration between F5 and Gamma increased the 
complexity of their R&D project.  F5 needed to look beyond their own community of 
practice in order to find a suitable partner that had the requisite skills, technology, and 
resources for advancing beyond animal studies.  F5 exploited their network of contacts 
in order to connect with Gamma.  Gamma’s primary focus was in the area of 
implantable hearing devices, which required them to structure their collaboration with 
F5 in a way such that it did not interfere with their core business.  The decision was 
made to organize a “clean company,” which would enable F5 and Gamma to raise 
venture capital funds to support the subsequent rounds of their R&D.  Consequently, 
they organized and founded CMT in 2003.  Over an eighteen‐month time period, CMT 
had advanced the R&D project to a stage in which it created a device that it could 
implant into humans for clinical testing.   
  With the founding of CMT, the R&D project increased in network scope.  Initially, 
scientists from the F5 group had an agreement in which they would consult for CMT.  A 
general manager from Gamma, who was involved in the initial discussions between 
Gamma and F5, became the CEO of CMT.  CMT contracted with various research groups 
at the University of the Southern Hemisphere, including the departments of anatomy, 
cell biology, and veterinary science.  As the R&D advanced, tensions arose between the 
Gamma and F5 groups in the wake of shortcomings with the implantable devices that 
CMT was developing.  Ultimately, all but one of the F5 scientists resigned their 
consulting agreements with CMT.  Gradually, CMT has expanded its network of 
expertise to include researchers at various Australian universities and affiliated hospitals 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that serve the company as clinical trial sites.  Currently, CMT continues to contract with 
University of the Southern Hemisphere scientists because of the university’s critical 
mass of relevant expertise.  Additionally, the company maintains a supply contract with 
Gamma, which manufacturers and sterilises the devices.  In 2007, CMT merged with 
FaecalCare Holdings, another start‐up company whose continence control technology in 
the area of faecal management complemented the technology of CMT.   
  In summary, the CMT R&D project has evolved from its conception as an idea 
within a community of University of the Southern Hemisphere scientists.  Its 
organizational structure has transformed to reflect the evolving nature of the project.  
The role of the founding university scientists has diminished over time, which reflects 
both the evolution of the R&D as well as disagreements among the parties involved in 
the project.  At present, CMT is largely a virtual company, which reflects the distributed 
nature of the requisite expertise desired by the company as well as the clinical trial 
stage of the R&D.  The CMT project has remained a relatively open social structure, as 
evidenced by the expanding connections between the project and experts from other 
various organizations who contribute to it. 
 
Institutional factors 
  Since its inception, the R&D project underlying CMT has been commercially 
supported.  As such, it has largely adhered to a commercial logic.  Despite the 
participation of university labs and university scientists throughout the various stages of 
its R&D, the CMT project has not been characterized as an academic undertaking.  
 
 147 
Furthermore, the relative lack of university support in the commercialization process 
has influenced the social structure of the project and the nature of collaboration among 
parties to it. 
  Neither F5 nor CMT has symbolically sought to legitimize their activities through 
traditional academic channels.  With the exception of specific research ties between 
CMT and the University of the Southern Hemisphere, the company is largely guarded 
from the rest of the academic community.  At the direction of the company CEO, very 
little academic material related to the CMT R&D project has been published.  This 
decision was made in order to protect the company’s intellectual property position.  
Additionally, no studies from the F5 group related to CMT have been published.  These 
qualities beg the question of whether or not CMT has strategically sought academic 
legitimacy.  Through the extended network of the R&D collaborators at the University of 
the Southern Hemisphere, other universities, and Gamma, multiple scientific 
collaborators have been exposed to the knowledge base underlying CMT.  The passage 
of knowledge through these channels suggests a modicum of the project’s credibility.  
Yet the lack of open dissemination in the form of presentations and publications leaves 
the company with a lack of symbolic academic legitimacy.  Additionally, the lack of 
technology transfer office involvement in the venture has left the company without a 
university‐level champion.  Overall, the lack of academic transparency suggests that 
academic legitimacy has not been a strategic priority for CMT. 
  In contrast, the company has sought and has achieved multiple instances of 
commercial legitimacy.  Multiple rounds of investor funding are indicative of investor 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confidence in the underlying idea behind the CMT project.  The F5 group successfully 
raised an initial round of funding from both private investors and government funders, 
and they subsequently secured the interest and financial support of Gamma Industries.  
Once formally established, CMT received additional venture capital funding in 2004.  In 
2007, CMT was merged with FaecalCare, and the combined company received 
additional funding.   
  Intellectual property protections further symbolize the company’s commercial 
legitimacy and assure investors of the strength of the company’s knowledge assets.  
Furthermore, the protection of intellectual property has been prioritised ahead of any 
forms of symbolizing academic credibility.  It is evident that the impact of academic 
legitimacy is something that company officials have considered, but they have 
nevertheless decided to keep their R&D project relatively non‐transparent beyond 
participants.   
There’s been, we’ve had very limited publications because… I wanted us to be 
able to hit the airwaves with something strong, and I wanted to make sure we 
didn’t complicate our intellectual property position by drawing attention to 
ourselves prematurely… So there was a couple of… publications and we have 
some stuff that, that is going into publication at the moment.  But no I, I 
intentionally kept it pretty low (Respondent #16). 
As such, close to a decade and a half of academic research has not been publicly 
disseminated at the desire to protect the commercial integrity of the company (see 
Gumport, 2000). 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 The intellectual property of CMT is protected by one identified patent, and the 
company has several patents pending to further protect its IP.  Just as academic 
conference presentations and publications symbolize academic legitimacy, patents 
symbolize the commercial legitimacy of a new company (Higgins and Gulati, 2003).  The 
company’s limited patent portfolio, coupled with the developmental nature of its 
medical technology, likely limits any academic knowledge dissemination because such 
knowledge would not otherwise have a sufficient level of IP protections behind it.  
Without widespread academic dissemination, the company has not constructed an 
academic narrative of the knowledge that underlies the company’s developments, nor 
has a visible company champion emerged. 
  The University of the Southern Hemisphere was mostly non‐involved in the 
commercialization of CMT.  In the mid 1990’s when F5 decided to seek commercial 
funds in support of the ideas within their community of practice, they were responsible 
for bearing the costs associated with any intellectual property protections or 
commercial development.  It was a difficult process for the F5 group to individually 
undertake (see Wright, Lockett, Clarysse, and Binks, 2006).  Despite F5’s responsibility 
for bearing the patent costs, the University of the Southern Hemisphere remains a 
beneficiary of the CMT patent.   
I don’t know where he [university vice‐chancellor] got the advice but it certainly 
wasn’t from anybody in the university, that IP should be put in the hands of the 
university inventors, that they should be responsible for paying for the patent 
cost and that didn’t work quite obviously because most of them don’t have the 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money to pay for the costing.  So with F5 and CMT, we’ve probably spent maybe 
three or $400,000 on patenting and licensing and protecting inventions and very 
few academics have three or $400,000 that they could spend on that sort of 
work.  So it was… not to put too fine a point on it, it was a disaster (Respondent 
#8). 
Currently, the company has an investment tie to the university.  The company maintains 
some contact with University Enterprises in the context of shared intellectual property. 
  In summary, the combination of institutional factors – the university’s lack of 
involvement in commercialization; the partnership with Gamma; the founding of CMT; 
and the merger with FaecalCare – has shaped the social structure of the underlying R&D 
project to create a replacement sphincter.  The ongoing need to raise multiple rounds of 
money in order to support the evolution of the R&D has been a factor in shaping the 
project’s current virtual structure.  Virtual companies require little overhead, which 
frees capital to be spent on an otherwise exploratory project and on its core R&D 
operations.  The current lack of involvement by the founding scientists has decoupled 
the community from the project, which has resulted in a loosely coupled structure of 
scientists who are coordinated by a small management team. 
 
Creating knowledge 
  The evolving social structure of the replacement sphincter R&D project is 
indicative of knowledge creation and transfer in the context of CMT.  As a largely virtual 
company, the management team has the responsibility of coordinating the various 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project contributors and the knowledge generated by them.  As a venture whose R&D 
has evolved over the course of a decade and a half, knowledge has been codified and 
transferred among numerous participants.  The initial years of the F5 community of 
practice would have offered many opportunities for “bench level collaboration” (Zucker, 
Darby, and Armstrong, 2002) and the articulation of shared meaning. 
  Crossan, Lane, and White (1999) describe a challenge that innovators often face 
with respect to knowledge. They write, “True innovators have a problem akin to the 
child (trying to describe something for which it has no words to do so).  They have a 
sensation – an insight into a possibility – but they have no literal language to describe it” 
(p. 527).  F5 faced a similar situation.  They initially speculated about the possibility of 
using transplanted smooth muscle in the development of a replacement sphincter, but 
they had nothing more than their vision from which to build.  They organized in order to 
build upon their idea.  In doing so, other participants gradually joined them in 
constructing knowledge and insight around their idea.  A very practical need – creating a 
device to treat human incontinence – motivated F5 to organize, assimilate existing 
knowledge, and to create knowledge (Popper, 1972).  The subsequent knowledge that 
F5, Gamma, CMT, and FaecalCare has created has been directed toward this practical 
end and constructed to the norms and practices of developing a medical device through 
commercial channels (Knorr‐Cetina, 1981).  Very little knowledge has been publicly 
disseminated from this R&D project.  Consequently, “knowledge transfer” has been 
largely confined to the social structure of the project. 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And so to get a, to gain that sort of knowledge where it is cutting across function, 
things like the work we did certainly fostered that, that transfer of knowledge in 
that sense albeit was within the tent of confidentiality and control of [CMT] 
(Respondent #16). 
   
  Finally, the evolution of the CMT R&D project reflects a desire to increasingly 
create order from disorder.  The project began with a speculative idea, and it evolved 
into a speculative company.  The roles of the F5 founders have diminished over time, 
and they experienced disagreements with their collaborators at Gamma.  Multiple 
partner scientists from various organizations have increasingly filled project roles.  The 
CMT management has faced the task of coordinating these various actors as well as 
assimilating their knowledge and transferring it throughout the project’s evolving social 
structure.  Knowledge is created through organization and the order that can be 
achieved from an R&D project such as the replacement sphincter project of CMT (see 
Patriotta, 2003). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
  This chapter describes academic spin‐off companies that might not resemble the 
types of “companies” that one is accustomed to envisioning.  In many ways, Delta and 
CMT represent a profound shift in the nature of innovation and knowledge creation.  
The idea that a “company” can exist as a globally dispersed network of experts whose 
collaboration is facilitated in part by modern information technologies and orchestrated 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by a small management team differs significantly from traditional notions of established 
firms in distinct locales.  CMT and Delta are organized as exploratory R&D projects that 
assemble clusters of diverse university and non‐university experts and research teams 
to contribute to project efforts.  The incorporation of each of these as companies 
provides coordinating mechanisms in the form of investment capital and management 
teams who assemble and integrate these networks of knowledge and expertise.  As R&D 
projects, commercialization is a means to an end in that commercial funds are used to 
fund a major project that might pay off in the long term but is generally not capable of 
earning any significant revenue in the short term.   
  In some ways, the role of the university shifted to the background of these two 
companies.  Delta and CMT both emerged from the activities of University of the 
Southern Hemisphere research teams, and some of the early commercially funded work 
occurred at the founders’ University of the Southern Hemisphere labs.  University 
scientists and their labs continue to fulfil some – but not all – of the needs for each 
company.  In the case of Delta and CMT, these founders play an increasingly limited role 
over time as their respective projects advanced through developmental phases.  
Consequently, the University of the Southern Hemisphere became less institutionally 
critical for each company’s practices, as the management structure of each respective 
company assembles knowledge resources from other various universities and other 
organizations.  Because of the shifting role of the University of the Southern Hemisphere 
as well as the lessening of overall academic influence in each of these companies, these 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cases suggest that an “academic spin‐off company” may become less “academic” over 
time. 
  As with any new venture, the companies in this chapter illustrate the dynamic of 
legitimacy and the ways in which a company achieves legitimacy.  Both companies 
amassed venture capital funding and patent protections, which symbolize their 
commercial legitimacy.  Both companies are based on academic science, but the notion 
of academic legitimacy was a point of departure between them.  Delta is a relatively 
transparent company whose knowledge base has been disseminated through traditional 
academic channels, which has added credibility to the company’s R&D project and was 
important for signalling its promising aspects.  Establishing and updating academic 
legitimacy has been critical for Delta because one of its investors did not fully accept the 
strength of the findings from some initial studies.  In contrast, CMT is not very 
transparent in that it has not openly disseminated its research findings.  The founding 
group of scientists established credibility with a major corporate collaborator based on 
their idea and the work they ultimately conducted in partnership.  Yet the need to 
continuously subject CMT R&D to academic peer review has not been strategically 
critical for the company.  The differing notions of academic legitimacy impact the 
company’s relationship with the academic community and illustrate each company’s 
degree of transparency as an academic entity. 
  Coordination of a virtual company suggests that knowledge is captured and 
transferred through the coordinating roles of company managers.  The virtual nature of 
these companies reflects many years of coordinating and codifying knowledge across a 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network of partners.  The cases illustrate ways in which each company is an organizing 
mechanism through which knowledge can be assembled, codified, internally 
transferred, and externally disseminated.  Each company’s respective projects are goals 
that articulate the knowledge and expertise requirements, and the company structure is 
a mechanism for achieving order.  Each company has created knowledge, as evidenced 
by their ability to advance among R&D and clinical trial stages.  Each stage represents 
accumulated learning and insight.  Some of this knowledge has been disseminated 
through academic conference and publication channels, as determined by each 
company’s strategies and tactics for signalling legitimacy. 
  In summary, this chapter has illustrated two academic spin‐off companies that 
are organized as virtual companies for the purposes of assembling a wide network of 
experts who contribute to long‐term R&D projects.  The coordination of these networks 
of loosely coupled experts enables knowledge creation by bringing order to these 
collaborative relationships and through the assimilation and transfer of collective 
learnings.  The “founding” universities from which project emerge matter to these 
companies, but their roles evolve throughout the evolution of R&D projects.  Companies 
can assimilate scientists and experts from other universities and from other non‐
academic organizations into the rhythm of each project, therefore minimizing the role 
that any one university plays in the context of each project.  In some cases, university 
scientists play relatively few roles in the advanced developmental stages of these 
projects, which can further lessen academic institutional influences on these ventures.  
Academic spin‐off companies that evolve into virtual company structures reflect the 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richness of knowledge creation.  Knowledge creation is increasingly a function of inter‐
institutional collaboration and collaboration among a variety of parties within the global 
academic community, and the role of any one university can lessen in the course of an 
academic venture. 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Chapter 6 – Academic Spin‐off Companies as Communities of Practice 
 
Introduction 
  This chapter presents two companies – Alpha Pharmaceuticals and Foxtrot 
Pharmaceuticals – whose social structures most closely resemble that of an archetypical 
community of practice, with close collaboration among core members as well as 
ambiguous organizational boundaries.  Unlike virtual companies, many of the scientists 
who work for the companies presented in this chapter do so in close proximity to one 
another.  Yet in a manner that resembles that of virtual companies, Alpha and Foxtrot 
are organized as long‐term R&D projects.  Both companies presented in this chapter are 
“academic” in that the founding university scientists remain involved in much of the 
company R&D, and many of those activities are conducted in university labs.  
Consequently, these companies blur the boundaries between academic and corporate 
activities, as much of the knowledge creation resembles casual notions of academic 
science. 
  Both Alpha and Foxtrot are drug development companies.  Alpha is organized 
around the development of drug treatments for neurodegenerative diseases.  Foxtrot is 
organized around the development of a drug treatment of fibrosis.  In both cases, the 
company founders pursued commercialization because their intellectual property was 
 
 158 
valuable enough to secure the investment dollars of venture capital firms.  The money 
that both companies raised supports their extensive R&D programs that are aimed at 
bringing their respective drugs to market.  Alpha has also raised additional money 
through an initial public offering of stock.  Both companies are speculative in nature in 
that their projects are aimed at the long‐term creation of knowledge that ultimately 
supports their R&D.  As such, they have not yet turned a profit for their investors, and 
they have relatively little intellectual property to exploit in the short term for revenue in 
the marketplace.  Alpha was established over a decade ago, and has actively 
disseminated research findings related to its R&D and underlying knowledge base in an 
effort to signal its academic and scientific credibility and legitimize itself as an 
enterprise.  Foxtrot was established in 2007 and has not yet engaged in similar 
dissemination efforts for the purposes of strengthening its legitimacy.  However, 
academic credibility remains an important factor for the company.  Both companies 
maintain idiosyncratic relations with the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  
University Enterprises actively helped commercialize Foxtrot, while no university 
technology transfer channels were involved in Alpha’s commercialization efforts.  
However, both companies maintain extensive R&D ties to the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere and with other universities. 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Alpha Pharmaceuticals 
 
Goals and strategies 
  Alpha is a drug development company that is organized to conduct R&D on 
neurodegenerative diseases – especially Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases – and 
develop drug treatments.  The company has adopted a strategy of exploration (March, 
1991) in that it is an R&D company focusing on the long‐term development of drug 
treatments.  The company is currently engaged in clinical trials of an Alzheimer’s 
treatment, but it does not currently have a drug on the market and therefore is not yet 
earning product revenue nor exploiting its intellectual property.  Alpha leverages its ties 
to the academic community to signal the credibility of its knowledge base and R&D 
program, which enables the company to generate additional funding from investors.  It 
is a publicly traded company. 
  Alpha is a small company.  As of June 30, 2008, the company had a total of 13 
employees.  Eight of those employees were in R&D, three of those employees were in 
management and administration, and two were in operations.  Consultants fulfill other 
important roles at Alpha.  Scientific co‐founders Elwood Feagley and Marlin Guitierez 
are consultants to the company and have served on the company’s scientific advisory 
board.  Marlin Guitierez continues to work from an American Ivy League University 
(ILU).  Elwood Feagley returned to Australia from ILU in 2005 and is now primarily based 
at a local mental health research facility, which is located near the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere campus. 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 The company has a solid presence in the local area, but it also has an extended 
worldwide network of collaborators.  Each of the company employees is locally based.  
Much of the company’s day‐to‐day R&D work is conducted at the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere or at the mental health facility.  The local concentration of R&D 
enables key company scientists to interact as a community.  In the beginning years of 
the company, some of the critical R&D work was conducted at Ivy League University.  
However, none of the current R&D associated with Alpha’s latest drug compounds is 
conducted at ILU.  Alpha has a history of collaborations with universities and research 
institutions locally and worldwide.  For example, the different stages of its clinical trials 
were conducted at a variety of locations, including Boston, London, and Uppsala 
(Sweden), which incorporated other experts into the company’s extended network of 
practice. 
  Unlike other companies in my sample whose virtual structures reflect loosely 
coupled scientific collaborators, Alpha’s structure reflects a strategic decision to align its 
R&D program with the academic community and its local knowledge base.  Since 2005, 
Alpha’s key scientific collaborators have been located in close proximity to one another 
and have been part of the region’s local concentration of mental health research 
experts.  This concentration has provided the company with access to key knowledge 
resources that has supported its R&D program, which has consequently impacted the 
company’s social structure.  Alpha’s R&D program is rooted in an area of Alzheimer’s 
research, which at one point in time deviated from accepted theories about the cause of 
the disease.  Consequently, Alpha has actively pursued the strengthening of the 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company’s legitimacy through the open dissemination of its research findings.  The 
combination of knowledge dissemination and public company are key institutional 
factors that impact the company’s structure and transparency. 
 
Epistemological factors 
  The discovery of a cure for Alzheimer’s disease has eluded scientists for many 
years.  One of the reasons for these difficulties lies in the uncertainties about the 
disease’s cause.  Alpha is rooted in a line of research that theorizes about the cause of 
the disease.  The work focuses on the amyloid precursor protein (APP) as the gene 
associated with the disease.  The APP gene demonstrates metal‐binding sequences, 
which suggests that metal toxicity in the brain – caused by the binding of naturally 
occurring brain metals with APP to form plaques – is a cause of the disease.  The APP 
research of Elwood Feagley and Marlin Guitierez at Ivy League University in the 1990’s is 
the basis of the founding of Alpha and its subsequent R&D efforts.  Their Alzheimer’s 
research differed from conventional theories about the cause of the disease, which 
necessitated the raising of money to support their ongoing efforts.   
But sure enough, it [APP research] got into [the journal] Science, and it basically 
generated a whole cottage industry now of hundreds of papers that look at the 
method of how metals drive the amyloid toxicity and this has become the main 
target and platform of Alpha (Respondent #17). 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 The knowledge base underlying Alpha’s Alzheimer’s R&D efforts reflects 
revolutionary aspects of science as described by Kuhn (1970).  Much research has been 
conducted around Alzheimer’s disease, which has led to the creation of much 
knowledge and paradigmatic beliefs about aspects of the disease.  Yet the lack of 
certainty about the disease’s underlying cause leaves an opening for revolutionary ideas 
to challenge existing paradigms and update existing knowledge in an effort to ultimately 
solve the practical medical challenges posed by the disease.  The organization of Alpha 
reflects the continuously evolving nature of their R&D efforts to develop their theories 
around APP and a drug treatment that counteracts metal toxicity in the brain, but it also 
reflects the company’s efforts to revolutionize the study of the disease. 
  In the early 1990’s, Marlin Guitierez and Elwood Feagley worked together in a 
lab at Ivy League University.  Feagley, who was from Australia, was working for Guitierez 
as a postdoctoral researcher.  A company called Midwest Pharmaceuticals (pseudonym) 
was funding Guitierez’s amyloid research and, in essence, was funding Guitierez’s 
fellowship.  Eventually Midwest Pharmaceuticals stopped funding this lab because of its 
changing interest with respect to amyloid research as well as its overall need to control 
costs.  The Midwest Pharmaceuticals funding roughly lasted from 1993‐1997.  By 1997, 
there was an interest in forming a company as a way to raise money for the 
continuation of this line of research, which was believed to have long‐term commercial 
potential in that it showed promise as a line of sight toward the development of an 
Alzheimer’s treatment.  Elwood Feagley arranged private funding through a long‐time 
friend in Australia who was able to attract another investor.  Thus, Alpha was 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established as a company in 1997.  It was incorporated in Australia, but much of the 
initial R&D work occurred in the United States at ILU from 1997 until 2000. 
  Alpha is organized as a community of practice, which reflects the close working 
relationship among a core group of scientists on a specific R&D project.  The locus of this 
community has shifted since the company’s founding.  When the company was 
originally founded in 1997, much of the company’s R&D was based in labs that were 
affiliated with Marlin Guitierez and Elwood Feagley at ILU in the United States.  Initially, 
Feagley worked in Guitierez’s lab, but Feagley started his own lab upon completion of 
his post‐doctoral training.  Elwood Feagley maintained ties to his former University of 
the Southern Hemisphere PhD advisor, Rod Pfrogner, while he was based at ILU, and he 
involved Pfrogner in some of the company’s initial R&D work.  Thus, the initial Alpha 
community consisted of scientists working in both Boston and Australia.  Interestingly, 
Guitierez and Feagley were treating transgenic Alzheimer’s mice with specific drugs and 
sending the mice brains to Rod Pfrogner in Australia for his analysis.  Despite the 
physical distance, these three scientists had established a work rhythm (see Bauer, 
2007) that was generating insight and knowledge – as research findings were being 
transferred within their community of practice.  By 2000, Alpha had developed a 
prototype drug, and it subsequently became a publicly‐traded company in order to raise 
for continued R&D and subsequent clinical trials.  At that time, much of the company’s 
R&D had shifted to Rod Pfrogner’s lab at the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  
Elwood Feagley left the United States and returned to Australia in 2005. 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The locus of Alpha’s community of practice is currently in Australia.  Rod 
Pfrogner and Elwood Feagley maintain labs at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere and the mental health center, respectively.  Some of the scientists who 
work in these respective labs conduct Alpha‐related research, which contributes to the 
local community of experts contributing to Alpha’s R&D program.  The University of the 
Southern Hemisphere is engaged in ongoing work related to Alpha.  Alpha’s medicinal 
chemistry program is based at the university, and much of the company’s scientific base 
since 2000 stems from research conducted at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere under the direction of Rod Pfrogner.  One respondent articulates the 
nature of the company’s current rhythm of practices. 
[The structure] is very tight... There are two or three key individuals who do the 
research work, who meet regularly to define the direction of the research in 
collaboration with the company officers.  They determine how the work is going 
to be done and what needs to be done.  The chemists are producing compounds, 
which are then going to pre‐clinical testing and eventually come out the other 
end for human testing (Respondent #3). 
 
Alpha’s local network of collaborators extends beyond the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere.  In 2003, Alpha joined a local research alliance that consisted of a 
biotech start‐up company engaged in the development of cancer therapeutics, a public 
health research institute, and the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  The 
commonwealth government provided a $250,000 grant for this project, and it was 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intended to develop a cure for Alzheimer’s disease.  Through this collaboration, Alpha 
was able to access certain vaccine technologies from the other company.  However, 
Alpha terminated its agreement with it in 2006 because of certain delays in reaching 
specific milestones.  Alpha did however continue to collaborate with scientists from the 
company who eventually left the company and subsequently moved to another local 
university.  Alpha also formed a collaboration in 2004 with a subsidiary of this other 
company and the University of the Southern Hemisphere in the development of an 
Alzheimer’s disease vaccine.  In general, Alpha’s embeddedness in the knowledge 
network and social structure of the region near the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere has been a beneficial asset of fostering a community.  As one respondent 
noted: 
Yeah, it's very easy to meet with people that’s for sure, because we’re here in a 
sort of, in the park for precinct which means Alpha is five minutes drive in that 
direction.  University is five minutes drive in that direction and when you want to 
have meetings with larger groups of people, it's very easy to get together and 
that does make a difference.  So that kind of simple infrastructure makes a lot of 
difference (Respondent #4). 
 
Despite its local knowledge base, Alpha’s network globally extends to include 
numerous collaborators, especially with respect to the company’s clinical trials and 
related research efforts.  London and Uppsala (Sweden) were two international clinical 
trial sites that involved collaboration with scientists at those sites.  Clinical trial sites are 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determined based upon specific expertise that is needed to conduct a trial with a given 
sample population, which necessitates the location of trials in a variety of locations.  The 
company also has a tie to an American west coast research university.  In 2005, Alpha 
established ties with researchers at this university’s department of neurology and, 
concurrently, with the affiliated Veteran Affairs Medical Center.  Alpha was involved in a 
study of Huntington’s disease.  The study produced findings that suggested a promising 
line of research that the company conducted in collaboration with this university’s 
researchers.  The nature of these global collaborations is rooted in the company’s 
attitude toward the global nature of academic science.  As one respondent noted, Alpha 
is part of an extended community of scientists. 
Scientists know who’s doing what, so we’re a community of people who know 
who’s doing what… I can give you an example.  We want to study some aspect of 
illusion in the retina, right?  We don’t do that ourselves, so we look around 
Australia, and then we look around the world – who’s doing that work?  Then, 
because we happen to know somebody who knows somebody who does that 
specific work in London, we just pick up a phone and talk to that person in 
London and say, ‘Hey, we’ve got a drug here, we want you to test it on the eye.  
Would you do it?’  And they say, ‘Yup,’ so research contracts draw it up and the 
work’s done and you get the result (Respondent #3). 
 
Alpha also continues to maintain a close connection to Ivy League University. In 
its annual reports, Alpha lists ILU as a “core research alliance” and notes that ILU was a 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source of some of the company’s core intellectual property.  Alpha formalized certain 
aspects of its tie with ILU.  In 2001, the company signed a three‐part agreement with 
ILU.  First, Alpha would pay for a portion of Elwood Feagley’s research that would 
ultimately feed into Alpha’s knowledge base.  Second, the chief of psychiatry at ILU 
would consult with Alpha in the areas of clinical trials and regulatory matters relating to 
the FDA.  Finally, ILU would provide Alpha with an exclusive license to a patent 
application relating to a dopamine agonist in the therapeutic treatment of Parkinson’s 
disease. 
The organization of Alpha reflects over a decade’s worth of collaborations 
between a core community of scientists and multiple experts around the world in the 
context of a specific R&D program to develop a treatment for Alzheimer’s disease.  The 
connectedness of the company reflects the intellectual diversity that has contributed to 
this program.  Although the company’s current core activity is the development of a 
drug treatment for Alzheimer’s disease, its extended network of collaborations have 
reflected a strategic interest in broadening the company’s knowledge base in the area of 
neurodegenerative diseases.  These collaborations contribute to a broad knowledge 
base that ultimately enriches the expertise that is engaging in the core Alzheimer’s drug 
development project.  Thus, its strategy of knowledge exploration is broad‐based and 
reflects a deliberate effort to position itself at an axis of neurodegenerative research. 
The boundaries between academic and commercial science are blurred in 
Alpha’s social structure.  Elwood Feagley, Marlin Guitierez, and Rod Pfrogner are key 
members of the company’s scientific team, but each member holds primary academic 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appointments with universities and academic research institutes.  The work that they 
formally do for Alpha does not constitute their full time schedules, yet much of their 
work ultimately contributes to the company’s knowledge base.  This is consistent with 
the nature of communities of practice (see Wenger and Snyder, 2001; Wenger, 2000).  
In communities of practice, members often work together while maintaining separate 
roles in other formal organizations.  Despite the evolution of their roles within the Alpha 
social space, these three scientists sustain a level of commitment to the company 
because it represents a long‐term project that is fuelled by their research interests. 
 
Institutional factors 
  A variety of institutional factors drive Alpha’s organizational structure.  The 
publicly traded nature of the company represents the highly systemized nature of the 
company’s legitimacy in the commercial marketplace.  The ongoing dissemination of 
research findings related to the company’s R&D represents the company’s legitimacy 
within the academic community.  As a function of its corporate legitimacy, much of its 
knowledge base is protected as intellectual property through the patent system.  
However, as a function of its academic legitimacy, academic peers have gradually 
accepted Alpha’s knowledge base as credible by way of the traditional dissemination 
channels of publications and conference presentations.  Consequently, Alpha is fairly 
transparent.  One of its key scientists has evolved as one of the company’s major multi‐
institutional advocates and has played an integral role in shaping the company’s 
narrative of its mission, its knowledge base, and its overall R&D strategy. 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 The company’s successful fundraising symbolizes its legitimacy as an R&D stage 
company.  In addition to its 2000 initial public offering of stock, which symbolized the 
market’s willingness to accept some risk around the company’s R&D platform, Alpha has 
received numerous sizable grants.  It received a $1.74 million START grant from the 
Australian Industry Research and Development Board with subsequent follow‐up 
funding of $1.35 million.  It received a $230,000 Ausindustry grant and a $250,000 
Commonwealth government grant in collaboration with another biotech company.  To 
date, the company has also raised close to $100 million in additional private funding. 
  Alpha’s intellectual property portfolio is also symbolic of its legitimacy (see 
Higgins and Gulati, 2003).  As of the date of the filing of Alpha’s latest annual report, the 
company has 22 patents and patent applications in its portfolio.  It also has a library of 
over 400 drug compounds, each of which represents a potential drug development 
project.  It is from this library that the company has selected its most promising 
compounds for clinical trials.  The library of compounds specifically gave Alpha the 
flexibility to shift its R&D efforts from one lead compound (C1) to another (C2) in 2005 
when C1 demonstrated impurity issues.  Colloquially, the company didn’t miss a beat in 
that its library of compounds provided it with a back‐up, which it could enroll in new 
clinical trials while maintaining the overall credibility of the R&D program.  A robust 
intellectual property portfolio also protects the company as it disseminates its research 
findings.  Strategically, Alpha filed the requisite IP protections behind the dissemination 
of findings.  As one respondent notes, this is a typical strategy for drug development 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companies like Alpha, and it balances the importance of protecting IP with the desire to 
publish.  IP protections are a prerequisite for academic transparency. 
If you’re planning on doing IP, you generally file it before you submit the paper 
or before you present it.  But then you – if you’re in a company, the company 
might say, ‘We’re not going to publish the paper until the IP publishes.’  In 
academia, no, in academia you just file the IP, you get the protection but you 
don’t care about keeping it a secret, so you put the paper out whenever you 
want.  [In a company] you just file the IP beforehand if you want to protect that 
(Respondent #17). 
 
  Academic legitimacy has been a strategic priority for Alpha since it was founded.  
This stems from the knowledge base of its R&D platform in that it was a radical 
departure from conventional knowledge about the underlying cause of the disease.  The 
novelty of the knowledge base, in part, drove the efforts to commercialize as a new 
company.  Traditional scientific funding agencies (i.e. government funding agencies such 
as the NIH) were skeptical of the ideas, which led to the seeking of investors who were 
willing to take a risk on their approach.   
Even to this day, no‐one knows what the cause is so there’s no treatment 
currently that is guaranteed to work that’s a biological disease modifying 
treatment for Alzheimer’s disease, we’re still not at that point.  In 1996 we knew 
much less, yet there’s as much bombast now as there was then and there was 
huge amount of bombast then, people simply thought they knew, they knew 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what it was going to be, they knew what it would take to fix, well nonsense.  So 
therefore, someone like me came along with good scientific credentials and 
good publications but a theory that was not very familiar, it was impossible, it 
was just ridiculous, so that’s what motivated me to go out into the commercial 
world (Respondent #4). 
 
  The establishment of academic credibility has been integral mechanism for 
Alpha’s organization.  As a company that was established as a mechanism for the raising 
of money and the exploration of new knowledge, Alpha emerged with a liability of 
newness (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Stinchcombe, 1965) on multiple levels.  First, as a 
drug development company, Alpha entered the commercial marketplace from a 
speculative position.  Second, the knowledge base that underlined its R&D program was 
radically different from existing theories about Alzheimer’s disease.  Therefore, the 
company was both commercially and academically speculative, which necessitated 
efforts to overcome both constraints.  The company settled into a rhythm in which 
managerial practices of fundraising and IP protections coincided with a steady stream of 
academic activities that disseminated research findings and strengthened the 
company’s R&D position through the peer review process. 
I think there’s usually a need to publish.  Companies usually just publish and 
present to raise money and to raise value.  Depending on how much you need to 
do that, that’s how much you present and publish rather as opposed to keep 
secret... Biotech company start ups don’t have a clinical pipeline, they can only 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raise money on the promise of their pre‐clinical discovery and development.  So 
they have to tell stories, they have to get out there and publish and present to 
raise interest in the company and raise money.  So I think it’s that simple 
(Respondent #17). 
 
  The championing of the company integrated into the rhythm of Alpha’s 
organization.  One benefit of Alpha’s community of practice structure, which maintained 
connections among a core group of scientists for an extended period of time, was the 
long‐term growth of the company’s advocacy and the subsequent construction of a 
consistent narrative about the company, its mission, and its work.  Alpha was one of the 
companies in my sample that benefited from having a clearly defined champion who 
could speak with credibility and enthusiasm to multi‐institutional audiences about the 
company’s scientific capabilities in an effort to raise the company’s legitimacy in order 
to sustain the support of stakeholders.  A champion would do what one venture capital 
professional described as: 
“[Communicating] the impact of their research in a relatively intelligible manner 
to those who are not skilled in the art” (Respondent #9). 
Alpha’s founding team of Marlin Guitierez, Elwood Feagley, and Rod Pfrogner had 
strong CV’s and had developed a track record of academic achievements.  The collective 
academic abilities of these scientists helped legitimise the company (Tornikoski and 
Newbert, 2007). 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 Elwood Feagley evolved into the role of the company champion, as the individual 
who acted as the public face of the company’s collective academic productivity and 
legitimacy.  He acted in this role while participating in “investor road shows” with the 
company’s CEO.  Feagley’s role at an investor road show would consist of presentations 
that would mix academic rigor with an enthusiastic pitch for the company’s scientific 
potential.   
We’ve spoken to hedge funds over the years, the notorious hedge funds and of 
course institutional investors and big pharma.  So you go in basically with the 
objective to try and enthuse the other side to invest one way or the other.  So 
it’s absolutely necessary… At conferences it's all about scientific rigor and on 
road shows it’s a combination of rigor and trying to gather enthusiasm 
(Respondent #4). 
Over time, this strategy resulted in a refined narrative about the company.  Such a role 
is consistent with sensegiving strategies (Holt and Macpherson, 2010; Maitlis and 
Lawrence, 2007; Hill and Levenhagen, 1995). 
  The internal championing of the company was especially important for Alpha 
because it was not “spun off” through any formal university technology transfer 
channels.  No TTO championed the company during its critical early commercialization 
stage.  The company’s successful raising of commercial funds and entrance into the 
commercial space stemmed from direct personal relationships between scientists and 
investors (Knockaert, Wright, Clarysse, and Lockett, 2009).  Both the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere and ILU were licensors of Alpha intellectual property.  One of the 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early roles of the company managers was the securing of IP from the university and ILU, 
and Alpha continues to maintain a series of intellectual property agreements with both 
parties.  Consequently, the championing of Alpha was largely an internal process that 
was separate from university involvement. 
 
Creating knowledge 
  Alpha’s R&D program is based on a line of Alzheimer’s research that, at one 
point in time, differed from conventional theories about the cause of the disease.  
Collins (1989) argues that the divergent factions between scientific paradigms create an 
intellectual tension, and the resolutions around which symbolize the creation of new 
knowledge.  In essence, Alpha has created new knowledge about the underlying cause 
of Alzheimer’s disease.  The company’s increasing academic and commercial legitimacy 
reflects this knowledge.  The evolving stages of clinical trials of the company’s key drug 
compound manifest and reflect an accumulation of new knowledge. 
  Knowledge creation at Alpha adheres to a constructivist perspective (Knorr‐
Cetina, 1981).  The company’s R&D platform is a function of the desire to solve a 
practical medical need for the treatment of Alzheimer’s disease.  However the R&D that 
has produced new knowledge has been subject to the inter‐institutional constraints of 
funding and skepticism against the novelty of the platform.  Alpha has successfully 
legitimized its R&D platform as evidenced by the ongoing funding that it has received as 
well as the multiple peer‐reviewed publications and academic presentations that have 
symbolized its credibility.  In essence, Alpha has created knowledge that seeks to 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minimize any skepticism against it, thus moving the company closer to solving its 
mission‐driven medical challenge. 
  Practically speaking, the current phase of Alpha’s clinical trials reflects close to a 
decade and a half of R&D.  Some of this R&D involved the creation of over 400 
compounds – each of which has the potential to serve as the basis for a drug treatment.  
This library of compounds reflects years of insight around what works and what doesn’t 
work.  When the company’s C1 compound faced impurity issues in the clinical trial 
process, the subsequent shift to C2 as the lead compound is indicative of a granular 
richness of knowledge that had been integrated into company learning patterns.  In 
other words, the switching of lead compounds would not have been possible if 
knowledge about the compounds and their potential was absent.  These compounds 
have the potential to be developed into possible treatments for other 
neurodegenerative diseases such as Parkinson’s disease and Huntington’s disease, and 
they have also attracted the interest of researchers in the areas of oncology and 
cardiovascular disease.  This library of compounds has generated traction among other 
researchers, which further indicates Alpha’s accumulated knowledge and the credibility 
associated with it. 
  The local situating of much of Alpha’s community of practice as well as the global 
reach of its extended collaborative network has other interesting implications for the 
creation of knowledge.  Despite a local concentration of Alpha R&D, the primary 
scientists also maintain respective networks with other scientists and experts from 
around the world.  As a result of these networks and the structural holes that bridge 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them to a variety of expertise (Burt, 1992), the company is able to utilize the expertise 
of these experts for various research tasks as needed.  In essence, the company creates 
knowledge on a local level through a rhythm of close interaction, and it accesses 
knowledge through its extended network on a global level.  Locally, the company’s 
community of practice facilitates social personal interaction, which generates tacit 
knowledge.  Globally, the company’s extended network of practice generates codified 
research results that are subsequently internalised into the company’s knowledge base 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). 
 
Foxtrot Pharmaceuticals 
 
Goals and strategies 
  Foxtrot Pharmaceuticals is an early stage drug development company whose 
goal is the development of a drug for the treatment of fibrosis that occurs in such 
chronic diseases as kidney disease, heart failure, pulmonary fibrosis, and arthritis.  
Strategically, Foxtrot is an exploratory company (March, 1991), as it is engaged in pre‐
clinical‐trial phase R&D.  The company was founded as a vehicle for the raising of 
commercial funds to support the R&D project of its fibrosis drug treatment.  Foxtrot is a 
small private company whose funding has been provided by grants and venture capital 
investment.  Prior to the receipt of venture capital funds, the company’s R&D was 
largely tied to discretionary funds associated with the research budgets of some of the 
company’s founding scientists. 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 The securing of its primary intellectual property was strategically critical for the 
launching of Foxtrot as a business venture in 2007, as the basis of the company was the 
development of an existing off‐patent drug that demonstrated anti‐fibrotic qualities.  
Because the scientific development involved the use of an off‐patent drug, it was 
important for the company to secure new composition‐of‐matter patents for their work.  
The composition‐of‐matter patent gives the company a strong intellectual property 
position because it represents novel attributes and improvements to the off‐patent 
drug.  In contrast, a method‐of‐use patent on an existing drug would not have provided 
the company with an adequately strong intellectual property position to meet the 
satisfaction of its eventual investors.  Chemical compounds comprise the bulk of 
Foxtrot’s intellectual property portfolio.  Currently, Foxtrot has a library of 50 chemical 
compounds, one of which is a lead compound that is positioned to proceed through the 
clinical trial process. 
  Foxtrot is organized as a community of practice around a specific drug 
development project.  Most of its scientists work in close proximity to one another, and 
each have academic responsibilities beyond their respective roles as members of 
Foxtrot’s drug development project.  Many run their own labs.  The company’s founding 
team consists of several university scientists – each of whom is employed by their 
respective academic units.  Tim Holford is a chemist who runs an organic chemistry lab 
at the University of the Southern Hemisphere and works with a post‐doc who has 
created the company’s molecules.  Maurice Gillock is a senior research fellow at the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere who runs a lab in the area of biochemistry and 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molecular biology.  Jerold Carlsten – who serves as the company’s CEO – is a medical 
researcher who works at a local hospital, which is affiliated with the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere’s department of medicine.  Two of Jerold’s previous collaborators 
also work with Foxtrot as scientific advisors.  One is a clinical endocrinologist at a 
Canadian University and a former professor at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere.  The other is the head of clinical pharmacology at another Australian 
university and has experience in the design of clinical trials.   
  Because of its early stage nature, Foxtrot has been relatively guarded from 
disseminating any research findings associated with its R&D.  Consequently, it has not 
sought widespread academic credibility as a strategic factor.  Despite any widespread 
dissemination of knowledge beyond the company organization, Foxtrot’s closely‐knit 
and interdisciplinary community of practice of core scientists has yielded novel insight 
and new knowledge that has been instrumental in the company’s R&D.  
 
Epistemological factors 
  Interdisciplinary collaboration has been a cornerstone of Foxtrot’s R&D and 
commercialization efforts.  The company’s drug development project is a collaborative 
effort among scientists from chemistry, biochemistry, and medicine, and the project 
incorporates both research and clinical experience.  Furthermore, the company 
exemplifies the University of the Southern Hemisphere’s deliberate recent efforts to 
spark interdisciplinary collaboration among scientists through co‐location of labs.  The 
co‐location of scientists in a new university research facility – known as Veritas – was 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responsible for the meeting of individuals who would eventually collaborate and help 
launch Foxtrot.   
  Initially, Jerold Carlsten was working to increase the potency of an off‐patent 
drug that demonstrated anti‐fibrotic qualities.  He contacted Maurice Gillock, who had 
recently relocated to Veritas and who had recently met Tim Holford at Veritas.  Gillock 
introduced Holford (a chemist) to Carlsten in order for Holford to help Carlsten generate 
some new drug molecules.  Holford enlisted his post‐doc, Rico Ceconi, in the actual 
development of the molecules.  The novelty in this connection was that chemists are 
not known for generally collaborating with medical researchers (or vice versa).  The 
connection represented the strength of a weak tie between Holford and Gillock (see 
Granovetter, 1973).  This connection also marked a tipping point because it enabled 
cross‐disciplinary creative abrasion (Leonard and Sensiper, 1998) that was critical for 
jumpstarting the collaborative research that formed the basis of Foxtrot.  One of the 
company respondents describes the dynamic among Foxtrot’s interdisciplinary team. 
[Rico and Tim] are completely different because they’re coming from a synthetic 
approach and not as much knowledge as the cell side of things, and I’m coming 
from another angle looking at learning how the drugs interact with the cell 
systems at a micro level.  So the ones that [Jerold’s] got look at the outside the 
cell, what’s happening, changes to the cell, I look at the inside of the cell and the 
guys upstairs are marking the things to go around the cells.  I think we’re quite a 
good team and then we’ve got the clinicians that... I mentioned, they’re looking 
at what happens inside the patient (Respondent #6). 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Foxtrot’s intellectual diversity is representative of the various stages of the company’s 
R&D, including the creation of molecules, the testing of molecules in animals, and the 
clinical aspects of human testing.  The deliberate combination of scientists from 
different disciplinary backgrounds within the context of Foxtrot’s R&D is consistent with 
Simonton’s (2004) argument that breakthrough science stems from actions of scientists 
who are open to “novelty, complexity, and diversity” (p. 177). 
  In a manner that is consistent with Wenger and Snyder’s (2001) description of 
communities of practice, Foxtrot’s founding team self‐organized around the specific 
project of working with an existing off‐patent drug and developing it into a new drug, 
which they hope will ultimately treat fibrosis.  Foxtrot’s community of practice is more 
epistemologically diverse than it is expansive.  The core group of company scientists 
represent a requisite variety of disciplinary, clinical, research, and study design 
experience.  At the time of this study, there was no evidence of significant collaboration 
beyond this core group.   
  A limited number of students and research assistants have participated in 
Foxtrot related activities and are peripheral to Foxtrot’s community of practice.  Student 
participation has been limited because of intellectual property concerns.  From the 
perspective of graduate students seeking to build their CV’s, Foxtrot’s IP position largely 
restricts publication activity.  From the perspective of the university and Foxtrot (which 
share the ownership of Foxtrot’s IP), the hiring of students would give ownership of 
some IP to the students.  Consequently, Foxtrot has benefited from the work of a post‐
doc (who is considered a university employee) and some research assistants who work 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in the respective labs of some of the core group of founding scientists.  As one 
respondent noted about research assistants: 
The relationship is really from a technical perspective.  It’s really that I employ 
them, and they’re doing some work for me and the company.  So they’re part of 
the team, but not part of the core, they’re part of [my] team (Respondent #15). 
Research assistants have tested drug compounds, looked at protein interactions, and 
conducted some animal tests.  One post‐doc, Rico Ceconi, has played an instrumental 
role in Foxtrot’s R&D in that he has made each of the company’s molecules.   
He’s really been a crucial person in the company because he’s the only one that’s 
making these molecules.  He’s making new molecules; he’s got a background in 
total synthesis, but he’s also been able to manufacture kilogram scales of these 
molecules, which from a chemistry perspective is a non‐trivial exercise, so he’s 
really been quite special in enabling this project to go ahead, because not only 
can he make the new things that enable the patents, but he’s also been able to 
make sufficient amounts of material to facilitate the animal studies going ahead 
(Respondent #1). 
 
  In summary, Foxtrot’s social structure is a self‐organized and multi‐disciplinary 
team whose members generally work in close proximity to one another as a community 
of practice.  They self‐organized around a project that pre‐dated the commercialization 
efforts that led to the founding of Foxtrot.  Each remains committed to Foxtrot’s R&D to 
the extent that they continue to play a vital role in the project.  The social structure is 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epistemologically diverse but relatively closed from external collaboration, which 
reflects the early stage nature of the company and the pre‐clinical‐trial stage of the core 
R&D project. 
 
Institutional factors 
  A variety of institutional factors contribute to Foxtrot’s lack of transparency.  
Foxtrot is a young, private company whose financial stakeholders consist of venture 
capital investors.  The company has not yet embarked on clinical trials.  Thus, as an R&D 
stage company, Foxtrot is still heavily engaged in the research aspects of its business.  
Intellectual property protections have been critical for Foxtrot in signalling its 
commercial legitimacy. 
  As a drug development company with no products to market and little 
intellectual property to exploit, Foxtrot faces a liability of newness (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977; Stinchcombe, 1965) around the speculative nature of its business.  
Academic legitimacy is an important aspect of negating any speculation around the 
company’s scientific base.  However because it is a young company with pending patent 
applications, the IP protections are not firmly solidified to the point at which company 
scientists are actively presenting at academic conferences or publishing papers.  Before 
the company secured financial resources from venture capital investors, the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) in the United States did provide the company with a critical 
vote of credibility that ultimately positioned it as an academically legitimate enterprise.  
The NIH is conducting an important piece of the company’s R&D, which the company 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would otherwise have to self‐fund.  As a quasi‐academic entity, any meaningful support 
from the NIH carries the weight of academic legitimacy. 
  Many of the Foxtrot respondents recognized the long‐term value in gaining 
academic legitimacy as an enterprise.  Academic legitimacy is an aspect of the 
company’s long‐term marketing and fundraising strategies.  Foxtrot is concerned with 
disseminating important findings through a top‐tier publication.  As one respondent 
noted, an association with a top‐tier publication provides scientists with long‐term 
lucrative funding options. 
We’re aiming to put together a large publication on identification of the drugs 
and how they work, but we’re not in a hurry because we know we’ve got this 
stuff off the way, we’re the only ones who are working on it.  We prefer to take 
our time to get a really significant publication in one of our major journals... 
Getting the science out there so that you can get the funding without a doubt 
and if your first with a big story obviously you could publish in a big paper.  If you 
come in second you have to think of a slight way of making it different but you’re 
in a much lower journal which means your less likely to get money (Respondent 
#6). 
Once the company sufficiently secures intellectual property protections on its drug 
compounds, Foxtrot scientists expect to disseminate important R&D findings through 
the publication of papers and presentations at conferences.  One respondent reflected 
on this and likened such dissemination to both company marketing and broader 
knowledge transfer. 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Well that is a knowledge transfer thing isn’t it?  That’s the way to get the 
message out into the community, that you’re looking at down the track, so you 
need to tell your academic colleagues what you’re doing, and that you’re setting 
– that you’re establishing this company with this data, but you also need to tell 
the broader pharmaceutical community that you’ve got this company.  So it’s a 
bit of marketing really (Respondent #15). 
The cautionary position that Foxtrot is taking by timing the release of a major article 
once it is based on adequately protected intellectual property is consistent with views 
expressed by venture capital professionals.  As one venture capital professional 
articulated: 
You’ve got to be careful in terms of what you put in the public domain.  You 
want to put in enough to get people excited but you don’t want to put in enough 
that people can just leap straight onto your heels.  In some situations you may 
put everything into the public domain on the basis that no one can catch you, 
but usually not (Respondent #9). 
 
  Numerous efforts have been made to champion Foxtrot as a venture and to 
signal the legitimacy of the company and the R&D of its drug development project.  
Company co‐founder and CEO Jerold Carlsten has evolved into the role of Foxtrot’s key 
champion.  Foxtrot is one of the companies in my sample that benefits from the skills of 
an individual champion who has developed the ability to speak with credibility on both 
academic and commercial matters related to the company.  As a medical researcher 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who also has a diploma in business as well as experience consulting with pharmaceutical 
companies, Jerold Carlsten is Foxtrot’s champion – as identified by other company 
respondents.  He has been part of the company’s 60‐70 presentations to venture capital 
professionals, which has entailed the framing of the company’s narrative around a line 
of research that shows promise in the development of a drug treatment for fibrosis and 
which is backed by a growing list of IP protections.  An individual associated with the 
venture capital and managerial aspects of Foxtrot emphasized the importance of this 
role. 
Technology commercialization really depends on an internal scientific champion.  
So one of the researchers going to champion commercial development and the 
opportunity, it’s really difficult for us to do it.  I’ve got a specific case that I’m 
working on right now.  There’s a lot of opportunity in it but we’ve yet ‐ I’ve yet to 
find within the group a champion that’s willing to take on the leadership for 
driving the technical development of the commercial opportunity (Respondent 
#12). 
 
  Foxtrot also benefited from the assistance of University Enterprises in the 
championing of the company and the construction of its narrative.  University 
Enterprises helped the founding scientists refine their business case, which they would 
eventually pitch to venture capital investors.  They also helped them adjust their initial 
R&D by increasing the potency of the existing off‐patent drug in order to strengthen the 
venture’s IP position and attract potential investors.  In essence, University Enterprises 
 
 186 
helped the founding scientists negotiate an aspect of commercial institutional norms 
(i.e. the desire for strong IP protections) by providing then with advice about how to 
adjust the focus of their practices (i.e. the R&D around the anti‐fibrotic qualities of a 
drug).  University Enterprises also helped Foxtrot network with venture capital firms 
(Jain, George, and Maltarich, 2009) and champion the overarching ideas and intellectual 
base of the company. 
  In summary, Foxtrot is not a very transparent company.  The current lack of 
transparency around the company’s knowledge base is indicative of the efforts to 
strengthen the intellectual property position of the company.  Foxtrot received its first 
major source of venture capital funding in 2009.  Venture capital funding – as well as the 
company’s growing intellectual property portfolio – are indicative of its legitimacy as a 
commercial enterprise (see Higgins and Gulati, 2003).  As the company’s R&D activities 
advance toward clinical trials, the academic credibility and efficacy of these trials will be 
critical for marketing the company to investors and the securing of subsequent funding.   
 
Creating knowledge 
  Various patterns and routines are present within Foxtrot’s community of 
practice, which are indicative of the ways in which the company creates knowledge 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982).  One such routine is the production of drug molecules in one 
lab, which is followed by sending them to another lab for animal model and cell culture 
model tests to determine the potency of the molecules.  As a result, tacit knowledge 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becomes embedded in these routine back‐and‐forth interactions.  One respondent 
describes this routine in detail. 
So, basically what happens is that [Tim] would make a series of compounds, then 
give us the compounds to do proof of concept studies in animal models and cell 
culture models.  So we can then work them up and say how potent the 
compounds are, and then potentially we can take them from there into clinical 
development... [The routine occurs] several times a week.  There’s people 
coming back and forth between the two laboratories.  All the time actually, 
that’s part of the interaction that’s worked really well... One of our advantages 
of this collaboration is I’ve actually learnt more about chemistry than I would 
ever come across and vice versa, he’s learnt a lot about bio‐medical research 
(Respondent #15). 
Because these scientists in the Foxtrot community are generally working together in 
close proximity, they are learning from one another about the other’s respective 
discipline and how it applies to their own work.  This is consistent with Nonaka and 
Takeuchi’s (1995) pattern of socialization, as a form of knowledge creation and tacit 
knowledge transfer.  As such, Foxtrot is an organizing mechanism that enables such 
patterns of socialization and knowledge creation. 
  Foxtrot’s interdisciplinary nature has enabled it to create knowledge through the 
novel combinations of its founders’ respective expertise.  The commercialization of 
Foxtrot and its organization as an R&D project yields an axis around which the various 
sources of knowledge can be applied.  Foxtrot is a not a garbage can model of organizing 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(Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972) in which scientists of various disciplines and 
persuasions are searching for ways to apply their logics to undefined problems.  Instead, 
Foxtrot is an organizing mechanism around a practical drug development challenge that 
outlines defined needs to which an interdisciplinary community of scientists can attend.  
As an organizing mechanism for interdisciplinary knowledge creation, Foxtrot enables 
the conscious sorting, grouping, matching, and combining of expertise, which the 
company CEO (who is also a founding scientist and member of the community) 
coordinates (see Leonard and Sensiper, 1998). 
  As a company that is organized around a drug R&D project, Foxtrot is addressing 
a practical societal need by creating knowledge (Popper, 1972).  Furthermore, the 
company adheres to a constructivist perspective of knowledge creation (Knorr‐Cetina, 
1981).  In the course of commercializing, the founding scientists had to organize their 
efforts around the creation of molecules that would ultimately increase the potency of 
the existing drug, which formed the basis of their R&D.  The decisions to create 
knowledge in this regard were made with an interest in strengthening their intellectual 
property position in order to attract investors.  Thus, the founding team was creating 
knowledge that was contextually specific to the commercial sector, which would 
ultimately fund the venture and enable it to further address its overall mission of 
developing a new drug. 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Discussion and conclusion 
  As communities of practice, the study of Alpha and Foxtrot yielded some 
interesting findings about the creation of knowledge.  The close proximity among 
scientists in each of the companies indicated social proximity and trust, which facilitated 
mutual learning over time and the transfer of tacit knowledge.  The richness of this tacit 
knowledge was embedded in these communities of scientists, which consequently 
embedded into the social structure of both companies.  Proximity also enabled the 
routinization of various knowledge tasks, and these routines embedded the flow and 
transfer of knowledge.  The communities of practice behind both Alpha and Foxtrot 
included collaborative ties to other scientists at different universities around the world.  
The structure of both companies acted as organizing mechanisms through which these 
extra‐local ties could contribute to the communities of practice.  For example, Alpha’s 
community includes a key collaborator in Boston, and the company provides a 
framework through which this individual can collaborate with researchers in Australia.  
Similarly, one of Foxtrot’s key collaborators is located in Canada.  In both cases, the 
extra‐local collaborators have a personal history and established trust with the other 
members of the community, which provides them with social proximity to the other 
members of their respective communities and enables them to work within the 
parameters of the company R&D projects. 
  One of the aspects of communities of practice that was evident in these two 
companies was the extent to which company scientists maintained independence from 
each other and from the company, despite their physical and social proximity.  Many of 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the collaborating scientists in each company maintained their own independent labs 
and were, therefore, embedded in a variety of different collaborative networks.  For 
these scientists, their affiliation with their respective companies is part‐time and based 
on contract.  Their roles as company scientists are among a list of other projects in 
which they are involved.  This rich web of networks among company scientists puts a 
diverse array of intellectual resources at the disposal of each company and strengthens 
its requisite variety of knowledge. 
  The role of the university has interesting implications for academic spin‐off 
companies that are organized as communities of practice.  The university from which a 
company emerged continues to play a role in the company to the extent that its 
scientists are engaged in university research.  In the case of Alpha and Foxtrot, company 
scientists continued to work as university scientists, which consequently put university 
resources at the disposal of each company.  A point of departure between both 
companies was the extent to which the University of the Southern Hemisphere played a 
role in the commercial aspects of each company.  Alpha was established outside of any 
technology transfer channels, while Foxtrot greatly benefited from technology transfer 
channels.  Therefore, the university continues to play a role in the commercial matters 
related to Foxtrot but not for Alpha. 
  This chapter illustrates two companies that each benefit from an internal 
champion who is skilled at both academic and commercial aspects of their respective 
companies.  In both cases, the champion is an academic scientist who speaks with 
credibility about matters related to the company’s scientific research base, which acts to 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strengthen the legitimacy of the enterprise, and the champion also demonstrates a level 
of business literacy that enables them to effectively navigate the commercial terrain of 
their respective ventures.  Existing scholarship that university technology transfer offices 
often assume many such roles of the championing of academic spin‐off companies.  
However this chapter illustrates the ways in which an academic enterprise (Alpha, in this 
case) can champion itself in the absence of a technology transfer office. 
  In conclusion, this chapter illustrates two academic spin‐off companies that 
organize as communities of practice and engage in knowledge creation that supports 
long‐term R&D projects.  The knowledge that each company creates is contextually 
driven by its R&D goals as well as by the providers of funding that ascertains the 
commercial legitimacy of the enterprise.  Both companies share a common tie to the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere, yet other universities play important roles in 
the activities of each company.  In the case of Alpha, both the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere and Ivy League University offer the intellectual and scientific origins of the 
company, which suggests that an academic spin‐off company is not always traceable to 
a single organization.   Each company’s academic connections are important aspects of 
its legitimacy as an enterprise, but academic legitimacy manifests in different ways 
based on the life cycle stage of the venture.   Collaborative ties also diversify the 
requisite variety of skills and expertise that contribute to the work of each company. 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Chapter 7 – Academic Spin‐off Companies as Hierarchical Firms 
 
Introduction 
  This chapter presents two companies – Beta Health Services and Echo 
Technology Solutions – whose social structures most closely resemble that of an 
archetypical hierarchy, with a clear division of labour and function among members.  
Colloquially, these companies “look what one might expect to see” when they envision a 
company and visiting it.  Each company has a dedicated office space and employees who 
work there.  They are both locally based, and each is located within a short walking 
distance to the University of the Southern Hemisphere campus.  These companies are 
organizationally independent from the university community.  In this sample, university 
technology transfer channels did not actually “spin‐off” these companies.  Instead, 
company founders launched each respective company through their own efforts by 
securing financial resources from investors.   
  The goals of both companies differ in content, but each founder launched their 
respective company with the intent of applying academic knowledge to the addressing 
of specific niche industrial needs.  Beta’s founders addressed a need in the 
pharmaceutical industry by developing a cognitive test that could be easily administered 
as part of large‐scale clinical trials.  Echo’s founders recognized the drawbacks in existing 
technologies that detect radiation and developed a new technology that overcomes 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these limitations and is applicable across a wide range of industries, including medical 
technology and defense.  These two companies have the strongest exploitation aspects 
of their respective strategies because, unlike the other companies in my sample, they 
were founded with the ability to immediately market products in the commercial 
marketplace.  Each company strategically balances this with varying degrees of 
exploration activities, which balance their strategies.  Consequently, the scale and scope 
of the exploration aspects of these respective strategies differ and also impact the 
extent to which each company is collaborative, transparent, and ultimately engaged 
with academic research.  Each company maintains idiosyncratic relationships with the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere.  Furthermore, each company is agnostic toward 
the University of the Southern Hemisphere and considers the university one of many 
current and potential collaborators. 
 
Beta Health Services 
 
Goals and strategies 
  Beta Health Services is a medical software company that markets cognitive tests 
and related services to pharmaceutical companies and other research organizations.  
The cognitive tests that Beta designs and markets are utilized in the context of clinical 
trials and other large scale research programs in which researchers desire to measure 
change in cognitive function in populations of people over time.  Beta was founded in 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1999 and has been marketing its tests since its founding.  It has been a publicly traded 
company since 2004. 
  Strategically, Beta maintains a balance between exploration and exploitation of 
knowledge (March, 1991).  Beta is able to exploit its testing product as its core 
intellectual property by directly earning revenue from it.  The company is also 
strategically focused on exploring new uses for its tests, participating in related research 
studies on cognition, and generating new knowledge in order to continuously 
demonstrate the efficacy of its tests.  
The potential of this technology, of the core technology we’ve got is enormous in 
many, many areas that we haven’t even had time to even think about, let alone 
– well, we’ve thought about lots of them, but have not had time to develop at all 
(Respondent #2). 
Beta supports this exploration by incorporating an extensive student‐based research 
program into its organization.  Among the companies in my sample, Beta most exhibits a 
long‐term strategic balance between exploration and exploitation of knowledge and, 
consequently, the balance between short‐term revenue generation and long‐term 
investment in projects (see Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, and Souder, 2009; Tushman and 
O’Reilly, 1996).  It is also the only company in my sample that extensively incorporates 
students into its organization. 
Beta is organized as a hierarchical firm with dedicated office space and staff.  It is 
organizationally separate from universities or any other entities.  The company consists 
of 30 employees.  It is roughly structured into a small leadership team and a small 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research team.  Included in the mix are information technology staff and programmers, 
finance and billing staff, statisticians, and staff psychologists.  Beta also involves 
students from local universities to work on a variety of research projects for the 
company.  Currently, four doctoral students, three Masters students, and honours year 
undergraduate students work on Beta related research projects.  Beta’s office location is 
roughly a ten‐minute walk from the University of the Southern Hemisphere campus and 
a ten‐minute walk from a second university campus – a technical university.  Many of 
Beta’s students come from these two universities.  In 2006, Beta opened a second office 
in the northeast United States in order to support one of the company’s major U.S. 
pharmaceutical clients.  Through some of its scientific collaborators, Beta has also had a 
presence in London. 
  Among the companies in my sample, Beta is the most transparent and one of the 
most globally and epistemologically networked organizations.  The company has 
relatively little intellectual property that it protects.  The software algorithms for its 
cognitive tests are protected.  Otherwise, the company openly disseminates its 
knowledge through academic channels and maintains a culture of transparency in order 
to continuously signal its academic credibility.  Beta’s research collaborations globally 
extend to multiple researchers at various universities around the world and incorporate 
a diversity of expertise.  Despite this transparency, much of Beta’s competitive 
advantage is rooted in the tacit knowledge of its team. 
 
 
 
 196 
Epistemological factors 
  Beta originated as a collaborative effort between two scientists who combined 
their diverse backgrounds in order to address a practical need in the area of cognition 
research.  Gordon Kirts was a staff neurologist at a local hospital with a non‐faculty 
appointment at the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  Through his work, he was 
involved in the hospital’s dementia program and worked to develop cognitive 
assessments.  He also had a personal interest in computer programming.  As a result of 
these interests in programming and cognition, he sought to develop a web‐based, 
culturally neutral, computerized test of cognition, which he recognized was an unmet 
need within the context of the administration of large‐scale research projects.  Kirts 
contacted Lewis Caples, who was a colleague with whom he had previous contact 
through professional conferences and associations.  Caples was a neuropsychologist 
with a lab at another local university who had an interest in mental health research and 
who was an experienced methodologist in that field with a wide range of collaborations 
across interest areas.  Consequently, these two researchers combined their respective 
areas of expertise to a shared goal (see Leonard and Sensiper, 1998) and successfully 
developed a cognitive test.  Such patterns of combining diverse intellectual perspectives 
to shared goals have continuously exemplified Beta’s corporate culture and exploratory 
strategy of knowledge creation and have also broadened the company’s collaborative 
network structure. 
  One aspect of the company’s connectedness that supports its exploratory 
strategy is the extent to which Beta is a social learning space for an extended network of 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student researchers.  A research team is an aspect of Beta’s organizational structure.  
Unlike other companies in my sample that largely avoid involving students in 
commercially related research activities, Beta embraces them.  Lewis Caples directs 
Beta’s research activities.  He also maintains an adjunct academic appointment at a local 
technical university.  Caples’s ties to the local academic community put him in touch 
with students whom he has recruited to work at Beta on various research projects.  At 
the time of this study, four doctoral students, three master’s students, and honours year 
undergraduates work on Beta projects.  This mix is comprised of students from both the 
technical university and the University of the Southern Hemisphere.   
  Beta designed a mutually beneficial student research program in which the 
company benefits from the manpower and diverse expertise of the students, while the 
students benefit from the opportunity to work in a commercial environment and to 
publish research papers from data.  This arrangement blurs the boundary between 
academic and commercial activities.   
In fact if you could come in here and sit around and I led you in blind folded and 
sat you in the corner and let you make observations for a day, I reckon you 
wouldn’t know whether you were in an academic environment (Respondent #5). 
On the one hand, Caples mentors students in a manner that resembles that of an 
advisor‐advisee relationship and gives them freedom to pursue projects that interest 
them.  On the other hand, projects must relate to Beta’s mission, and the work is largely 
conducted off‐campus at the company’s workspace.  Kirts and Caples summarized the 
nature of the company’s relationship with students. 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They do a lot of primary R&D that we otherwise wouldn’t have the funds to get 
done.  We – the things they do are small components of larger pictures, so when 
we help them get experience in a commercial environment in terms of doing 
research which is going to help us commercially.  But also give them a chance to 
write up papers, and get their first publications.  They help us with manpower 
basically and some expertise in the sense that they have lecturers and other 
people to help them.  They have time to do interesting studies and they have 
some background usually – psychology or research methods – that allows them 
to slot in quite quickly (Respondent #2). 
 
So if you came through and I have a meeting with you and you look like you’re 
maybe immature, you’re one of those students that comes through school and 
really just being cloistered.  Then I’ll set you a project that pretty much you stay 
right under my wing.  I don’t let you outside, but I’ll give you something and okay 
well I’ve got this problem now, there’s a construct that we’ve been looking at 
and I really don’t know how it works and here’s two or three experiments that 
would really help us understand that and so off they go (Respondent #5). 
   
  Research collaboration that utilizes the company’s cognitive test or supports its 
research efforts in human cognition is strategically critical for Beta.  The hierarchical 
(and non‐virtual) nature of the company illustrates the dynamic of the company’s 
collaborative efforts.  One the one hand, the student research program incorporates 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students into the formal structure of the company’s activities.  On the other hand, Beta 
maintains a variety of ties to other individuals and organizations beyond its internal 
social structure.  Some of the company’s collaborative ties extend to individual 
researchers at various universities around the world who are using Beta’s tests in their 
research studies or who are doing research that is relevant to Beta’s overall research 
agenda on the measurement of human cognition.  Lewis Caples sits on dissertation 
committees of doctoral students whose advisors collaborate with Beta and whose 
dissertations relate to Beta’s research agenda.  In his role as research director, Caples 
plays an especially central role in maintaining the company’s academic ties by bridging 
structural holes and broadening the company’s network (Burt, 2004, 1992).  
Alternatively, the company maintains collaborative relationships with its customers.  
Many of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies are Beta customers.  The 
relationships with these companies are more than just transactional.  They are 
relationship driven in that Beta seeks to learn from these companies and their research 
studies to the extent that it enriches its own knowledge base. 
  Interestingly, Beta also illustrates the drawbacks of strategic level collaboration 
that exceed a company’s core goals.  At the time of the company’s initial public offering 
of stock in 2004, Beta had diversified its business and expanded into drug development 
by in‐licensing Alzheimer’s disease and Parkinson’s disease drug development projects 
from other biotechnology companies.  The company undertook the drug development 
projects in an effort to raise the value of its IPO.  Much of the work for these projects 
was subsequently contracted to scientists in external labs.  Consequently, the 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company’s role in these projects was mostly project management.  The drug 
development projects did not fit with the original motivation for the founding of the 
company in order to provide cognitive testing products and services.  The drug 
development projects distracted the company from its core product and drained 
financial resources, despite their role as a means of attracting additional funding.  
Consequently, the company divested these projects in 2005.  These projects gave the 
company a greater level of requisite variety of knowledge resources and available 
expertise (Weick, 1979; Ashby, 1956) while broadening its external network.  However 
the projects complicated the company’s exploratory strategy by not directly relating to 
the knowledge resources around its cognitive tests, which the company was already 
able to exploit. 
   In summary, Beta has a widespread collaborative network that extends beyond 
the boundaries of the formal social structure of its firm.  These collaborations support 
the company’s exploratory strategy of developing new uses for its cognitive tests and 
for conducting research on related aspects of human cognition.  The company also has a 
straightforward strategy of marketing its cognitive tests to users who pay the company a 
license to use it.  In doing so, it is exploiting its knowledge resources.  In many ways, its 
collaborative activities support both its exploratory and exploitative strategies in that it 
collaborates with those to whom it sells, and vice versa.  Collaboration increases the 
requisite variety of Beta’s knowledge resources, but it also embeds those knowledge 
resources in the hands of its collaborators. 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We talk about it as much as we can whenever we can and we basically have built 
up quite a large collaborative network by doing that, maybe between 60 and 100 
different sites around the world that are using our tool.  Then we also get 
credibility when we work with drug companies who then – the turnover in drug 
companies is quite high.  Some people go to academia, some people come from 
academia, and so that also helps in terms of people knowing about us and 
talking about us and using us (Respondent #2). 
As such, students and other academic and industrial collaborators contribute to Beta’s 
knowledge base, but they also utilize Beta’s knowledge resources in their own work, 
which effectively spreads awareness and application of the company’s cognitive tests.  
 
Institutional factors 
  Strategically, Beta is a very transparent company in that it regularly disseminates 
knowledge related to its activities through academic channels.  This transparency is a 
function of the company’s need to continuously signal the academic credibility and 
efficacy of the core asset that it exploits in the marketplace (its cognitive test), which 
subsequently legitimizes the overall business.  Despite having earned revenue from its 
cognitive tests since its inception as a new venture, the company has still not turned an 
annual profit.  Therefore, its commercial legitimacy (to the extent that shareholders 
accept the company as a viable long‐term investment) directly relates to its academic 
legitimacy (to the extent that its cognitive test works and is scientifically credible). 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 Unlike the drug development companies in my sample, which engage in 
extensive R&D in anticipation of an eventual drug product, Beta’s cognitive test 
“product” was marketable very early in the company’s existence.  Alternatively, Beta 
offered a marketable “product” as soon as it became an established business venture.  
The company’s initial private investors gave Gordon Kirts and Lewis Caples a limited 
amount of start‐up capital and a three‐month time frame to develop the cognitive test.  
They successfully developed the test and ascertained its validity.  This boosted the 
company’s credibility and enabled it to market its test and raise revenue.  Beta has been 
operational for over a decade, and during this time its cognitive tests have been 
successfully utilized in a variety of clinical trials and research settings.  Thus the 
company no longer suffers from a liability of newness (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 
Stinchcombe, 1965), and it arguably has crossed an academic legitimacy threshold 
(Rutherford and Buller, 2007) in which any fundamental academic questions of the 
company’s test have been adequately addressed. 
Despite having crossed a basic legitimacy threshold, Beta continues to 
strengthen the credibility of its tests and promote its overall academic legitimacy.  Its 
researchers participate in academic conferences and publish papers.  The peer review 
process legitimizes their work, and this academic legitimacy further serves as a 
commercial marketing strategy.  As one respondent noted: 
In terms of a marketing strategy… It’s very important, and particularly in the 
early days, ‘Tell us about the academic research that’s been done…’  ‘Tell us, 
show us the papers that analyze the efficacy…’ and so on… These pharmaceutical 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companies are investing very big money… so to have a little Aussie software 
company waltz in the door in New Jersey and say, ‘Hey, we’ve put the best thing 
for you,’ they need to be really confident that our science is good, our quality… 
and so on is good (Respondent #11). 
 
The marketability of the Beta’s test relies on its applicability in many testing 
scenarios.  So while the company is able to exploit its knowledge resources in the 
commercial marketplace, it continues to explore new knowledge and strengthen its test 
in the academic context in order to avoid any mishap or validity issue in the commercial 
space.  Although the company is raising sales revenues, it continues to remain 
unprofitable.  Therefore, Beta cannot afford a negative issue around the validity of its 
core cognitive test product and must continue to sustain its academic legitimacy. 
Unlike a drug development company that can protect molecules and chemical 
compounds as intellectual property, Beta has little IP that it can protect.  As a result, 
much of Beta’s knowledge has been disseminated through academic channels such as 
publication and conference presentation.  The company is very transparent, as the 
academic legitimacy of its knowledge base is fundamental to its commercial success.  Its 
academic legitimacy is not rooted in a tie to a single university; rather it is rooted in its 
extensive collaborations and participation within a global network of academic 
colleagues. 
We try and collaborate widely; we try to do as much ongoing research with 
academics as possible, mainly because the applications of our technology are so 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wide, so broad.  Having collaborations with the [University of the Southern 
Hemisphere and other local universities], with other universities in different 
parts of the country and with universities in America and Europe and really 
pretty much all over the world is the way we gain credibility to then sell this 
product into trials for pharma companies (Respondent #2). 
 
  Beta’s path to commercial legitimacy was not a function of formal university 
technology transfer channels.  No university technology transfer office played a role in 
championing the company.  Beta’s founders benefited from personal networks of 
individual investors who had a trusting relationship with the founders and understood 
both the scientific and commercial potential of what the business venture offered.  Beta 
emerged from academic ideas, but no university technology transfer office “spun off” 
the company or helped it navigate the commercial sector.  Beta has few formal ties to 
the University of the Southern Hemisphere, as the development of the cognitive tests 
did not originate from specific work that occurred at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere.  In fact, in the process of establishing the actual company the University of 
the Southern Hemisphere was asked and agreed to acknowledge that it had no 
intellectual property claim to the company.  Once established, Gordon Kirts and Lewis 
Caples received adjunct faculty appointments at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere as well as honorary appointments at the university’s centre for 
neuroscience.  They have no official responsibilities to the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere.  However they occasionally lecture at the university. 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 In summary, Beta is organized to promote its overall academic credibility and 
legitimacy in an effort to directly affect its commercial legitimacy and success.  Its 
organization promotes transparency in the context of the relationships that it 
establishes with academic and industrial scientists and collaborators.  Beta researchers 
actively publish papers and present at academic conferences.  These activities are 
emblematic of the company’s academic legitimacy.  As such, the company does not seek 
an exclusive relationship with any one university or academic institution, but it instead 
relies on this widespread engagement with the global academic community.   
   
Creating knowledge 
  A unique aspect of Beta’s organization is its social structure as a learning space 
for students, as identified by intellectually rich patterns of knowledge creation.  In this 
learning space, students are mentored in the research that they conduct, and the 
subsequent results of their work contribute to the knowledge base of the organization.  
Because students routinely work at the company’s office location under the supervision 
of Lewis Caples, Beta resembles a traditional academic learning environment in which 
tacit knowledge is developed and shared in an atmosphere of close collaboration 
between a mentor and a student.  This is the socialization form of knowledge creation in 
which tacit knowledge is transferred and new meanings and insights are created 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  The development of tacit knowledge and a network of 
researchers who use Beta’s tests are important for the success of the company.  The 
company’s local location in the vicinity of universities supports this.  Despite the lack of 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formal ties to any one particular university, the company maintains connections with 
universities as a way of reaching out to local pools of expertise for transferring tacit 
knowledge (see Audretsch and Stephan, 1996).  Because of the company’s transparency, 
student research results are disseminated, which makes the students and the company 
agents of knowledge transfer.  In essence, Beta’s social structure is an organizing 
mechanism that works through a revolving door of students who learn as well as create 
and disseminate knowledge in an established rhythm and work routines (Bauer, 2007; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
  Interestingly, the organization of Beta as a venture provided its founders with a 
flexible social structure that was independent of their respective universities in which to 
pursue their ideas about cognitive testing.  The company’s social structure was 
sufficiently flexible for the co‐founder’s intellectual pursuits, which ultimately resulted 
in a knowledge‐creating company. 
He (co‐founder) was very pleased to be able to work in the business because of 
the much more excitement than just continuing academia.  Because he gets, he 
gets the best of both worlds (research and practice)… I think (other co‐founder) 
enjoys the same environment and they get to swan around the world and 
influence neuroscience at a far higher level than if they’d just remained at a pure 
academic situation.  They’ve thrived in that environment (Respondent #11). 
The company enabled them to fully develop their test and validate the test through its 
use by customers – mostly large pharmaceutical companies – and by academic 
collaborators. 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 All projects in which Beta collaborates ultimately must have something to do 
with the company’s mission and must not conflict with that mission.  As such, Beta’s 
knowledge productions are contextually specific constructions that adhere to the 
interest structure of the organization (see Knorr‐Cetina, 1981) of generating the best 
cognitive test that holds an intellectual monopoly of sorts in the commercial 
marketplace of such tests (see Latour and Woolgar, 1979).  As one respondent notes, 
Beta’s collaborative relationships must ultimately create knowledge that benefits the 
company. 
So often times generally, it works very simply, that is that [a] professor has a 
problem, I have a solution.  The solution involves Beta technology or ideas... And 
so one example might be that the professor then says, ‘Well I don’t want you to 
do so much of that Beta stuff, I want you to start working on this other stuff.’  To 
which I say, ‘That’s not the project, I have no expertise in this other stuff’ and 
then they might say or alternative and ultimately if you can’t resolve it I just 
always say look, I want Beta, I have to have something to do with Beta for me to 
collaborate it and if it’s not I’m conflictive, right, I can’t give you advice about 
things that might either compete with Beta or things that don’t involve, because 
I haven’t got enough time to be talking about something else. 
 
  In summary, Beta is a globally networked, knowledge creating company.  As a 
commercial entity, Beta markets a tool that contributes to the efforts of researchers in 
conducting large‐scale studies.  Through its strategy of exploitation, Beta raises revenue 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from its cognitive testing application.  Through its strategy of exploration, Beta creates 
knowledge around the application of this test.  The cognitive test is an enabler of 
knowledge creation.  It is the basis of ongoing research studies that the company 
internally conducts through students as well studies in which the company externally 
participates through collaboration with customers and academic partners. 
 
Echo Technology Solutions 
 
Goals and strategies 
  Echo Technology Solutions is a small company, founded in 2004, which is based 
on founder Rick Avans’s technology that he developed while pursuing a PhD in electrical 
engineering at the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  The company strategically 
balances exploitation and exploration around its core digital pulse processing 
technology (Simsek, Heavey, Veiga, and Souder, 2009, March, 1991).  The exploitation 
aspect of its strategy is the marketing of this core technology in a variety of industries 
and applications.  The company’s core technology is applied to business activities in four 
major categories – medical imaging, defense and security, minerals exploration and 
analysis, and materials analysis.  The exploration aspect of the strategy is the search for 
new innovative industrial applications for the technology, which necessitates the 
navigation of adjacent areas of knowledge in order to discover these new possibilities.  
The balancing of exploitation and exploration are elements of the company’s 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ambidexterity (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), which is meant to ensure the its continued 
financial growth. 
The organizational structure of Echo is relatively simple.  The company has three 
employees.  Rick Avans is the technical director of the company and is responsible for 
the R&D and technical aspects of the company’s development.  There is a managing 
director of the company who is largely responsible for business development.  There is 
also a chief technology officer and a non‐executive board chairman.  The company also 
employs consultants in the areas of intellectual property management and computer 
programming.  At the time of this study, the company was looking to add a few 
additional employees in the areas of business support and technology development.  
The company is based in a small office location in a suburb near the the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere campus.  The chief technology officer is based in a satellite city 
approximately 130 kilometres from the company, but he works from the company’s 
offices twice a week.  Although the company is very small, it has an organizational 
structure with defined roles and responsibilities.  These attributes therefore 
characterize the company as ‘hierarchical’ rather than as ‘virtual.’ 
 
Epistemological factors 
  The organizational structure of Echo reflects an interesting evolution around 
founder Rick Avans’s goal of commercializing technology that he developed during his 
doctoral studies at the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  The social structure 
leading to the formation of Echo was initially characterized by a community of practice 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whose goal was to ascertain the commercial potential of Avans’s technology that he 
developed through the course of his doctoral studies.  This community of practice took 
the form of an interdisciplinary team that entered a business plan competition with a 
commercialization plan for Avans’s technology.  The team met its goal by placing second 
in the competition and attracting the interest of an investor who would eventually 
support Avans’s efforts.  With the founding of Echo as a company, its social structure 
has since evolved into a more formalized system with clear roles and responsibilities for 
the members of the company, who devote their full time efforts to the venture. 
  As a doctoral student in electrical engineering at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere, Rick Avans pursued his interest in the development of detection 
technologies for land mine clearance in the humanitarian context.  During this time, he 
worked to develop a specific technology that improved the accuracy and speed of the 
detection of radiation.  Existing gamma ray detection suffered multiple practical 
drawbacks in that the detection signal was either slowly generating weak data or rapidly 
generating mostly corrupted data.  The knowledge that Avans developed around digital 
pulse processing in the course of his studies enabled him to create a technology that 
overcame existing limitations.  In essence, he started with a practical problem and 
created knowledge around solving it (Popper, 1972) 
  During his time as a doctoral student, Avans entered a business plan competition 
through the university’s business school on a team that included a personal friend who 
was enrolled at the school.  This team resembled a community of practice in that it was 
informally bound by the shared objective of determining the commercial applicability of 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the technology that Avans had developed (Wenger and Snyder, 2001).  The social 
structure of this team assembled an interdisciplinary mix of both academic and business 
knowledge in order to discover potential applications for a technology.  A team for an 
academic business plan competition also represents an alternative to discipline‐specific 
academic organization, as it gave Avans a mechanism by which to expand beyond the 
traditions of his academic department and to discover novel possibilities around his 
work (see Simonton, 1983).  The team was successful in the competition.  They won 
some money, and they also won the support of someone who would ultimately invest in 
what was to become Echo. 
  The current social structure of Echo is relatively closed – as the company does 
not collaborate with many external partner organizations.  The company did rely on the 
expertise of an external IT/system architecture firm for programming and the writing of 
computer code, which enabled the technology to move from a concept to a solution.  
The founders remain in close contact with the University of the Southern Hemisphere 
through personal connections, which include connections with colleagues in the school 
of engineering and University Enterprises.  The company is open to future university 
collaborations in support of the exploration aspects of their strategy (University of the 
Southern Hemisphere or elsewhere) to the extent that such collaborations enable them 
to discover new applications for their core technology.  As one respondent noted about 
the company and its collaborative relationships: 
We’re effectively an intellectual property design house and we’re focused on 
designing and extracting and licensing intellectual property... We want to remain 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very focused on developing the best technology we can with these applications.  
And in solving our customer’s problems when they come back and they say ‘well 
this is not working for us.’  So we see in the near future probably having a 
stronger role with the university in terms of... progressing in different technology 
areas.  I guess we see that potentially we’re a good vehicle for extracting 
technology out of the universities in this particular space (Respondent #13). 
 
  Once Avans founded Echo, much of the company’s efforts were aimed at the 
securing of its intellectual property from the university and other sponsoring parties.  
This necessitated an emphasis on the exploitation aspects of the company’s strategy 
because IP protections would enable the company to market its technology while 
simultaneously protecting it.  Consequently, the exploration aspects of the strategy 
were secondary, and the company was neither widely collaborative nor aligned with 
academic research activities.  In recent years the company has presented at academic 
conferences, but it has done so for the purpose of discovering adjacent opportunities 
for the application of its technology.   
Now that we’re presenting conferences people come to us with applications that 
we’ve never heard of.  But that wasn’t the marketing technique that was 
available to us until we felt more comfortable about the IP protection 
(Respondent #13). 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We’ve really only done a lot of public access or academic access presentations 
more recently… and that’s on the back of every patent granted.  So once your 
patent’s granted and the paper details it goes into some or obviously quite a lot 
of detail about the process that our core technology follows, then the risk gets 
significantly diminished (Respondent #14). 
Because of the technology’s potential application in a range of disciplines, including 
medical imaging, mining, and security, much of the company’s current efforts involve a 
navigation of various knowledge areas.  By beginning to present at academic 
conferences in 2008 and seeking novel combinations of knowledge around his 
technology, Rick Avans is shifting focus toward the exploration aspects of his company’s 
strategy. 
  In summary, the organization of Echo reflects efforts to commercialize the 
efforts of Rick Avans’s academic research.  A business plan competition – organized as a 
community of practice – was responsible for generating momentum that led to the 
founding of the company.  Once founded as a company, Echo was organized to 
continuously market Avans’s core technology and explore different applications for it.  
Both the community of practice and the established company of Echo were organizing 
mechanisms for advancing knowledge from a scientific construct to a practical 
technology.  In doing so, external collaboration has been minimized at the interest of 
other priorities related to the exploitation aspects of the company’s strategy. 
 
 
 
 214 
Institutional factors 
  A major driver of Echo’s structure is the inter‐institutional dynamic between the 
company’s origin in a university research setting and the efforts that its founder 
undertook to isolate the technology from the university and acquire full ownership of it.  
Echo is very protective of its intellectual property, which obscures the transparency of 
the company’s knowledge base and limits its interactions with the academic community.  
Consequently, efforts at achieving commercial legitimacy ahead of academic legitimacy 
characterize Echo’s path to commercialization. 
  Echo has delineated a clear boundary between academic research and 
commercial activity.  The University of the Southern Hemisphere, through a complex 
relationship with various corporate partners, formed a consortium that partially funded 
Avans’s doctoral research.  Consequently, this consortium retained ownership of the 
intellectual property that he developed through his studies.  For approximately three 
years after formal establishment, the efforts of the company were directed at securing 
full ownership of its intellectual property from the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere and this consortium of funders.  Because of concerns around intellectual 
property, any research that has been conducted around Echo’s technology has been 
internalised and not publicly disseminated through academic channels in order to 
strategically maintain a monopoly over these knowledge‐based resources for the 
purposes of commercial exploitation (see Knorr‐Cetina, 1981; Latour and Woolgar, 
1979).  Rick Avans made a conscious decision to forgo an academic career in order to 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develop his company and the applications of its technology while separating the 
intellectual property from the university setting. 
  At Echo, the quest for academic legitimacy has remained a secondary priority to 
matters of commercial legitimacy and the securing of intellectual property protections 
for the company’s technology and knowledge base.  As a result, the company’s social 
organizational structure has been relatively non‐transparent.  Beginning in 2008, Rick 
Avans has begun to present at some academic conferences, thereby increasing the 
transparency.  These efforts have been aimed at marketing the company’s technology 
and exploring for new applications of the technology rather than the dissemination of 
knowledge and the seeking of academic legitimacy.  For Echo, the scientific rigor and 
integrity of the company’s core technology was established while Avans was a PhD 
candidate at the University of the Southern Hemisphere.   
In the early days, in the very early days the company’s first tick… we were quite 
focused on getting news releases out about this technology coming out of [the 
University of the Southern Hemisphere].  So getting our name associated with 
the university was helpful in terms of a granting exercise and whilst [University 
of the Southern Hemisphere] is not known massively overseas.  If I’m overseas 
saying this technology has come out of [the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere] and someone searches the [University of the Southern 
Hemisphere] website and there’s no reference to it, then it damages your ‐ it 
doesn’t damage it, it may not damage your credibility but having that reference 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there of you being in this university newspaper article or something like that or 
press release, it’s just one level of credibility (Respondent #13). 
As such, having the association with academic research has been a valuable aspect of 
the company’s marketing strategy, but it is not the only aspect.  For Echo, the 
applicability of the technology in a variety of industrial settings has been especially 
valuable.  In other words, once the rigor of the science was established, it has been very 
important to the company that the technology works and that it has a narrative about 
what the technology does. 
  The institutional boundary between Echo and the academic community is clearly 
delineated.  The company primarily resides in the commercial institutional space.  As a 
result, it has relied on commercial symbols of legitimacy such as patents (Higgins and 
Gulati, 2003), business development grants, and business innovation awards.  In 
particular, the first major award associated with the company was the second place 
finish in a business plan competition at the business school in which Rick Avans and 
others competed around a plan that became the basis for the eventual establishment of 
Echo.  The company has subsequently received a variety of awards from various 
business groups.   
  The University of the Southern Hemisphere did not spin off Echo, as the 
company was not established through any formal technology transfer channels.  Rick 
Avans was able to generate credibility through the course of the business plan 
competition, which served as a platform for the sharing of the narrative behind the 
commercial potential of his knowledge and technology.  In this role, he became the 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company champion.  One of the business plan judges – who himself was an 
entrepreneur – was receptive to this narrative and became an advocate for the idea 
behind the business and also played a role in the networking of capital for the company.  
His efforts helped legitimise the Echo enterprise in the commercial institutional space 
(see Morrell, 2008).  Similarly, University Enterprises has shown an interest in the 
commercial success of Echo and has helped the company network for funds (Jain, 
George, and Maltarich, 2009; Colyvas et al., 2002).  In this role, University Enterprises 
has been a mechanism for communicating the company’s narrative despite its otherwise 
limited and informal relationship with the company. 
Aside from the company’s past intellectual property ties to the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere, Echo has no remaining formal ties to the university.  The 
company exclusively owns its intellectual property.  In the process of considering 
funding options, the company did approach University Enterprises and presented a 
proposal to a venture capital fund, but ultimately the funding from this source did not 
materialize.  Despite this, Echo maintains a good relationship with the people at 
University Enterprises.  Although there is no formal tie between the company and 
University Enterprises, the two parties remain in close contact.  University Enterprises 
has promoted Echo in its published materials as a company with a rooted knowledge 
base in the university community. 
  In summary, Echo has been a relatively non‐transparent company.  The lack of 
transparency reflects its effort at establishing commercial legitimacy through the 
securing of its intellectual property.  Such efforts would subsequently enable the 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company to exploit this intellectual property in the commercial‐ industrial marketplace.  
The credibility of Echo’s technology and knowledge base was initially established during 
founder Rick Avans’s doctoral studies at the University of the Southern Hemisphere.  
This credibility was sufficient at academically legitimizing the company and attracting 
investors through personal networks of the founder and his immediate collaborators.  
Upon successfully achieving ownership of its intellectual property, the company is 
becoming gradually more transparent in an effort to market the technology to new 
industries and to develop new applications.  Therefore, academic legitimacy is an aspect 
of the company’s marketing strategy, and it also relates to the company’s efforts at 
finding adjacent opportunities by navigating a gradually expanding space of scientific 
collaborators. 
 
Creating knowledge 
  Popper (1972) wrote that the world around us challenges us with practical 
problems that require novel solutions based on the advancement of science and the 
creation of new knowledge.  He wrote, “We learn about our environment not through 
being instructed by it, but through being challenged by it” (p. 266).  The challenge of 
humanitarian land mine clearance presented Rick Avans with just such a challenge, but 
the existing technologies were limited in their ability to address this problem.  His 
academic studies, followed by his efforts to commercialize his findings, represent the 
codification of new knowledge‐in‐action as manifested in his technology.  He 
continuously seeks adjacent industries in which to apply his company’s core technology. 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Such efforts offer the opportunity to create new knowledge around the role that his 
technology can play in the addressing of other practical challenges. 
  Upon successful securing of its intellectual property ownership, Echo has added 
flexibility at creating new knowledge.  Intellectual property protections are integral to 
the exploitation aspects of the company’s strategy.  Consequently, the knowledge that 
the company has created or will create through the search for adjacent business 
opportunities will be contextually specific constructions of the practical needs of 
customers in various industries as well as the contingencies and constraints associated 
with intellectual property protections (see Knorr‐Cetina, 1981).  Echo represents an 
interesting example of a social structure whose knowledge producing capabilities were 
somewhat arrested by the constraints of intellectual property.  Organizationally, Avans 
and his team brought order to an otherwise disorderly intellectual property ownership 
structure, which has subsequently positioned the company for the creation of 
knowledge and the development of an increasingly better technology platform through 
the potential pursuit of collaborative R&D relationships and business opportunities (see 
Patriotta, 2003). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
  This chapter demonstrates the ways in which intellectual property protections 
matter to a company and affect the extent to which the company is transparent.  
Despite both having their intellectual roots in academic research, the companies 
presented in this chapter widely differ with respect to their strategies around 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intellectual property protections for their knowledge.  Beta is relatively transparent and 
collaboratively networked to companies and universities around the world.  In contrast, 
Echo is relatively non‐transparent, and it does widely collaborate with other partner 
organizations. 
  The two companies described in this chapter are social organizational structures 
that enabled their respective founders to enact better conditions in the contexts in 
which they work and in which their interests and passions lie.  The founders of Beta 
organized to pursue their interdisciplinary interests in cognition, research study design, 
and computer programming in an effort to help large pharmaceutical companies design 
better clinical trials, which ultimately speeds the development of new drug treatments.  
The founders of Echo recognized a passion for humanitarian land mine clearance, and 
they consequently improved upon existing radiation detection technologies and 
assembled other intellectual resources in order to serve the original passion as well as 
to discover adjacent sectors in which the same technology could make a meaningful 
difference in people’s lives.  The founders worked in various capacities in the university 
research environment.  Yet in both cases, they recognized that the university 
environment limited their abilities to pursue their respective goals, which necessitated 
organizing in a separate social structure.  The commercial environment provided each 
founder with added flexibility to pursue their goals, access to commercial funds, and 
customers who could readily benefit from their knowledge‐based offerings. 
  Neither of these two companies organized as speculative long‐term R&D 
projects.  Both Beta and Echo organized as new ventures with products and services 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that they could immediately market for revenue.  As such, the strategies of both 
companies incorporated aspects of exploitation, which enabled them to market their 
knowledge‐based resources in short‐term time frames.  However both companies 
balanced these exploitation strategic aspects with long‐term exploratory elements that 
would enable them to diversify their businesses with new knowledge over a longer time 
frame.  Beta and Echo differed with respect to their strategies of exploration.  Beta’s 
exploration strategy was more established and based on a model of transparency and 
widespread collaboration, while Echo exhibited a more nascent exploration strategy 
that was contingent upon the strengthening of intellectual property protections. 
  The University of the Southern Hemisphere and the broader academic 
community played varying roles in the context of both companies.  For both Beta and 
Echo, technology transfer channels were not involved in the launching of each venture.  
Both companies undertook the exploitation aspects of their respective strategies 
independent of any university involvement.  The university was not involved in helping 
either company market their respective products or services, and neither company 
appeared to seek any such assistance from the university.  Echo had the resources of 
University Enterprises at its disposal, while Beta did not.  Yet both companies “went at it 
alone” by leveraging their otherwise extensive networks of business and investment 
contacts.  Despite the university’s lack of involvement of the exploitation side, academic 
connections mattered more to the exploratory aspects of each company’s strategy.  
With a well‐established research program, Beta heavily relied on its academic ties for 
attracting local student researchers and for engaging on a global level with specific 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experts.  Likewise, Echo was beginning to explore potential collaborative ties with local 
universities in order to enhance its own internal R&D for the purposes of developing 
adjacent opportunities for its core technology.  The University of the Southern 
Hemisphere did not appear to hold an exclusive relationship with either company, as 
each company considered other universities as potential collaborators.   
  Academic legitimacy was a common factor for both companies, but its dynamic 
differed in each case.  The underlying knowledge base of both Beta and Echo was rooted 
in academic knowledge.  Therefore, the citation of the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere as an affiliation or the citation of related research that ascertains the 
credibility of each company’s business model were important marketing aspects and 
enabled the companies to establish themselves as legitimate enterprises.  Any new 
venture must establish the credibility of its product or service.  For an academic spin‐off 
company, the validation of knowledge by peers in the field of one’s venture is a 
mechanism for establishing some degree of credibility for an idea, while the securing of 
investors and intellectual property protections is a mechanism for establishing the 
credibility of the commercial viability of the idea.  Academic legitimacy was an ongoing 
concern for Beta’s value proposition because its cognitive testing product was routinely 
used in clinical trials.  For Echo, the establishment of academic legitimacy was important 
at the outset of the venture, but its ongoing importance seemed to diminish over time.  
Also, the source of academic legitimacy was quite variable.  Because of Beta’s ongoing 
renewal of academic legitimacy, the company seemed to establish a reputation across a 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wide network of academic colleagues.  The University of the Southern Hemisphere was 
not the pivot point of the company’s legitimacy. 
  For both companies, the value of knowledge creation is determined by two 
criteria.  Is it valid, and does it yield something that works?  These two academic spin‐off 
companies organized and went to market with products and services.  Before doing so, 
the founders of each company tacitly and affirmatively answered each question. 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Chapter 8 – Conclusion  
 
Chapter overview 
  This chapter summarizes key lessons from this dissertation with theoretical 
summaries and directions for future research.  The first section of this chapter revisits 
the essence of knowledge creation, which addresses the main research question.  I will 
revisit the constructivist philosophy of knowledge as a central tenet for understanding 
knowledge creation in academic spin‐off companies.  I will illustrate how evidence of 
knowledge creation reveals itself throughout the research process.  Included in this 
section are various directions for future research around knowledge creation. 
  The second section of this chapter addresses a key insight around the meaning of 
projects and practices.  My dissertation study was designed from an organizational level 
of analysis and from the perspective of the spin‐off company.  Throughout my 
dissertation, I explored various archetypes of organizing, which enabled me to make 
meaningful distinctions among the six companies in my sample.  I revisit these 
archetypes and explore directions for future research from the level of analysis of 
projects and practices.  This reframing affords me the opportunity to develop additional 
insights about my sample companies and explore various aspects of organizational 
patterns.  In this section I offer a revised conceptual framework, which factors in these 
new reflections about the projects and practices. 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 In the third section, I consider my research against the broader backdrop of 
academic research commercialization in the life sciences.  Specifically, I consider the 
arguments of Pisano (2010, 2006), which suggest that the business of science (life 
sciences in particular) has struggled at profitability and overarching success.  I use these 
arguments as a lens through which to reflect on the inter‐institutional nature of 
academic spin‐off companies and their relationships with the academic community.  I 
argue that the university technology transfer function should evolve to address the 
systemic shortcomings around life sciences and that university technology transfer 
could assume more of a knowledge orchestration role in the midst of broader 
collaborative innovation networks.  These arguments address the sub‐question of this 
dissertation, what roles do universities play in the creation of knowledge by academic 
spin‐off companies? 
  I conclude this final chapter with other directions for future research that stem 
from various insights that I gained from this endeavour.  In particular, I reflect on the 
meaning of doing “good science” for the enrichment of society and the ways in which 
academic spin‐off companies embody the passions of the academic scientists behind 
them.  I also reflect on the geography of innovation and the extent to which place and 
space matter to the study of knowledge and innovation.   
 
Revisiting knowledge creation 
  My dissertation began with a key research question – how do academic spin‐off 
companies create knowledge?  An elaboration of knowledge creation, therefore 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directed my attention throughout this process.  In the literature review from earlier in 
this dissertation, I argued that knowledge creation is an iterative cycle of questioning 
and answering.  We update and refine what we know about the world through the 
process of creating solutions and then critiquing and modifying them (Lee and Cole, 
2003).  Individuals engage in this iterative cycle, and organizations assimilate individuals 
into a social structure and amplify knowledge creation at a collective level (Nonaka, von 
Krogh, and Voelpel, 2006).  Thus, knowledge is created when individuals or 
organizations offer updated conclusions (as expressed through such means as abstract 
ideas, concrete solutions, or patterns of behavior) about the world.   
 
The constructivist perspective of knowledge creation 
  Among the key insights in my dissertation, knowledge creation in the context of 
academic spin‐off companies and research commercialization exemplifies the 
constructivist epistemology.  Knorr‐Cetina (1981) writes, “The “products of science are 
contextually specific constructions, which bear the mark of the situational contingency 
and interest structure of the process by which they are generated, and which cannot be 
adequately understood without an analysis of their construction” (p. 5).  With respect to 
the notion of “contextually specific constructions,” knowledge creation in the social 
structure of an academic spin‐off company differs from that of a university in that it is 
more open ended in the latter than it is in the former.  Colloquially, universities pursue 
the creation of knowledge for its own sake, while businesses pursue the creation of 
knowledge in order to address a specific “real world” issue and produce a marketable 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product or solution.  With respect to the notion of “situational contingency and interest 
structure,” knowledge created in the context of an academic spin‐off company bears the 
mark of the vested interests of their respective investors and customers, the situational 
contingencies associated with the funding or de‐funding of R&D projects, and the 
normative standards of academic collaborators or peer reviewers whose actions lend 
credibility to company projects. 
  Many of the companies in my sample engaged with the University of the 
Southern Hemisphere and other universities under contract for specific collaborative 
research projects that supported overall company goals.  However, in addition to 
engaging university researchers, some academic spin‐off companies work with other 
stakeholders.  Beta is a particularly good example of how a company engages with its 
customers (in this case, large pharmaceutical companies) in order to strengthen its 
exploratory research and, ultimately, its efforts at creating knowledge for practical ends.  
This is consistent with Van de Ven’s (2007) notion of engaged scholarship, whereby 
researchers collaborate with stakeholders to use research for achieving practical goals 
that are situationally constructed.  Popper (1972) writes that knowledge grows and is 
created by scientists who confront problems and attempt to solve them by re‐evaluating 
and updating existing theories.  Again, this notion of knowledge creation is driven by the 
situation‐at‐hand and the intellectual reactions to it, which is consistent with the 
practical nature of academic spin‐off companies. 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Evidence of knowledge creation 
  Throughout my study, I sought the verisimilitude of knowledge creation.  How do 
I know it when I see it?  Academic conference presentations and publications offer 
tangible evidence of the iterative cycle of questioning and answering, as knowledge is 
created and disseminated in these explicit, codified forms.  Yet the situational 
contingency of such dissemination is usually marked by a need for funds in support of a 
spin‐off company’s program of R&D.  Thus, these forms of knowledge dissemination 
follow careful negotiations of the scientific terrain in order to ensure dissemination 
through the highest quality channels.  Scientists looking to raise additional R&D funds 
and signal the credibility of their work will often seek publication in the “best” journals 
or deliver presentations at the “most prestigious” conferences. 
  Evidence of knowledge creation is also found in routines.  Various forms of 
scientific practice were evident throughout this study that represent the iterations 
within the context of creating knowledge.  Beta Health Services maintained an extensive 
student fellowship program that involved continuous engagement with groups of 
students on various research projects of strategic importance to the company’s 
knowledge base around human cognition.  Alpha Pharmaceuticals and Foxtrot 
Pharmaceuticals demonstrated various processes for developing compounds that would 
ultimately contribute to each company’s library of compounds to be developed as 
possible drug treatments.  Such routines would also include the sharing of information 
such as test results between labs, which would subsequently lead to new insights 
among those involved in such collaborative practice. 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 Coordination was another interesting factor in the process of knowledge 
creation.  In loosely coupled scientific practice that underlies virtual collaboration within 
some of my sample companies, coordination became the means by which order could 
be appropriated from disorder (Patriotta, 2003) and by which meaning could be 
constructed by connecting participants’ scattered, but related, insights.  Coordination 
can also be considered in relation to Latour’s (1999, 1987) concept of translation in 
which the interests of people working in similar but parallel trajectories are combined to 
form a single shared goal.     
  For example, in the case of Delta Pharmaceuticals, an investor’s suspension of 
funding of the company’s HIV drug development project nearly derailed the company 
because it halted the actual work that scientists were doing in their lab.  Consequently a 
coordinating entity became necessary in order to cultivate new interest in Delta’s 
project and attract funding to sustain it.  This coordinating entity, BioMedicine Services 
(BMS), successfully attracted funding, but the interest structure of the new funding 
source necessitated the participation of other scientists with specific expertise as a 
condition of funding the Delta project.  BMS organized a team of loosely coupled 
scientists and other drug development experts from around the world – who otherwise 
have no order among them – and coordinated their activities in an orderly way.  By 
coordinating this loosely coupled team and creating order among team members, BMS 
amplified the knowledge of these individuals within Delta’s organizational structure.   
  In writing about translation, Latour (1987) gives the example of a rich 
businessman who wishes to fund a pet project that enrols scientists in the search for the 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specific mental neurons for inductive and deductive reasoning.  Scientists are skeptical 
of this rich man’s goal, so they persuade the rich man to invest in their research.  But 
Latour writes that one way the two parties could reconcile is through a translation of 
interests.  “You cannot reach your goal straight away, but if you come my way, you 
would reach it faster, it would be a short cut...A little detour through their neurology is 
necessary for a few years before the neurons of induction and deduction, which he is 
aiming at, are evenetually discovered” (Latour, 1987, p. 111‐112).  This scenario mirrors 
Opal’s HIV drug development project.  The work of the original scientists was defunded, 
but their goal of developing their findings into an HIV treatment remained.  BMS 
shopped the project and the goal to a variety of investors, and the willing investor set 
parameters that necessitated a detour from the original founding scientific team to a 
new, loosely coupled project team that BMS would coordinate.  Thus, BMS translated 
the Opal project from one group of scientists to another group.  Given that investor 
funding for key R&D projects is an important aspect in the life of many academic spin‐
off companies, translation of research interests among stakeholders and the 
corresponding enrollment of researchers into projects is a realistic course of action in 
knowledge creation. 
  Coordination plays another role in the appropriation of order.  When unforseen 
circumstances (i.e. a loss of funding or issues with the efficacy of a drug or technology) 
disrupt a project, the integrity of existing work and the value of knowledge that has 
been created in the course of the project may be questioned or challenged.  Responses 
need to be orchestrated in the face of a shifting context, and knowledge about how to 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address these disruptions must be coordinated within the responsible social structure.  
Coordination offers another interesting area for future research on knowledge creation 
because it represents an increasingly important function, as distributed practice across 
globally dispersed networks consume a greater share of collaborative innovation efforts.  
Even if disruptions are an expected aspect in the course of a large‐scale project, they 
require increasingly complex responses when participants are globally dispersed.  
Coordination also represents an interesting area for future research about confronting 
unexpected disruptions to iterative cycles of knowledge creation and the organizational 
responses to those disruptions (see Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
 
Understanding academic spin‐off companies from the levels of projects and practice 
  One of the overarching insights stemming from this dissertation research 
concerns knowledge creation and levels of analysis.  In the course of research design, I 
considered several possible levels of analysis for this study.  I considered the university’s 
role and studying spin‐off companies from the perspective of the university and its 
technology transfer office.  I also considered an individual level of analysis and studying 
spin‐off companies from the level of the individual actors in the process.  Ultimately I 
chose to take the perspective of the spin‐off company and consider the ways in which 
commercialization and knowledge creation efforts are affected by its relationship with 
the academic community.  I selected the latter as my level of analysis because of its 
novelty and for the opportunity to study broader issues of academic research 
commercialization from an “outside‐in” perspective (academic research 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commercialization from the institutional perspective of the company, looking “in” 
toward the academic community).   
 
‘Projects’ as a level of analysis 
  After conducting this study and reflecting on the findings, I believe that future 
research about academic spin‐off companies (and possibly academic research 
commercialization as a meta‐level topic) should be approached from the level of the 
project.  This conclusion stems from a reconsideration of the “ideal” archetypes for 
knowledge creation. 
  The “project” level of analysis was one that I did not consider when designing my 
study and actually represents a novel approach to the study of academic research 
commercialization and possibly the broader study of entrepreneurial businesses 
(whether or not the businesses are academic in nature).  The grouping of the six 
companies in my sample into three archetypes enabled me to see a broader pattern of 
organization around projects.  The “virtual” companies in my sample as well as the 
“communities of practice” were organized around specific, long‐term, exploratory 
projects.  The “hierarchical” companies in my sample divided their projects into shorter‐
term knowledge exploitation as well as longer‐term knowledge exploration efforts.  
Hence, projects may offer a meaningful lens through which the social structure of 
knowledge creation may be observed, and organizational archetypes may be best 
understood. 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 In my original conceptual framework (Figure 2.1, p. 75), I argue that knowledge is 
created through recognition of limitations to existing knowledge and that the 
subsequent setting of goals and determination of strategies structures organized 
practice to achieve these stated goals.  An interesting characteristic of projects is that, 
by definition, they have goals that are meant to address something specific, which direct 
people’s work.  The tracking of the success of a project involves determining the extent 
to which it moves closer to addressing its stated goals.  Many of the companies in my 
sample were organized around single projects, which means that these companies live 
and die by their projects.  If a project changes hands or is de‐funded, the entire 
company may be consequently reorganized and reconfigured.   
  The organizational structure of many academic spin‐off companies is determined 
by the characteristics and scope of their respective projects.  In some cases, projects 
may remain constant, while the organizational structure of the academic spin‐off 
company varies over time.  This was the case with Charlie Medical Technologies and 
Delta Pharmaceuticals whose projects were sustained over time, while the constellation 
of people working on these projects reorganized and reconfigured.   
  In other cases, projects and the company associated with them may both remain 
constant.  This has been the case with Alpha Pharmaceuticals and Foxtrot 
Pharmaceuticals.  Many of the same core people have remained involved in each 
company’s respective projects over time, but some project collaborators have come and 
gone as project needs evolve.  With Alpha, the core project team has remained 
constant, but the locus of the project has shifted from the United States to Australia, 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shifting from one lab to another.  Additionally, various collaborators with the core 
community have participated and moved on.  For example, clinical trial stages have 
occurred at various research sites under the direction of various project collaborators.  
Upon completion of the work in these stages, the collaborators no longer need to 
actively participate in the company project. 
  The hierarchical companies in my sample – Beta Health Services and Echo 
Technology Solutions – are organized to exploit existing knowledge resources, but they 
balance this strategy by engaging in multiple exploratory projects to create new 
knowledge.  Beta engages in a variety of exploratory projects through its student 
fellowship program and through a variety of collaborative relationships with multiple 
academic partners.  Echo has recently engaged in projects to explore new applications 
of its existing technological platform.  In companies whose strategies are purely 
exploratory in nature, organizational structure follows the nature of these exploratory 
projects.  Yet in the case of these two hierarchical companies, exploratory knowledge 
creating projects flow from an organizational structure that is already defined by its 
knowledge exploitation strategy.  Thus, the company remains an appropriate level of 
analysis when dealing with hierarchical organizations, but projects provide a richer 
analytical perspective that enables a researcher of knowledge creation to further 
discern more meaningful distinctions among companies of varying structure, goals, and 
strategies. 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Reflections on the meaning of ‘practice’ 
  Projects also enable us to observe practices at an appropriate level of analysis 
because they reveal different patterns of knowledge creation.  Knowledge creation is 
embedded in practice.  That is, scientists and researchers with deep domain expertise 
and the interest and ability to stay abreast with existing knowledge and participate in 
critical discourse around their area of expertise are practicing their respective crafts and 
engaging with their respective professions.  This reflection on practice stems from a 
further consideration of the community of practice archetype in my initial framework 
and the meaning that can be applied to the broader understanding of the social 
structure of knowledge creation.   
  Communities of practice are social learning systems embedded within 
superordinate systems, which are constellations of these communities (Wenger, 2000).  
In the examples of Alpha Pharmaceuticals and Foxtrot Pharmaceuticals, core company 
scientists are organized as communities of practice focused on their respective drug 
development projects.  Yet these scientists belong to a variety of superordinate systems 
– including the larger organization of the University of the Southern Hemisphere and the 
organization of their respective academic departments.     Brown and Duguid (2001) 
suggest that those who study communities of practice should not lose sight of the 
meaning of practice.  Specifically, the knowledge that an individual constructs within an 
organization and which is concurrently amplified through organizational structure is 
expressed through the specific practice in which they engage.  For example, chemists at 
Foxtrot pharmaceuticals make compounds, and they subsequently transfer those 
 
 236 
compounds to medical scientists within the company project team who conduct further 
proof‐of‐concept studies in animal models.  Both the chemists and the medical 
researchers are engaged in practice, but the structure of the company connects the 
practices of these scientists and amplifies their efforts as collective knowledge that 
addresses the company’s goals.  Similarly, Beta Health Services engages students in an 
extensive fellowship program.  Students individually engage in the practice of research, 
but Beta collectively amplifies the work of these individual students as cumulative 
knowledge that contributes to the company’s larger efforts around human cognition. 
  Additionally, Duguid (2005) reminds us, practice occurs at various levels of 
interaction.  So while scientists at Alpha Pharmaceuticals and Foxtrot Pharmaceuticals 
practice in proximity to one another as members of close‐knit communities, scientists at 
Charlie Medical Technologies and Delta Pharmaceuticals practice as members of 
extended networks whose loosely coupled interactions are coordinated by project 
managers.    
  The original concept of a community of practice (Wenger, 2000; Wenger and 
Snyder, 2000; Lave and Wenger, 1991) is comprised of interactions among individuals in 
proximity to one another and collaboratively working on specific projects.  These 
individuals share common epistemic beliefs.  They self‐organize and self‐regulate 
around a “joint enterprise” based on shared competence; they establish norms and 
relationships of “mutuality”; and they produce a “shared repeortoire of communal 
resources” such as routines, artifacts, tools, etc. (Wenger, 2000, p. 229). 
 
 237 
  Duguid (2005) suggests that some shared practice occurs without close personal 
interaction.  He argues that networks of practice exist when loosely coupled individuals 
interact with one another in joint projects and tasks but otherwise do not ever meet.  
He gives the example of a student who is socialized into an academic discipline and who 
eventually practices that discipline but never personally interacts with many similar 
professionals who comprise his or her extended professional network. 
  Shared practices may occur across disciplinary boundaries.  An individual who is 
socialized into a specific discipline may develop expertise that is valuable to others 
engaged in projects that span disciplinary boundaries.  Wenger’s (2000) definition of a 
community of practice includes the concept of engaging in a joint enterprise, which may 
include interdisciplinary endeavours that seek these individuals.  Networks of practice 
may also involve the same level of shared interdisciplinary practices but whose 
members are not working in close proximity.   
  Academic spin‐off companies are organizations whose members practice their 
academic disciplines in contexts that prioritize applications to practical problems.  When 
organizing my data and looking for meaningful distinctions among the six companies in 
my sample, I arrived at three categories of organizational structure based on the 
coupling of organizational actors that differentiate among the nature of practice within 
these companies.  Thus, the distinctions among practices across the six sample 
companies and the extent to which these practices underlie company projects offer a 
lens through which to study academic spin‐off companies. 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Linking projects and practices in a revised conceptual framework 
  In this section I offer a revised conceptual framework (Figure 8.1).  This revision 
is based on the initial framework that I proposed in Chapter two (Figure 2.1), but it now 
incorporates projects and practices as elements in the knowledge creation process.  
Additional research on academic spin‐off companies – using projects as the level of 
analysis – could further refine this framework while offering updated conclusions about 
the nature of practices. 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Figure 8.1 – Revised conceptual framework 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 The labelling of organizational archetypes in the present study is a means of 
making meaningful distinctions among the companies in my sample.  However, these 
archetypes are fluid and appear to represent a snapshot view of the social structure of 
company projects and practices at a given period of time.  Archetypes are not 
deterministic.  Individuals do not set out to establish virtual companies or communities 
of practice.   
  For example, the two virtual companies in my sample – Charlie Medical 
Technologies and Delta Pharmaceuticals – did not originate as virtual companies.  Much 
like the community of practice companies, Charlie Medical Technologies originated as a 
self‐organized group of academic scientists who shared a passion for the development 
of an idea about the transplant of smooth muscle tissue (into a replacement sphincter 
for continence control).  Likewise, Delta Pharmaceuticals originated as a discovery in a 
university research lab, which evolved into an HIV drug development project that 
encompassed the entire lab.  The evolution from tight‐knit proximal groups of scientists 
to virtual companies came about as the project goals moved to drug device 
development that required a form of specialized practice that was not available within 
the founding teams.  In other words, these two companies evolved from tightly coupled 
communities of practice that could be coordinated within the lab environment to 
loosely coupled networks of practice that required coordination of geographically 
dispersed experts.   
  These study findings support an important revision of my conceptual framework.  
Academic spin‐off companies are comprised of one or multiple projects.  The clustering 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of specific tasks and corresponding practices of individuals underlie these projects.  The 
fluid nature of projects necessitates that practices concurrently evolve in order to adapt 
to the shifting needs and demands of projects as they advance toward achieving a 
company’s stated goal.  
  In my original conceptual framework, I propose that epistemological and 
institutional factors influence the organizational architecture of academic spin‐off 
companies.  Epistemological factors relate to partnering between a company and other 
individuals or organizations that offer requisite knowledge and expertise that support 
the goals and strategies of the company.  These factors coincide with a spin‐off 
company’s overall level of connectedness.  Institutional factors relate to ways in which a 
company builds credibility around its knowledge base and signals its legitimacy to 
stakeholders.  These factors correspond with the overall transparency of a spin‐off 
company’s knowledge base and its relationship to both the academic and commercial 
sectors.   
  The study of an academic spin‐off company from the level of projects 
necessitates a look at the ways in which epistemological and institutional factors impact 
the nature of projects.  For example, Beta Health Services routinely engages in a variety 
of research projects around human cognition, which reinforces the company’s expertise 
as a provider of cognition services and strengthens the applicability of its core cognitive 
test.  Some of these projects are field based in that researchers engage in studies of 
cognition in a particular sample population.  Field based projects often require 
collaboration with experts, which epistemologically diversify the project team.  Because 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academic credibility is important to Beta, projects are structured in order to provide 
researchers with opportunities to publish their findings.   
  Beta Health Services was a unique company within my sample in that it was the 
only company that extensively involved students.  Students broadened Beta’s skill set 
with epistemological diversity.  The company’s transparency gave students an 
opportunity to engage in projects and publish their findings.  In contrast, other 
companies were less willing or unwilling to involve student researchers.  Such 
unwillingness reflects commercial institutional factors around intellectual property 
protections.  When Delta Pharmaceuticals was initially founded, it was structured as a 
project within a single university research lab, which benefited from the intellectual 
diversity of students.  However the institutional constraints of intellectual property 
protections necessitated that students would have to embargo for one year any 
research publications stemming from their efforts on the project.  While Delta 
ultimately provided opportunities for students to participate in a project and publish, 
other companies (for example, Alpha Pharmaceuticals and Charlie Medical 
Technologies) largely disallow student participation because of concerns over 
intellectual property.  Such policies constrain the nature of projects by restricting 
participation by students and others who might otherwise add value through 
contributions of their practice.  Thus, a consideration of companies from the level of 
their projects provides a level of detail about specific constraints to practice that might 
not otherwise be evident. 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 The perspective of projects and practice offers opportunities for future research.  
Additional research could elaborate the propsed framework to the extent that 
epistemological and institutional factors affect the nature of practice and the evolution 
of projects that comprise academic spin‐off companies.  Future research could be 
designed such that it focuses on academic spin‐off companies that specifically operate 
multiple projects and study these companies from the perspective of these projects.  
Another possible opportunity is to study academic spin‐off companies that “failed” – 
meaning that the corporate entity ceased to operate or that corporate funding for 
projects was exhausted.  The projects behind such “failed” companies may reveal a 
different story about the nature of practice and the extent to which knowledge was 
created in the course of these projects.   
   
Academic research commercialization and life sciences research 
  A tangential group of conclusions that stems from this dissertation research 
clusters around the topic of academic research commercialization in the life sciences.  I 
elected to control my study by focusing on companies from a common industrial context 
– the life sciences.  Most of the six companies in my sample can be categorized as life 
sciences to the extent that they are engaged in drug development projects or medical 
device development projects.  One of my companies – Echo Technology Solutions – is 
not exclusively a life sciences company, but one of the core applications of the 
company’s technology is medical imaging.  The selection of these companies was 
designed to offer a balance of industry control with a sufficient level of variation in 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order to arrive at interesting conclusions.  Because of this concentration in the life 
sciences, my dissertation offers some potentially useful insights into issues facing the 
life sciences. 
  Pisano (2010, 2006) has argued that the life sciences represent a novel 
organizational form of “science business” as characterized by the strategic challenges of 
exploration and exploitation (March, 1991).  He contrasts traditional high‐tech 
industries with the life sciences in a notable way.  While most high‐tech industries and 
their firms are organized to exploit existing knowledge created by scientists applying 
that knowledge to new technologies, life sciences firms usually face an exploration 
challenge in that the basic scientific knowledge that offers hope for addressing large‐
scale challenges is often underdeveloped and requires extensive research before it can 
be developed and exploited as new technology, drugs, solutions, etc.  Therefore, many 
life sciences companies remain unprofitable and cash‐flow negative, which raises 
fundamental questions about the viability of the industry as a whole.   
  My dissertation addresses elements of organizational variation among academic 
spin‐off companies in the life sciences, but the study’s emphasis on knowledge creation 
particularly offers some fresh insights that address some of Pisano’s key issues with the 
life sciences industry.  In this section, I use Pisano’s arguments to frame some reflections 
about academic research commercialization and collaborative innovation in general.  
Also in these sub‐sections, I will reflect about ways in which university technology 
transfer efforts can be redirected in order to address these issues. 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Evaluating the success of academic spin‐off companies 
  One of the questions that lingered in my mind throughout the course of my 
study was, how do I evaluate the success of these academic spin‐off companies?  Most 
of the companies in my sample – at the time of the study – were unprofitable.  Profit is 
an important metric for determining the success of companies, but it is not the only 
metric.  Additionally, expectations for profitability in early stage, entrepreneurial 
companies, like those in my sample, are low.  This is an especially problematic matter in 
the life sciences industry.  Nevertheless, the companies in my sample demonstrated the 
ability to attract investor dollars in support of their respective projects.  I devoted 
considerable attention throughout this dissertation to the concept of legitimacy, and I 
argued that establishing and signalling legitimacy is an important element of the success 
of academic spin‐off companies.  That is academic credibility is an important factor in 
determining the value of a promising, but unprofitable, program of research and 
development that demonstrates the potential for a breakthrough innovation. 
  Academic research and business performance are dominated by two separate 
criteria for success, as Pisano (2010) notes, “In science, score is kept by peer review and 
grant givers, and measured ultimately by reputation; in business, score is kept by capital 
markets and measured by profitability” (p. 470).  This is consistent with the inter‐
institutional dynamic that my dissertation research uncovered with respect to 
competing factors of legitimacy.  Pisano offers three directions for achieving success in 
the life sciences industry – managing risk and rewarding risk taking; integrating the skills 
and capabilities that reside in a range of disciplines and functions; and advancing critical 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knowledge at the organizational and industry levels.  I will address these three 
directions. 
 
Managing risk 
  One of the issues of the life sciences industry that Pisano raises is that most 
companies are islands of specialized expertise that monopolize knowledge as 
intellectual property.  Conventional wisdom suggests that the ownership of intellectual 
property is a hedge against the risk of a project with an uncertain future because it 
represents exclusive ownership rights to knowledge that could be sold or licensed for 
revenue. 
  The protection of knowledge as intellectual property was a theme among the 
companies in my sample.  This theme expressed itself in multiple ways.  First, some 
companies disseminate few, if any, research findings.  Second, some companies 
embargo research findings for a fixed period of time until appropriate intellectual 
property protections are secured.  Third, some companies are selective about 
disseminating research findings by only disseminating “significant” results that would 
attract the attention of high calibre research journals.  Many companies did recognize 
that dissemination of knowledge was beneficial both as a way to establish credibility 
and overall legitimacy as well as a way to market their businesses.  Of course marketing 
strategy varies.  For a company with a largely exploratory strategy, marketing is a 
mechanism for generating additional investment dollars.  For a company with an 
exploitation strategy, marketing is a mechanism for attracting customers. 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 My research suggests that the recognition of the importance of academic 
legitimacy by a spin‐off company will balance against overly restrictive intellectual 
property concerns and loosen knowledge flow by enabling more instances of research 
dissemination.  Some organizations are using other solutions to address this issue.  The 
New York Times recently (Kolata, 2010, August 12) reported about the Alzheimer’s 
Disease Neuroimaging Institute (ADNI).  ADNI is an example of an organization that 
plays the role of knowledge broker with the overarching goal of accelerating research 
into the root causes of Alzheimer’s disease by expanding access to shared knowledge 
while addressing ways to manage intellectual property protections among participants 
involved in Alzheimer’s research.   
  Interestingly, this model of knowledge brokerage may be a role universities can 
more effectively play.  University technology transfer is often rooted in “doing what is 
best for the technology,” which sometimes leads to a solution chasing a problem in a 
“garbage can” sort of way (see Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972).  By shifting the focus 
from the solution to the problem, or challenge, technology transfer as a profession can 
assimilate and organize knowledge from the perspective of alignment between 
problems and solutions.  Technology transfer contributes little to the bottom lines of 
many universities, so this refocus would not necessarily disrupt an otherwise attractive 
university operation and may instead generate more opportunities for raising research 
dollars.   
  I have argued that academic research commercialization efforts lead to 
knowledge creation by challenging, critiquing, and updating existing knowledge. 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Ultimately, the generative qualities of knowledge creation – rather than the 
transactional qualities of technology transfer – may be a more appropriate focus for the 
broader category of academic research commercialization.  By de‐emphasizing 
technology transfer and the associated issues of intellectual property and refocusing on 
knowledge creation, the risk criteria for academic spin‐off companies change.  Instead 
of simply asking, “How can we protect our intellectual property?” academic spin‐off 
companies might want to consider, “How can we gain access to more relevant 
knowledge and what are the drawbacks to not participating in more open flows of 
knowledge?” 
 
Integrating skills and capabilities 
  Pisano argues that new drug R&D projects are not easily broken into pieces.  The 
exploratory and ambiguous nature of projects necessitates flexibility with respect to 
project timelines, involvement by experts of diverse disciplinary backgrounds, and 
coordination of knowledge flow.   
  Life sciences R&D is not easily broken into pieces because it is a generative 
process.  Interdisciplinary work requires a certain level of knowledge transparency, 
which may compete with the need to protect knowledge as intellectual property.  But 
knowledge transparency and protection can be balanced, and interdisciplinary expertise 
can be managed by rethinking the life sciences through various models of collaborative 
innovation.  Gloor and Cooper (2007) write about “swarm activity” within collaborative 
innovation networks (or COIN’s) in which loosely coupled participants focus on a shared 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problem for which they all share a passion.  They argue that in such networks, value is 
realized and revenue is generated through unexpected opportunities rather than 
through the strict protection of intellectual property.   
  Coordination of such network participants remains a challenge.  Additionally, 
anecdotal evidence from discussions with venture capital professionals during the 
course of my research suggests that such “open source” methods of collaboration are 
simply not feasible in the life sciences as long as intellectual property protection remains 
a core concern.  Like the ADNI example and its design to accelerate knowledge creation 
around Alzheimer’s disease while recognizing the need to address intellectual property 
concerns, future models of collaborative innovation will require coordination among 
competing objectives. 
  The idea market approach is one that introduces new levels of coordination.  In 
an idea market, a third party coordinates “seekers” and “solvers” of complex but 
practical challenges.  A well known idea market is InnoCentive that scientists from Eli 
Lily founded in 1998, and it represents a model of brokerage of knowledge by a 
coordinating third party (see Tapscott and Williams, 2007). 
  In some ways, academic spin‐off companies (especially those with a virtual 
structure) are idea market microcosms in which the project is a “seeker,” and its 
managers coordinate among loosely coupled “solvers.”  Again, this reveals further 
opportunities for the practice of university technology transfer to operate on an idea 
market model.  Because of a technology transfer office’s position at the center of 
multiple campus knowledge networks, an idea market model could mean that it 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connects university deep domain experts to industry in order to address practical 
challenges.  Additionally, it could encourage the launching of new spin‐off companies 
that are organized as interdisciplinary communities of “solvers” within the broader idea 
market space. 
  Pisano also argues that a lack of tacit knowledge transfer and mutual learning 
over extended periods of time are shortcomings of the current life sciences industry 
structure.  One possible direction for future research that addresses these issues is the 
role of trust within networks of loosely coupled innovation.  When designing my study, I 
was aware of the role that trust plays in knowledge transfer over extended periods of 
time and in relationships between parties who engage in collaborative behaviour.  Trust 
is an interesting variable because it is often associated with close network connections 
and strong ties.  Such social structure is often necessary for mutual learning over time, 
but the redundancies of such structures also can limit the level of novel insight that is 
often required to spark breakthrough ideas.  Additionally, a deeper understanding of 
trust may shed new insight on the roots of intellectual property concerns in order to 
minimize the consequences of such concerns. 
  Trust in a highly embedded network of strong ties facilitates the sharing of tacit 
knowledge over longer periods of time (Andersson, Holm, and Johanson, 2007; 
Dhanaraj, et al., 2004; Reagans and McEvily, 2003).  Chen and Chang (2004) argue that 
such networks are associated with incremental innovation because the familiarity of the 
relationship and its routines foster the sharing of existing information.  Granovetter 
(2005) notes, “Because our close friends tend to move in the same circles that we do, 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the information they receive overlaps considerably with what we already know” (p. 34).  
This overlap is one of the mechanisms for the long‐term transfer of tacit knowledge. 
  The challenge for the life sciences will be to support and sustain tight 
communities of practitioners who work together over extended periods of time on 
specific projects and develop and refine their collective knowledge.  Yet coordinating 
entities – either idea markets, university technology transfer offices, or project 
managers – will have the responsibility for integrating these smaller communities into 
the broader industrial milieu.  In other words, coordination within this industry will 
involve coordination among individuals and groups and connecting them to projects 
across network space.   
 
Advancing critical knowledge at the organizational and industry levels 
  Another issue that Pisano notes is the challenge of advancing the flow of projects 
among companies in a cycle of continuous refinement.  I have argued that a study of 
academic spin‐off companies presents some interesting “level of analysis” challenges 
and that one way to refocus this area of research is to shift the focus from the company 
to the project.  However, I should qualify this statement by separating company 
exploration strategies from exploitation strategies.   
  For companies whose strategies are mostly exploratory in nature, projects 
become the primary unit of analysis because it is projects that are interesting to 
investors.  As my research demonstrates, projects evolve over time as the knowledge 
that is created achieves or fails to achieve specific milestones.  Projects migrate among 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people engaged in practice, and the organizational architecture connecting these people 
evolves to meet the demands of the project.  A project can move among different 
groups of people, and the “company” that owns the project acts as a coordinating 
mechanism that engages in project management, organization and assimilation of 
knowledge resources, and various “hand‐offs” among participants engaged in practice 
(see Sharma, 2010; Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeld, 2005 for related insights about 
organizing and “hand‐offs”).   
  This concept of inter‐organizational hand‐offs in knowledge‐intensive 
endeavours represents a growing area of research.  University technology transfer 
offices have an opportunity to engage in this coordination and hand‐off role because of 
their position in network space that enables the connection of ideas and people – 
particularly in the context of university‐industry networks – as well as because of their 
sensegiving role and their ability to communicate intelligibly across boundaries.   
  For academic spin‐off companies engaged in the exploitation of existing 
knowledge, which are in a position to generate revenue from their knowledge, the 
company remains an appropriate level of analysis.  The two companies in my sample 
that were organized to exploit existing knowledge resources were both hierarchies with 
clear divisions of labour and with clear boundaries from the university.  Markets 
regulate these companies because they generate revenues and cash flows, the value of 
which is determined based on the expectation of future cash flows. 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Concluding remarks 
  The opportunities for radical innovation in the life sciences are extraordinary.  
Yet achieving such levels of breakthrough innovation will require a re‐imagination of the 
industry’s structure, norms, and practices.  Companies in the life sciences are a unique 
form of organization that often cross the institutional boundary between the academic 
and industrial‐commercial sectors.  My study of academic spin‐off companies in the life 
sciences underscores this characteristic.  One way to begin re‐imagining the industrial 
order of the life sciences is to shift the level of analysis from that of the company to that 
of the project.  Individual companies are often organized around one or a few key 
exploratory projects, yet their commercial structures often adhere to archetypes in 
other high technology industries where exploration and exploitation of knowledge 
resources is more evenly balanced.   
  A shift in focus from companies to projects more appropriately aligns with the 
knowledge creation goals of academic spin‐off companies.  A focus on projects can 
further reinvigorate university technology transfer efforts by redirecting practices to a 
coordination role that assimilates university knowledge resources as well as external 
individuals and groups with specific expertise and aligns them with seekers of solutions 
to practical challenges.   
 
Other insights and directions for future research 
  One does not reach this point in the dissertation process and not reflect on 
unexpected and interesting insights (sometimes minor in the scope of the broader 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dissertation) and how those insights can catalyze future research.  These insights do not 
necessarily flow from my research questions but instead stem from my genuine desire 
to learn from my respondents and from the fieldwork process in general. 
 
The existential ‘so what?’ 
  A nagging question that lingered in the background of this dissertation was why 
do academic scientists launch their own ventures?  A related question was why should 
we care?  These are the existential questions that find their place at the completion of a 
dissertation when pondering the meaning of the whole experience.  The answers to 
these questions could fill another dissertation or research study.  Given that this 
represents an opportunity for further study, I offer these reflections in the hope of 
jumpstarting future conversations with others.  Nevertheless, my current study offers 
some insight into these broader questions.   
  In their individual and seemingly small ways, each of the scientists interviewed 
for this study wanted to make the world a better place and alleviate someone’s 
suffering.  The scientists battling diseases and looking to develop drug treatments from 
their research obviously reflect this.  The people of Echo started with an interest in the 
clearing of land mines out of general concern for the thousands of innocent people 
killed annually around the world from the remnants of war.  Beta’s founders recognized 
that better forms of cognitive testing as an aspect of major pharmaceutical clinical trials 
could improve the overall success of trials and help accelerate the introduction of new 
drug treatments.  Each scientist had a passion for an idea, possessed the requisite 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academic training for pursuing the idea, and ultimately recognized the value of 
commercial mechanisms for bringing the ideas to fruition.   
  Each of the scientists in this study held a variety of academic affiliations when 
they initially pursued their respective ventures.  Eight of the scientists were university 
faculty members.  One was a doctoral student.  One held a non‐faculty research 
position.  One was a post‐doctoral fellow.  A common denominator across their 
motivations for commercialization was the flexibility that a commercial environment 
provided for the pursuit of their ideas.  In many cases, the access to commercial funding 
and a lack of university funding was the source of flexibility.  In some cases, the goals 
and the means of achieving them deviated from accepted norms of academic work, and 
commercial space granted them flexibility to pursue their goals.   
  Despite these constraints, every company maintained some tie to the academic 
community in an effort to advance their goals.  This suggests that the organization of an 
academic spin‐off company provides its founders with the ‘best of both worlds’ in 
pursuit of their goals.  The academic origins and connections to academic science 
distinguish these ventures from non‐academically‐based ventures and provide them 
access to desired levels of knowledge resources – whether the access is in the forms of 
major collaborations or minor consultation with colleagues.  Yet by maintaining some 
degree of separation from the social structure of the academic environment, the 
scientists were able to avoid some of the cultural, fiscal, and bureaucratic constraints of 
pursuing their respective goals. 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 Academic spin‐off companies lie at the institutional boundary between the 
commercial marketplace and academic community.  In simple terms, this means that an 
academically‐based venture seeks resources from both worlds in pursuit of its goals and, 
consequently, both worlds constrain these ventures with sometimes conflicting 
standards of practice.  The academic community provides these companies with access 
to scientific expertise, research infrastructure, and other knowledge resources.  The 
commercial marketplace provides these companies with money, access to business 
expertise, and access to customers and users.  Conflict can arise, for example, when 
available money is not available for certain areas of research, or business advice around 
intellectual protections conflicts with academic practice of disseminating research 
findings.   
  Conflict and collaboration between agents of multiple institutions is not new and 
not limited to university‐industry relations.  Brugmann and Prahalad (2007) write about 
opportunities and tensions between large corporations and non‐government 
organizations (NGO’s) that have similar goals of creating value and improving the lives of 
people in the developing world.  The authors describe the ways in which the interests 
and capabilities of corporations and NGO’s can converge to achieve mutual goals but 
that such efforts require a redefinition of social contracts that govern their 
relationships.   
  Similar thinking around the convergence of multi‐institutional collaboration and 
mutually shared goals can influence the future direction of academic research 
commercialization and academic entrepreneurship.  This study demonstrates the ways 
 
 257 
in which academic scientists pursue commercialization as a mechanism for advancing 
their goals of putting their research into practice and making the world an incrementally 
better place.  It also demonstrates that the inter‐institutional differences between 
business and higher education complicate the pursuit of these goals.  Note the contrast 
in the following quotes and how it illustrates these differences.  The first is a quote from 
an academic scientist.  The second is from an Australian venture capital professional. 
So various companies I’ve started, I’ve had very much the same intention, which 
is just to accelerate the translational part of the research from bench side to 
bedside.  I train all my people here when they think about these things, I 
encourage this thinking of translational science and starting companies if you 
don’t want to wait for people to pick up what you’re doing or if you want to 
ensure it, start a company.  But I tell them one thing, I say, ‘Don’t do it for the 
money.  Don’t let profit be your intention or you will fail.  You have to keep your 
intentions pure.  It has to be to help people or you will fail’ (Respondent #17). 
 
I think we, where we come from on that is we’re not philanthropic outfit looking 
to spread the greater good, having said that pretty much everyone on the team 
has spent significant time overseas and came back to Australia with a real 
interest in making the industry, so the venture industry but also the biotech 
industry succeed in Australia.  We recognize that Australia has excellent basic 
research, has excellent clinical science, doesn’t have a lot of entrepreneurial 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skills to drag technologies out of early stage at universities and be successful 
(Respondent #7). 
The academic scientist recognizes that academic entrepreneurs should not pursue their 
efforts for the money alone.  The venture capitalist is unapologetic about the profit 
motivation.  These sentiments are not necessarily surprising, but they do hint at a point 
of convergence – that a lot of good ideas stem from university research, which require 
collaborative efforts for developing. 
  The consequence is the need for a renewed social contract between the 
academic and commercial world.  This dissertation does not have every answer for re‐
writing the social contract, but its findings can drive discussions around it.  It starts with 
the mutual recognition that universities are the centers of collaborative networks of 
researchers with good ideas with potential real‐world benefits.  It follows with an 
understanding of the legitimacy of ideas and the differences in the ways in which the 
academic community and the commercial sector accept the legitimacy of such ideas.  It 
also follows with an understanding that knowledge is assimilated and created in order 
to achieve very specific goals that have practical outcomes, which coincides with Boyer’s 
(1990) definition of the scholarship of application.  Thus, higher education’s evolving 
social contract and its impact on the nature of academic research commercialization 
remains a frontier in the scholarship of higher education and public policy. 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Scientific passions and the ‘soul work’ of academics 
  One possible direction for future research is the development of a better 
understanding of the motivations for one’s pursuit of academic commercialization from 
the perspective of their passions.  As argued in this chapter, the scientists interviewed 
for this study were relatively value driven in their personal outlooks and wanted to 
make the world a better place through the practical goals that their respective ventures 
sought to address.  An academic scientist could pursue their value driven intellectual 
passions through the university setting, but practical funding constraints may 
necessitate the commercialization of their efforts in order to raise money.  This may 
lead to reluctant academic entrepreneurs.  Yet some scientists may have an 
entrepreneurial drive to separate themselves from the university and launch their own 
companies out of a desire to control their work.  Two scientists in my study – one each 
from Alpha and Foxtrot – seemed to have this natural entrepreneurial drive, as 
identified by other respondents.  These individuals were company champions who 
seemed equally comfortable in both academic and business settings.  One of these two 
scientists was a serial entrepreneur and was involved in other academic ventures that 
were not part of this study. 
  One possible motivator of academic entrepreneurship is the desire for scientists 
to distance themselves from that which they are most familiar in order to arouse their 
creative energy.  This dissertation study shows evidence of many forms of 
interdisciplinary collaboration, and many of the respondents discussed its increasing 
prevalence within academic science.  Collaboration with other scientists across 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disciplines is one way to defamiliarize oneself from one’s intellectual biases, arouse 
creativity, and create new knowledge.  As Lokke (1982) noted in a piece about sublime 
aesthetics, “Familiarity breeds contempt; it is the unknown which excites admiration 
and passion” (p. 422).  To that end, entrepreneurial activities further throw people into 
unfamiliar territory, which forces them to act with a certain degree of creative response.  
An academic scientist who spends an entire career in the university environment may 
revel in the excitement of launching a new venture that allows him or her to further 
develop their ideas and renew their passions.  Universities are heavily institutionalized 
environments, which may stimulate entrepreneurship as a way to escape the grip of 
seemingly inflexible norms of undesirable teaching loads, tenure review policies, 
disciplinary dogmatism, and publication pressures. 
  Existing research on creativity and workplace passion may influence future study 
on the motivations behind academic entrepreneurship.  If people’s work lives are 
balanced with their personal goals and connected to the efforts in support of a greater 
good, then organizational life blurs from life in general and is driven by self‐motivation 
and feelings of satisfaction (Friedman, 2008; Amabile and Kramer, 2007; Amabile, 
Barsade, Mueller, and Staw, 2005).  This creates a state in which people are energized to 
devote their full intellect and energy to meaningful work, which is a necessary catalyst 
for creativity.  Creating knowledge and solving challenging and practical problems 
rewards people who are dedicated to pursuing work passions (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).  
People who follow their passions at work can achieve happiness and become effective 
value creators for their organizations and their stakeholders (Thakor, 2000). 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 Universities are environments that nurture intellectual freedom and allow for 
people to pursue meaningful work.  If the institutional constraints of the academic 
environment prohibit scientists from pursuing meaningful work, then launching their 
own venture may provide them with space from which to renew this meaning.  In my 
study, many scientists maintained a blurred boundary between academic work and 
work that related to their companies.  This has interesting implications in that the 
maintenance of separate – but sometimes blurred – spheres of work life provide 
scientists with an adequate level of freedom to pursue their independent goals through 
their companies while maintaining a connection to a university environment that also 
nurtures their sense of meaningful work.   
  Alternatively, academic entrepreneurship in the form of an academic spin‐off 
company may also embody a more deliberate desire to work as an academic 
practitioner within extended networks of other practitioners while abandoning or 
distancing from the rigidites of departmental or school‐based academic organization.  
Instead of relying on academic disciplines, departments, and schools to define the 
practice that one does, an academic spin‐off company may in fact represent another 
area in the taxonomy of academic organization.  In this case, the differentiating factor is 
that a company is a community of academic scientists with connections to other 
academic scientists, but it is separate from formal academic organization.  Mirvis (1997) 
describes the phenomenon of soul work and argues that companies are increasingly 
organizing as communities that nurture collective values and goals that are achieved 
through the intrinsic motivation of doing good.  From my sample, Beta and Echo 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represent this notion to the extent that they are organizationally separate from 
university organization, but their people maintain ties to the academic community while 
pursuing work that is meaningful to them.  In particular, Beta maintains many academic 
ties and organizes its routines to mirror those of a university environment, but the 
company is notably separate from any university. 
  Academic entrepreneurship is an outgrowth of individual passions, creativity, 
and the desire to continuously find meaning at work.  The academic community 
nurtures these actions by virtue of the autonomy and intellectual freedom it grants to 
academic professionals.  Academic entrepreneurship extends these characteristics by 
giving academic professionals the added flexibility and creative stimulation to further 
pursue their goals.  Future research on academic entrepreneurship could approach the 
subject from the perspective of individual creativity, workplace meaning, and the 
general field of positive organizational scholarship. 
 
The geography of innovation 
  Early in my research design process, I explored some aspects of economic 
geography and the geography of innovation.  As an American‐based researcher who 
conducted fieldwork in Australia, the implications of such a geographic scope enabled 
me to reflect on macro‐level collaborative work patterns across vast distances.  Yet the 
qualitative nature of my study also enabled me to visit individual workplaces and reflect 
on the micro‐level elements of workspace.  In general, I came away with some 
reflections about place and space as it relates to collaborative innovation.  A ripe area of 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future research could examine the physical pathways that people build to bridge 
geographic and social distance for the purpose of increasing collaboration. 
  The geography of universities and clusters of academic spin‐off companies are 
interesting concepts as they relate to the situation of people and organizations relative 
to each other at local and extra‐local levels.  Because academic spin‐off companies are 
social structures with different forms of organization, geography matters to the extent 
that it supports or hinders the inter‐personal interaction within those structures.  
Existing research indicates that close, personal, and physical interaction yields rich tacit 
knowledge transfer, yet distant interaction yields access to otherwise unavailable but 
novel information.  Therefore, geographic elements of collaborative relationships 
influence the mix of social interactions that sustain the flow of knowledge.  The 
proximity between a spin‐off company and a university matters to the extent that the 
local university is integral to the social structure and knowledge needs of the company.  
A local university can be integral, but the extra‐local academic community can also be 
important.  This study has demonstrated the ways in which knowledge can be 
assimilated across vast geographic distances and integrated into the rhythm of an 
organization.  Future research could isolate the geography variable and focus on 
academic enterprises that are not clustered in close proximity to universities in order to 
better understand the mechanisms that drive their locations and their assimilations of 
knowledge.   
  On a practical level, geography and place remain important variables as it related 
to the building of incubators or other research parks in the vicinity of universities.  Many 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universities peg their efforts on re‐creating ‘Silicon Valley” effect, but many of these 
efforts fall short because these variables must be considered in the greater context of 
social structures and patterns of behaviour. 
  Another interesting angle that warrants future research is the physical 
environment – or the architectural space – in which work is conducted.  In my study, I 
encountered the Veritas centre (pseudonym) at the University of the Southern 
Hemisphere, which offers interesting insight into the importance of both architectural 
design and inter‐disciplinary collaboration as factors for knowledge creation.  Veritas 
houses scientists of various disciplinary backgrounds.  It is a catalyst for the spanning of 
disciplines and schools of thought in anticipation of creating new ones.  The open 
architectural design of the institute, with its emphasis on encouraging collaboration, 
appeared to impact the origin of Foxtrot and the subsequent collaborations of its 
scientists.  The design appeared to matter to the formation of a community of practice.  
Interestingly, space did not seem to matter as much to companies such as Charlie 
Medical Technologies and Delta that were predominantly organized as virtual 
companies.  While it is likely that individual workplaces of the various members of these 
networks or virtual organizations are important, they likely do not matter if interaction 
among members is not geographically localized.  These are merely speculative 
suggestions beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Yet the variables of macro‐level place 
and micro‐level space will likely be of interest to scholars wishing to pursue more 
specific research into the construction of research incubators or science parks in an 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effort to exploit academic research for the purposes of university‐fueled innovation and 
growth. 
  In summary, people create knowledge, and they organize themselves in order to 
assimilate one another’s intelligence.  Physical space and geographic place affect the 
dynamics of human interaction, which affect organizing for knowledge creation.  Future 
research on academic spin‐off companies could explore these dynamics of space and 
place and the extent to which it impacts location in proximity to universities and other 
collaborative partners as well as the collaborative communication patterns among 
scientists within the social structure of a company. 
 
Concluding remarks about the future of this research 
  Countless other opportunities exist for future research in the areas of academic 
research commercialization and spin‐off companies.  However there is a limit to what 
one can explore in a single dissertation.  It is with this that I bring my dissertation to a 
well‐deserved conclusion.  On a personal level, I hope that future conversations around 
this topic stem from the perspective of collaborative innovation.  Collaboration and 
innovation are often used together in discussions about the ways in which people strive 
to make the world a better place – both incrementally or in great stride – by collectively 
working in a shared manner.  In the end, this is what my dissertation is really about.  I 
learned much about life and scientific discovery during the course of this research.  I 
applaud the many scientists who I met during the course of this project, and I am deeply 
grateful for the work that they do.  It is my hope that this dissertation adds some fresh 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insight and meaning into the social world that underlies the process of disciplined 
discovery, and I hope that it inspires others to re‐imagine new trajectories for their work 
and how it impacts the world that we share. 
 
 
Peter A. Bacevice 
Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA 
September 2010 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